A history of American political theories

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A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL THEORIES

j2^^^

A HIST#RY

OF

AMERICAN POLITICAL
THEORIES

BY

CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WeiD gorft

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1926

Ati rights reserved

Copyright, 1903,
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY,

Set up and electrotyped. Published February, 1903

3Co
PROFESSOR WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING

-MY TEACHER AND GUIDE IN THE STUDY

OF POLITICAL THEORIES

THIS VOLUME IS GRATEFULLY DEDICATED

PREFACE

The development of American political theories
has received surprisingly little attention from stu-
dents of American history. Even the political
ideas of the Revolutionary fathers and the tenets
of such important schools as those represented by
Jefferson and Adams have not been carefully ana-
lyzed or put in their proper perspective. The
political theory of the controversies over slavery
and the nature of the Union has generally been
presented from the partisan point of view, while
recent tendencies in political thought have received
no adequate notice.

In explanation of this fact, it might be said that
until very recent times but little interest has been
manifested in systematic politics. But while it is
true that Americans have never developed systems
of politics after the philosophic fashion of the
Germans, there has been no dearth of political
theory from the days of the Puritans to the present
time. Seldom worked out by political scientists
or philosophers, American political ideas have
generally taken shape in connection with some
great question of national policy which has seemed

vili PREFACE

to require a broad theoretical basis for either con-
demnation or approval. Conspicuous examples
of this are found in the discussion over the Revo-
lution, over slavery and secession. These political
theories have played an important part in our
national life, and are closely woven into the fabric
of American history. Of particular significance
are they in view of the fact that they represent
the philosophy under which has been developed
the mightiest democracy of modern times, or of
any time.

It is, then, the purpose of this work to present
a description and analysis of the characteristic
types of political theory that have from time to
time been dominant in American political life.
An effort has been made throughout to discuss
these theories in their relation to the peculiar con-
ditions under which they were developed, and to
keep in sight the intimate connection between the
philosophy and the facts that condition it. Like
all other poUtical theory, American political ideas
are of Uttle importance aside from the great his-
torical movements of which they are an organic
part.

In the preparation of this volume, use has been
made of several articles already published else-
where. "Paine's Political Theory" appeared in
The Political Science Quarterly for September,
1899, and "The Political Theory of Jefferson"
in the same magazine for March, 1902. "The

PREFACE IX

Political Theory of Calhoun " was printed in The
American Jotirnal of Sociology iox Mzj, 1902; and
the chapter on pohtical theory in relation to the
nature of the Union is an expansion of Chapter
IX in my monograph on " The History of the
Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau " (in Co-
lumbia University Series in History, Economics,
and PubHc Law, Vol. XH, No. 4, 1900).

This study is the outgrowth of investigations
begun in the Seminar on American Pohtical Phi-
losophy given by Professor Dunning in Columbia
University, 1 896-1 897; and the writer wishes to
acknowledge his deep sense of obhgation for the
inspiration then given and for subsequent encour-
agement and assistance in the prosecution of this
work. Acknowledgment is also due to Professor
Judson, Professor Jameson, and Professor Freund
of The University of Chicago, to Professor Hart of
Harvard, Professor Willoughby of Johns Hopkins,
Professor Macdonald of Brown, and others who
have kindly read parts of the manuscript and
offered invaluable suggestions.

September, 1902.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
The Political Theory of the Colonial Period

PAGI

1. Introductory considerations i

2. Basis of the Puritan System 2

3. Theocratic elements in Puritanism . . . j

4. The theory of the relation between church and state 7

15
23
26
27
32
36

5. Democratic elements in Puritanism

6. Puritan idea of liberty and equality

7. Conclusion as to the Puritans

8. Political ideas of the Quakers

9. The rise of democratic sentiment in the colonies
10. Summary

CHAPTER II

The Political Theory of the Revolutionary
Period

1 . Introduction — Sources of information — Historical

considerations — Constitutional theory . . 38

2. Fundamental principles of the Revolution — Natural

rights — The social contract — ■ Popular sover-
eignty — The right of revolution — The purpose
of government ....... 46

3. Typical Loyalist theory 63

4. Constructive theory of the Patriots :

Monarchy and aristocracy — Doctrine of dele-
gated powers and its application ... 69
(i) Weak government; (2) Separation of
powers ; (3) Short term of office . . ^^

Xll

CONTENTS

Theory and practice as to suffrage

Qualifications for office

Church and state
Source of Patriot ideas .
Conclusions

PAGa

84

8S
86
88
94

CHAPTER III
The Reactionary Movement

1. Historical considerations . . . . .

2. The Constitutional Convention and the Constitution

3. The theory of the Federalist :

General considerations
Democracy and territorial area .
Forms of government
The division of governmental powers
The legislature — The executive —
ciary .....
Guaranties of liberty .
Conclusions

4. The theory of John Adams :

Distrust of democracy
Theory of aristocracy .
Balance of powers

5. Summary

The

judi-

96

99

103
106
107

109
116
119

125

130

137
141

CHAPTER IV

The Jeffersonian Democracy

1 . Characteristics of the radical movement .

2. Jefferson and natural rights .

3. Means of perpetuating the social contract :

(i) Revolution

(2) Periodical revision of constitutions

143

147

149
150

CONTENTS

XIU

4. Attitude toward monarchy

5. Attitude toward aristocracy .

6. Analysis of JefFersonian democracy

7. Comparison between Adams and Jeflferson

8. Sources of Jeiferson's tlieory .

9. Conclusions

10. Summary of the epoch ....

PAGE

IS3
1 54
157
161
167
171
173

CHAPTER V
The Jacksonian Democracy

1. Introductory considerations ....

2. The development of the executive power

In the national government

In the states ......

3. The spoils system and rotation in office .

4. Abolition of property qualifications for office-holding

and suffrage

5. Religious liberty

6. Democratization of the judiciary .

7. Summary of political changes

8. Reactionary tendencies in political theory

176

178
178
183
184

188

193
197
199
200

CHAPTER VI

The Political Theory of the Slavery
Controversy

Introduction 203

The Anti-slavery Theory

1 . The theory of the radical abolitionists . . . 206

2. The philosophic argument 217

3. Lincoln's argument 221

4. Conclusion 226

XIV CONTENTS

The Pro-slavery Argument

1. Introduction 227

2. Theory of inequality ...... 229

3. Theory of natural rights 231

4. Concept of liberty . 234

5. Relation between superior and inferior races . . 236

6. Slavery and democracy ...... 240

7. Conclusions ........ 246

General conclusions on the slavery controversy . . 248

CHAPTER VII

Political Theory in Relation to the Nature

OF THE Union

Introduction 352

1. The compromise theory . . . . -253

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution . 257

Down to 1830 258

Madison's theory of the genesis of the Union . 259

2. The state-sovereignty theory 265

Tucker's contract theory 266

Calhoun's theory of nullification .... 268

The theory of secession 278

3. The Nationalist theory 284

Webster's theory 284

The later Nationalists 290

Burgess's theory 299

4. Summary of the arguments 302

CHAPTER VIII

Recent Tendencies

1 . General characteristics of recent theory . . . 305

2. Attitude toward the contract theory . . . y^i

CONTENTS XT!

rAGE

3. Natural rights 309

4. Civil liberty 311

5. Functions of the state 3'S

6. The separation of governmental powers . . . 322

7. Distinction between state and government . . 325

8. Modern democracy 3^7

9. Sociological contributions 3^9

10. Conclusions 33^

CHAPTER IX
Conclusion 334

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL THEORIES

CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS

A STUDY of American political theories may
appropriately begin with an examination of the
ideas of the colonists who laid the foundations
upon which the national structure now rests. In
view of the fact that the Puritan ideals, political
and moral, have been so potent a force in the
development of American national characteristics,
attention will first be directed to the Puritan
political tenets.

Puritanism was primarily a religious and not a
political movement.^ Its central doctrine was that
the spiritual element in worship is of far greater
importance than the ceremonial element. The

1 A complete discussion of the Puritan theory is given by H. L.
Osgood in the Political Science Quarterly, Vol. VI, " The PoUtical
Ideas of the Puritans." See also The Rise of Democracy in Old
and New England, by Charles Borgeaud; G. E. Ellis's Puritan
Age in Massachusetts; and the standard histories of this period:
in particular, Doyle's Puritan Colonies and J. G. Palfrey's History
of New England.

B I

2 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Puritans condemned a ritualistic service as not
only unnecessary and superfluous, but positively
injurious and sinful; and they demanded a style
of worship from which the ceremonial features
were as nearly as possible eliminated. The
Anglican Church they bitterly denounced for its
failure to carry through the desired reforms, and
its retention of so many of the features of the
Roman worship. Theologically, Puritanism was
closely allied to Calvinism, and it resembled Calvin's
system on the political side also. In common with
the other adherents of the Reformation, the Puri-
tans denied the binding force of Church tradition,
precedent, and law, asserting that the Scriptures are
the only authoritative guide of human conduct. In
a study of Puritan politics it is essential, therefore,
to remember that the spirit and purpose of the
Puritans' movement was only incidentally political.
Their aim was to found a spiritual, not a political,
organization — a church rather than a state. They
were interested above all things in the true wor-
ship of God, which meant to them, of course, the
Puritan style of worship.

It is important to observe at the outset the basis
upon which the Puritans rested their common-
wealth. Having rejected the authority of the Church
and ecclesiastical law and precedent, they relied
solely upon the Scriptures as a guide for all con-
duct, public as well as private, and considered the
Bible as the only proper foundation upon which

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 3

either a state or a church could rest. They a*--
tempted to deduce from the Old and New Testa.,
ments their whole system of public law, finding in
these writings, expressly or by implication, authority
for the government as organized and administered.
As their theology and their form of church govern-
ment rested upon a scriptural basis, so must their
political theory and their state have the same foun-
dation. This idea was well stated by John Eliot
in his work on The Christian Commonwealth ; or.
The Civil Policy of the Rising Kingdom of Jesus
Christ} when he said that " there is undoubtedly a
form of Civil Government, instituted by God him-
self in the holy Scriptures, whereby any Nation
may enjoy all the ends and effects of Government
in the best manner, were they but perswaded to
make trial of it. We should derogate from the
sufficiency and perfection of the Scriptures, if we
should deny it." In the establishment of New
Haven Colony, one of the questions submitted to
those participating was, "Whether the Scriptures
doe holde forth a perfect rule for the direction and
government of all men in all duties which they are
to perform to God and men, as well in the govern-
ment of families and in the Commonwealth, as in
the matters of Church .? " ^ ; and to this all assented.
This idea runs through the Puritan thought of that
time. They devoutly believed that somewhere in

' Mass. Historical Society Collections, Third Series, Vol. 9, p. 134.
2 New Haven Records, I, 12 (1639).

4 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the Scriptures there must be a rule of public as
well as of private conduct, and they further believed
that they had discovered and were applying this
rule in the development of their political institu-
tions. The particular part of the Bible upon
which they relied for this purpose was the Old
Testament, with its frequent references to the
political experiences of the Children of Israel.
This was a rich mine of precedent, to which the
Puritans frequently resorted when in need of such
support to justify their conduct.^

It is not to be assumed, however, that the Puri-
tans really constructed their entire political system
from an interpretation of the Scriptures.* They
brought with them to the New World the English
common law, English political precedent and
tradition of centuries' growth. This was beyond
question the real basis of their system, and the
additions to this from interpretation of the Scrip-
tures were less important than the Puritans them-
selves thought. It would be near the truth to
say that they did not begin with the Scriptures
and build up a complete system, but that they
attempted to justify a system already in existence

' For example, Cotton said that no instance could be given " of
any capital Law of Moses, but is of moral (that is of general and
perpetual) equity, in all Nations, in all Ages. Capitalia Mosis
politica sunt aeterna." The Bloudy Tenent, Chap. LIII.

2 O. S. Straus, in the Origin of the Republican Form of Govern-
ment in the United States of America, maintains this proposition.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 5

by finding for it a scriptural basis. In the general
tendeicy to test all things by Scripture, it wts
only i latural that the state should be subjected to
the same treatment, and that an attempt should
be made to find a scriptural model for political
institutions.

The system of government adopted by the Puri-
tans was what might perhaps be called theocratic
in character. The most cursory view could not fail
to reveal the predominant position of the clergy.
From the beginning, the life of New England was
largely under the influence of the ministers. In
many cases men of marked learning and sagacity,
whose Puritan morals and theology did not conflict
with shrewd worldly wisdom, they dominated the
political as well as the intellectual and religious Ufe
of the community. They were consulted upon all
matters of public policy, such as Indian affairs or
relations with the mother counti-y ; they frequently
preached political sermons bearing directly on
public questions ; there was never, perhaps, a
body of clergy that exercised greater influence
on affairs of state than did these New England
leaders. Especially in Massachusetts Bay, they
established an ecclesiastico-political regime, recall-
ing in many of its features the Geneva system of
John Calvin. In two of the colonies member-
ship in some approved church was essential to full
citizenship. Only those who were church members
could become "freemen" in Massachusetts Bay

6 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

and in New Haven, and it is not likely that other
than church members were actually received in
Plymouth and Connecticut. As late as 1660 the
General Court of Massachusetts Bay resolved that
no person could become a " freeman " who was not
in full communion with some orthodox church.
The exclusive character of the Massachusetts Bay
system is shown by the fact that down to 1674
only 2527 were admitted as freemen, one-fifth of
the total number of adult males. ^ Of the other
features in the theocratic regime it is not necessary
to speak at length. The Sabbath Laws, taxation
for purposes of church support, compulsory attend-
ance on church services, the anti-heresy acts, —
all were part of the general system in which the
civil power was invoked to stimulate the religious
sentiment and practice of the community. The
same tendency is also shown by the attitude of the
Puritans toward adherents of other religions. In
the controversy with Roger Williams, with the
Antinomians, with the Quakers and the Baptists,
a determination was manifested to preserve the
Puritan type of religion by force if necessary.
Liberal use was made of fines, imprisonment, dis-
franchisement and banishment as means of grace
for the spiritually perverse. The Puritans them-
selves were dissenters from dissenters, but they did
not intend that the process of dissent should be
carried farther.

^ G. E. Ellis, Puritan Age, p. 203.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 7

Their theory of the relation between church and
state was clearly brought out in the famous con-
troversy between Roger Williams and John Cotton,
the spokesman for the Massachusetts theocracy.^
An examination of this controversy may seem
somewhat remote from the field of political theory,
but only through such an inquiry is it possible
to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of the
political ideas of the Puritan. The gist of the
Williams-Cotton debate is found in three pam-
phlets occasioned by the banishment of Williams.
These were. The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for
Cause of Conscience (1644), by Williams ; The
Bloudy Tenent washed, and made white in the
Bloud of the Lambe (1647), ^y Cotton; The
Bloudy Tenent yet more Bloudy (1652), by
Williams.^

Two of the most significant topics discussed may
be considered here : first, the nature of the church
and the state ; second, the extent of the civil power
in rehgious affairs. First, then, the theory as to
the nature of the church gives the key to the under-
standing of the entire dispute. Williams's conten-
tion was that the state is distinct from, and may

1 See Doyle, Puritan Colonies, Vol. I, Chap. IV, for an account
of this affair.

2 See also the Cambridge Platform of 1648, Chap. 16. This was
a statement of church doctrine made by a synod representing the
four New England colonies. See also Cotton Mather, Magnalia,
Vol. II, Book 5.

8 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

exist without, the church, as, for example, among
heathen people. "The church," said Williams,
"is like unto a corporation, society, or company
of East India or Turkic merchants, or any other
societieorcompaniein London, which may. . . wholly
breake up and dissolve into pieces and nothing, and
yet the peace of the citie not be in the least meas-
ure impaired or disturbed."^ This is true, be-
cause the " essence " of the church and the state
is different, and consequently the religion may be
radically changed, while the government of the
city or state remains unchanged ; or the govern-
ment may be altered without affecting the char-
acter of the religion. Ephesus may cease to
worship Diana, and still be Ephesus ; or it may
happen that there are different religions in the
same city, the aim of all these religions being dis-
tinct from that of the state.

Cotton, for his part, agreed that the church is a
separate society, distinct from the state ; but held
that the church is the chief society in the state,
and that the growth and welfare of the state are
dependent on the purity of the church. The church,
although not the " essence " of the state, neverthe-
less "pertains to the integrity of the city"; it is
among the " conservant causes " of the state, and
cannot be broken up without affecting profoundly
the welfare of the body politic.^ Cotton conceded

1 The Bloudy Tenent, Chap. VI.

^ Bloudy Tenent washed and made white. Chap. VI.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS g

that there are historical examples of states which
have flourished under heathendom; but he de-
clared that after the true church is once intro-
duced, then this true worship must be protected
by the state.

The crucial question in the controversy was
that concerning the proper extent of the power
of the civil magistrate in religious matters.
Williams held that the true church is spiritual
in nature, and, as such, has no need of the
support of the civil magistrate in order to
maintain its proper position. It does not re-
quire worldly means of defence, but should
use only the spiritual weapons, such as "the
breastplate of righteousness," "the helmet of
salvation," "the sword of the spirit."^ Civil
magistrates had never been made defenders of
the faith in the Scriptures, and the omission
shows that there had been no intent to confer
such authority on them. The civil officers should
not proceed to organize churches ; they should not
inflict punishment on those adjudged heretics, or
impose civil penalties or disabilities for any reli-
gious reason. Williams contended that if civil
magistrates had rightful power in spiritual affairs,
then even in a barbarous Indian tribe rightful juris-
diction over the church of Christ would be vested
in the Indian civil authorities, and the Christian
religion would be entirely at the mercy of rulers
^ The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, Chap. XLV.

10 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

with pagan consciences.^ It is clearly evident, then,
that WilUams's view of the state was decidedly
secular in character. He limited its activity in
religious affairs to -what were called at that time
"breaches of the second table." ^ Transgression
of any of the last six commandments might be
punished by the state, but over violations of the
commandments in the first table they should have
no jurisdiction. " Scandalous (offence) against
parents," he said, "against magistrates in the
fifth command, and so against the life, chastity,
goods, or good name in the rest, is properly trans-
gression against the civil state and common weal,
or the worldly state of men."^ Such offences the
government may rightfully punish, but those crimes
which concern the relations of man to God it should
not attempt to suppress. They are spiritual in
nature, and civil penalties cannot properly affect
them. On this ground Williams denounced in vig-
orous terms the treatment to which he and others
had been subjected as wholly unwarranted and
unjustifiable.

Cotton replied to these arguments that "it is a
carnal and worldly, and, indeed, an ungodly imagi-
nation, to confine the magistrate's charge to the
bodies and goods of the subjects, and to exclude

^ The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, Chap. XCII.

^ The hrst four commandments, covering the duties of man to
God, were called the "first table"; the last six, covering the rela-
tions of men to each other, constituted the " second table."

8 Ibid. Chap. LVI.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS n

them from the care of their soules."^ He main
tained that it is the evident duty of the magis-
trates to use all available means to prevent the
pollution and corruption of the church, and to
strive in every way to preserve its purity.^ He
even attempted to show that laws about religion
are, strictly speaking, civil laws. "Whatsoever
concerneth the good of the city and the propuls-
ing of the contrary," is a civil law, said he. " Now
religion is the best good of the city, and therefore
laws about religion are truly called civil lawes." ^
But Cotton's reasoning would have been inade-
quate and ineffective from the Puritan point of
view, unless supported by scriptural authority.
Unable to find any express warrant in the New
Testament, Cotton met the difficulty by showing
that there was not authority in that part of the
Bible, even for the punishment of such crimes as
adultery and murder, and that consequently it
must be assumed that a rule of action is else-
where contained in the Scriptures. Such author-
ity is found in the " Laws of Moses and the
Prophets who have expounded them in the Old
Testament."* He maintained that all the capital
laws of the Mosaic Code are of universal validity,
and that whatever the kings of Israel inflicted on
transgressors of either the first or the second table,

1 The Bloudy Tenent washed and made white, Chap. XXXIII.

2 Ibid. Chap. XXXV. = Ibid. Chap. LXVII.
* IHd. Chap. LXXIII.

12 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

was a pattern and example to Christian magis.
trates.^ Thus basing himself on the Mosaic
Law, Cotton found abundant sanction for any
measures required to preserve the peace and
purity of the church. Such phrases as, " Thou
shalt surely kill him . . . because he hath sought
to thrust thee away from the Lord thy God,"
seemed to him to justify almost any means that
might be used.

It is evident, then, that Cotton was a thorough
believer in the doctrine that it is the right and duty
of the magistrates to punish transgressions against
the commandments contained in either of the
" tables." In addition to the offences specified by
Williams, Cotton included many others. He
declared that one who holds an " erroneous doctrine
or practise " is a violator of the civil law ; " he who
refuseth to subject his spirit to the spirit of the
Prophets in a holy Church of Christ " comes under
the same category. Even such offences as the
" censorious reproach " of one who rebukes our
spiritual error, or " rejecting communion " before
one is convicted, may be looked upon as a disturb-
ance of the peace and hence as falling under the
jurisdiction of the civil magistrates.^ In short.
Cotton's theory was that the state should guarantee
the observance of church law and ceremony, just
as if they were its own enactment, and that to
accompUsh this purpose any exercise of force
1 Ibid. Chap. XXXV. 2 /^^^ chap. VII.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 13

would be perfectly justifiable. As he phrased it
on one occasion, "legall terrours are ordinary
meanes blessed of God to prepare hard and stout
hearts to conversion." ^

He was far from admitting, however, ,that he
ustified persecution " for cause of conscience,"
as Williams alleged. On the contrary, he declared
that the conscience is sacred and inviolable and not
to be disturbed, whether it be conscience " rightly
informed " or " conscience misinformed." ^ A sig-
nificant exception was made, however, in case
" it may appear that the erroneous party suffereth
not for his conscience, but for his sinning against
his conscience." ^ In other words, individuals are
not punished because they follow conscience, but
because they refuse to obey its dictates ; not be-
cause they are blind, but because they wilfully shut
their eyes. Of the same character is the argument
that " to persecute is to punish an Innocent ; but
a heretic is a culpable and damnable person." *
Cotton realized that the action of the magistrates
might result in the production of hypocrites; but
" better tolerate Hypocrites and Tares than Bryars
andThornes."® Or as elsewhere expressed : "Better
a dead soule be dead in body, as well as in Spirit,
than to live and be lively in the flesh." ® Based
on like logic was the argument that in reality men
are never compelled to worship, for, " though teach-

1 Ibid. Chap. IX. = nij^ chap. X. « Ibid.

» Ibid Chap. LXV. ' Ibid. Chap. XXXIX. « md. Chap. XL

14

AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

ing and being taught in a Church estate be Church
worship, yet it is not a Church worship but to such
as are in a Church estate." ^

Such was the character of Cotton's theory, and
it was typical of Puritanism in the early days of
settlement in America. It was the theory of men
to whom the preservation of the Puritan religion
was an object of paramount importance — an end
for which they had already given up much and
for which they were ready to sacrifice still more.
They were thoroughly convinced that it was the
duty of the state to uphold and support the church
at every possible point, and they acted on this
conviction.^ In so doing they were neither in
advance of nor behind the theory and practice of
their time, but simply followed the custom of all
the states of that day. From one point of view it
may seem strange that the Puritans, fleeing from
persecution in England, should prove so ready to
persecute in turn those who dissented from Puri-
tanism. What the Puritans objected to, however,
was not the use of force to maintain a religion, but

1 Ibid. Chap. LXX.

^ In the Massachusetts Body of Liberties it was declared that
" Civill Authoritie hath power and libertie to see the peace, ordi-
nances and Rules of Christ observed in every church, according to
his word, so it be done in a Civill and not in an Ecclesiastical way."
Sec. 58. The converse right was not given to the church, however.
It was provided that, " No church censure shall degrade or depose
any man from any Civill dignitie, office or Authoritie he shall have
in the Commonwealth." Sec. 60.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 15

the use of force to support any other than the true
religion. Regarding their own form of worship
as the true one, they considered it perfectly just to
call on the civil power to preserve it, even by force
if necessary.

Having considered the Puritan theory of the
relation between church and state, we now turn
to an inquiry into the question how far Puri-
tanism was democratic. It would be wide of
the truth to assert that at the beginning there
was any general enthusiasm for democracy
as such. John Cotton on one occasion (1644)
denounced democracy as " the meanest and worst
of all forms of government," and on another
occasion openly indorsed theocracy.^ A propo-
sition for the establishment of an aristocracy
was made to Massachusetts Bay in 1634, and
was rejected only because it involved the aban-
donment of the church-membership requirement
for suffrage. " Two distinct ranks, we willingly
acknowledge from the light of nature and scrip-
ture," they said, " the one of them called Princes
or Nobles or Elders (amongst whom the gentle-
men have their place) ; the other the people.
Hereditary dignity or honors, we willingly allow to
the former, unless by the scandalous and base con-

1 Letter of Cotton to Lord Say and Seal, 1636, in Appendix to
Hutchinson's History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, Vol. I.
The Scriptures, he said, establish " theocracy as the best form of
government in the commonwealth, as well as in the church." Pg. 4981

l6 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

versation of any of them, they become degenerate." ^
It is also notable that only a part of the inhabitants
of the colonies were made " freemen " ; in the case
of Massachusetts, only about one-fifth. " Inhabit-
ants " and^" freemen " were sharply distinguished
and were accorded different degrees of political
privilege. All of these features were undemo-
cratic.

Other parts of the Puritan system show more
democratic tendencies. Among these was the
emphasis on local self-government, finding expres-
sion in the town-government which has played so
conspicuous a part in American constitutional de-
velopment. Furthermore, careful provision for
adequate protection of civil rights was made by the
colonies in such notable instruments as the Body
of Liberties in Massachusetts Bay (1641) and the
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639). These
were largely, however, the guaranty of the ordinary
rights of Englishmen, and consequently cannot be
regarded as exclusively Puritan in character.

A democratic tendency is seen in the method
adopted in the formation of new communities by
the Puritans. The use of the contract as a basis
for the establishment of a " body politic " was a
widespread practice in the New England colonies.

1 Ibid. I, 490 ff. This was somewhat qualified by the state-
ment th»t, " Hereditary honors both nature and scripture doth
acknowledge {Eccl. xix. 17), but hereditary authority and powei
standeth only by the civil laws of some commonwealths." Ibid.
493-

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 17

The first of these was the famous Mayflower cov-
enant of 1620. Here it was declared that the
undersigned, " Do by these Presents solemnly and
mutually, in the Presence of God and one another,
covenant and combine ourselves into a civil Body
Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation,
and Furtherance of the Ends foresaid; and by
Virtue hereof do enact, constitute and frame, such
just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitu-
tions, and Officers from time to time, as shall be
thought most meet and convenient for the general
Good of the Colony; unto which we promise all
due Submission and Obedience." ^

Another illustration of the same principle is
afforded by the example of Connecticut in the
adoption of the " Fundamental Orders." In this
agreement it was stated that: "We, the Inhabit-
ants and Residents of Windsor, Hartford, and
Wethersfield . . . doe associate and conjoyne our-
selves to be as one Publick State or Common-
wealth and doe, for ourselves and our successors
and such as shall be adjoyned to us att any time
hereafter, enter into Combination and Confedera-
tion together to mayntayne and presearve the lib-
erty and purity of the gospel of our Lord Jesus,
which we now profess, as also the discipline of the
Churches, which according to the truth of the

1 Poore, Constitutions and Charters, I, 931. But they did not
profess political independence. " We . . . the Loyal Subjects of
our dread Sovereign Lord, King James, etc."
C

1 8 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

said gospel is now practised amongst us, as also in
our Civell Affaires to be guided and governed
according to such Lawes, Rules, Orders and de-
crees as shall be made, ordered and decreed, as
followeth."!

In Rhode Island there were many similar con-
tracts made, as, for instance, the agreement at
Providence in 1636, and at Portsmouth in 1638. In
the latter the form of the covenant was as follows :
" We whose names are underwritten do here
solemnly in the presence of Jehovah incorporate
ourselves into a Bodie Politick and as He shall
help, will submit our persons, lives and estates
unto our Lord Jesus Christ."^

It is now necessary to inquire into the theory
on which these contracts rested. The discussion
of this question, however, involves an examination
of the theory on which the New England churches
were constructed. These ecclesiastical organiza-
tions, it appears, were formed on what is known

^ Connecticut Records, I, 20.

2 R. I. Records, I, 52. In the Newport Declaration of 1 641 is
found one of the boldest of democratic assertions. It is here pro-
claimed that " The Government which this Bodie Politick doth attend
unto in this Island and the Jurisdiction thereof, in favour of our
Prince is a Democracie or Popular Government ; that is to say it
is in the power of the Body of Freemen orderly assembled or the
major part of them, to make or constitute just Lawes, by which they
will be regulated, and to depute from among themselves such min-
isters as shall see them faithfully executed between man and man.'
Itid, I, 112.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 19

as the "Separatist" plan; namely, by voluntary
agreement between a number of individuals to
constitute themselves as a church. This was the
method followed by the Separatists in England,
who beUeved that the church is not formed by
action of the state, or by virtue of apostolic suc-
cession, but is merely a number of believers under
a covenant with God. Although the New England
Puritans were not all Separatists while in England,
they became so almost as soon as they reached
this country,^ and proceeded to adopt the cove-
nant as the proper method of forming a church.
Official recognition of this idea was given in the
Cambridge Platform adopted in 1648, when refer-
ence was here made to the " visible Covenant,
Agreement or Consent, whereby they give them-
selves unto the Lord, to the observing of the ordi-
nances of Christ together in the same society,
which is usually called the Church Covenant."'^
This covenant was described as the same as that
which made Abraham and the Children of Israel
the people of God, and was declared to have
the force of constituting societies of believers as
churches.

1 See the case of the Salem church, 1629.

2 Chap. IV, § 3. For a full discussion of these church cove-
nants, see Williston Walker, The Creeds and Platforms of Congre-
gationalism (1893); see also the classic work by II. M. Dexter,
Congregationalism as seen in its Literature. The Cambridge
Platform is given in Walker, pp. 1 94-237-

20 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

A remarkably clear and definite statement ol
the contract idea was made in a work by the
famous Connecticut divine, Thomas Hooker, —
A Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline
(1648). The reasoning of Hooker, to which
almost no attention has been given, is notable for
its early exposition of the contract theory and the
way in which it anticipates such classic writers as
John Locke. Hooker urges that all men are ec-
clesiastically equal, and where every man remains
uncontrolled there must follow the " distraction and
desolation of the whole." " In the building," said
he, " if the parts be neither mortised nor brased,
as there will be little beauty, so there can be no
strength. Its so in setting up the frames of
societies among men, when their minds and
hearts are not mortised by mutuall consent of sub-
jection one to another, there is no expectation of
any successful proceeding with the advantage to
the public." 1 "Mutual subjection," he declares,
"is as it were, the sinewes of society, by which it
is sustained and supported." ^ He calls attention
to two classes of covenant, the explicit and the
implicit, and indicates a preference for the explicit
agreement.^ The effect of this contract is to
make every part subject to the whole and bound
by its orders. Nevertheless, the people still re-
tain "the power of Judgment over each other"
and hence they proceed against any officer " that
1 Swvey, p. 188. » Ibid. Cf. p. 50. » Ibid. 47.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 21

goes aside." This they do, " though not by any
power of office, for they are not officers, but by
power of judgment which they do possess." ^
This is a striking anticipation of the theory of
revolution, later developed by John Locke.^ In
the one case the theory is applied to the church,
however, and in the other to the state.

The idea of the contract as the basis of associ-
ations was not peculiar to Hooker, but was com-
mon to the New England Puritans of his day. In
defence of their form of church organization, gov-
ernment, and discipline, they asserted again and
again that the contract is the method by which all
associations are formed. " All voluntary relations,"
it was said in the Apologie^ " all relations which are
neither natural nor violent are entered into by way
of covenant." Hooker stated the idea with great
clearness and force, but he spoke only as a repre-
sentative of the general opinion in New England.*
In the face of strong opposition from England,
the Puritans defended the formation of churches
through contract, the election of pastors and

^ Ibid. 192. The Cambridge Platform declares that "If the
Church have power to chuse their officers and ministers, then in
case of manifest unworthiness and delinquency they have power
also to depose them."

^ In the second of his Two Treatises of Government.

' An Apologie of the Churches in New England for Church
Covenant (1639), by Richard Mather.

* On this subject see John Cotton, The Way of the Churches of
Christ in New England (1645); The IVay of Congrefaiionai

22 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

teachers by the people, the rule of the majority in
church affairs, the right of the congregation to dis-
cipline or dismiss their ecclesiastical head.^ Fre-
quent reference was made to the contracts of Old
Testament days; for example, "Jehoiada made a
covenant between the Lord and the king and the
people; that they should be the Lord's people;
between the king also and the people " (II Kings
xi : 1 7). Another similar precedent was found in
Deuteronomy xxix : " Ye stand this day all of you
before the Lord your God . . . that thou should-
est enter into covenant with the Lord thy God . . .
that he may establish thee to-day for a people unto
himself and that he may be unto thee a God." It
seems to have been the prevailing idea that a con-

Churches Cleared (1648). Also Richard Mather, Church Govern-
ment and Church Covenant Disc-ussed {itd,'^; Model of Church
and Civil Power (quoted by Osgood, op. cii.); John Davenport,
A Discourse about Civil Government (1663). A later exposition
is that of John Wise, A Vindication of the Government of New
England Churches (1772).

' Mather's explanation of majority rule is suggestive. It seems
that a vote was first taken and an effort made to secure unanimity.
But if the minority " still continue obstinate, they are admonished,
and so standing under censure, their vote is nullified." Church
Government and Church Covenant Discussed^ p. 61.

It w-as explicitly denied that the form of church government was
purely democratic. Mather said, " our answer is neither thus nor
so, neither all to the People excluding the Presbytery, nor all to the
Presbytery excluding the People. For this were to make the gov-
ernment of the Church either meerly democratical, or meerly
aristocratical, neither of which we believe it ought to be."
Ibid. 57.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 23

tract was the necessary basis for both the church
and the state.^ These two classes of covenants were
known respectively as the " church covenant " and
the "plantation covenant " ; and there was an inti-
mate relation between the democratic method of
forming a church and the democratic method of
forming a state.

Let us now consider briefly the Puritan ideas
of liberty and equality from the political side.
First, then, what was the Puritan conception of
liberty? The common idea that the Puritans
were enthusiasts for political freedom can hardly
be sustained. What they were chiefly concerned
about was moral rather than political liberty.
This was shown by Winthrop when he divided
liberty into two classes: natural liberty and civil
or federal liberty. The iirst kind, natural lib-
erty, is absolute and unlimited; it cannot be sub-
jected to any restraint whatever from the side of
authority. Civil or federal liberty, on the other
hand, is constituted by the covenant between God
and man, and by the political covenant. This lib-
erty is freedom to do that which is " good, just, and

1 This idea of the contract had been worked out by the contro-
versialists of the sixteenth century. See the Vindicia contra Tyran-
nos, 1579, by an unknown author. This work contains a curious
blending of arguments derived from the Bible, Roman law, and
feudal custom. The rights, obligations, and other incidents of the
contractual relation are taken from the Roman law. The contract
theory wjis clearly stated by Richard Hooker in his famous work
on The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, {circa) 1594.

24 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

honest." ^ " It is," says Winthrop, " the same kind
of liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free,"
that is to say, freedom from the bondage of sin,
and the restraints it involves, liberty was not
conceived as absolute and unqualified lack of re-
straint, but as freedom of motion in that particular
direction in which one should go in accordance
with the covenant made with God. The Puritans
brought with them the undoubted liberties of Eng-
lishmen, and these they were careful to preserve.
The political liberty, however, about which they
were most anxious was the independence of their
corporation or society. This they were always
ready to defend against any other authority, espe-
cially the rule or attempted rule of the home gov-
ernment in England. But they were not so eager
in behalf of the individual within the corporation.
The corporate conscience and the corporate conduct
must be free and untrammelled, but not necessarily
the conduct and conscience of the individual. The
Puritans did not preach or practice religious toler-
ation, nor did they become enthusiastic about the
inherent rights of man. They jealously guarded
their traditional English liberties, they were ear-
nestly desirous of moral and spiritual freedom, but
their great end and aim politically was to secure a
kind of civil government under which their reli-
gious system could best be maintained.

Nor were the Puritans given to assertions about

' History of New England, II, 280-81.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 2$

the innate equality of all men. Particularly in
Massachusetts Bay, there were manifest in the
early period decidedly aristocratic tendencies. The
equality upon which the Puritans laid greatest
stress, and which was to them most significant, was
the equality of all men before God. Before Him,
all men were regarded as sinners, hopelessly lost,
so far as their own efforts could avail, and no one
more worthy than another. In the doctrine of
the Fall there is no room for rank or preeminence,
but all are reduced to one common level. Thus
it appears that the Puritans were beUevers in what
is sometimes termed " spiritual equality," as distin-
guished from other types; and even in this con-
nection, as has been suggested, they held to
"democracy in the Fall, but aristocracy in the
Redemption," for only the elect were regarded as
saved.

Nor did they grant religious equality to all, for,
as already indicated, they were intolerant of other
religions than their own. The idea of full and
complete freedom to choose whatever religion the
individual might prefer, they were not prepared
to accept, as the controversy between Williams and
Cotton indicates. They did not entertain doctri-
naire ideas about equality of any kind. They granted
equality in civil rights, but did not include equality
of political rights even among the adult males.
This was true not only of the earlier period of the
Puritan age, but of the later as well ; for the reli-

26 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

gious requirements at first exacted were succeeded
in the latter part of the seventeenth century by-
property qualifications for office-holding and for
suffrage. The conclusion must be, then, that for
political equality as such there was no great enthu-
siasm among the Puritans.

From this discussion it is evident that Puritanism
in New England, and particularly in Massachusetts
Bay, may fairly be characterized as theocratic.
The dominant class was the clergy ; church-mem-
bership was a prerequisite to full citizenship ; the
civil power was invoked to insure to the church
financial support, to enforce church discipline, to
suppress and root out heresy.

From a consideration of these tendencies of
Puritanism it might perhaps be assumed that there
was no democratic element in the system worth
considering. It would, however, be just as far
from the truth to conclude that there was no demo-
cratic element in Puritanism, as to assume that its
adherents came to the New World for the express
purpose of establishing political and religious lib-
erty for all men. Neither claim is borne out by
a consideration of the Puritan theory and practice.
Of greatest significance from the standpoint of
democratic political theory is the Puritan idea of
the contract. Primarily applied to ecclesiastical
relations, to the formation of a congregation through
the instrumentality of a church covenant, the same

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 27

theory of the contract was carried over into politi-
cal relations. The church covenant and the plan-
tation covenant went hand in hand. This theory
of contract necessarily emphasized the importance
of the individual as the unit in both the ecclesiasti-
cal and the political society, for it was voluntary
consent and not divine right or long-established
custom that was the basis of both church and state.
This individualistic idea contained a germ of
democracy which could not fail to develop under
favorable conditions. In New England the early
tendencies toward aristocracy or theocracy soon
began to disappear, and the process of democratiz-
ing social and political institutions began a course
which is not yet completed.

This result cannot all be attributed to Puritanism
as such, however. The Puritans inherited from
English ancestors and brought with them to the
New World the political capacity characteristic of a
highly developed political people. There was also
a highly favorable environment, inviting if not com-
pelling the growth of a democratic society and state.
In estimating the democratic value of Puritanism
these facts cannot be ignored.

Next in importance and interest to the politi-
cal ideas of the Puritans were those of the
Friends in Pennsylvania. Here was worked out a
system differing from that of the Puritans in re-
spect to religious tenets and upon many political

28 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

principles.^ In the religious teachings of the
Friends, the sternness and severity of the Puritan
theology was in many ways modified. In place of
the doctrine of election, it was taught that the
grace of God is universal in its application, and
that there is an immediate revelation of the spirit
of God to each individual soul in the form of an
" inner light." ^ In this respect the doctrine of the
Friends was the antithesis of Puritanism. In other
ways, however, the Friends were more Puritan than
the Puritans themselves. They not only denounced
ceremonialism as fiercely as did the Puritans, but
further abandoned all sacraments, denied the ne-
cessity for any special priesthood, denounced church
tithes, and refused to take an oath or have any-
thing to do with war. They emphasized plainness
of dress, and directness of speech, and refused
to uncover the head or bow to any man. But
at the same time the Quakers possessed practi-
cal characteristics that enabled them to achieve
great worldly success. Of this the establishment
of the colony of Pennsylvania was a signal proof.
The government of Pennsylvania was on the
whole about as democratic as that of the Puritan
colonies. The emphasis on the contract was lack-

^ A. C. and R. M. Thomas, A History of the Society of Friends
in America ; Isaac Sharpless, A Quaker Experiment in Govern-
ment, 1902.

^ See William Penn, The Rise and Progress of the People called
Quakers (1695); Robert Barclay, Theologite vera Christiana
Apologia (1676).

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 29

ing, but the theocratic element found in New Eng-
land was also wanting. Religious toleration was
granted to all deists, and there was no religious
qualification for office except the belief in Chris-
tianity.i The ecclesiastical organization of the
Friends was more democratic than that of the
Puritans. There was no special body of ministers
exercising authority over the people, women were
granted equal rights with men, and the meetings
whether for business or worship were conducted
with the greatest informality, not even a presiding
officer being regarded as necessary.

An interesting fragment of Quaker theory is
contained in the Frame of Government drawn up
by Penn for the colony.^ In this document atten-
tion is called to the great ends of government, which
are said to be two, namely, to terrify evil-doers
and to cherish those that do well. Particular em-
phasis is laid on this double character of govern-
mental activity. " They weakly err," it is said, " that
think there is no other use of government than
correction, which is the coarsest part of it." Of
the forms of government three are suggested as be-
ing most commonly discussed, but the conclusion
is drawn that, "any government is free to the
people under it . . . where the laws rule and the

^ After 1705, Roman Catholics were disqualified from holding
office.

2 Poore's Constitutions, Vol. II, p. 1518. Compare with this The
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, 1669, Ibid. II, 1397.

30 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

people are a party to those laws." Any govern-
ment will work in the proper hands ; for like clock i
they go from the motion communicated to them,
and in general depend on men rather than men on
governments. Good men will always have good
laws, whereas good laws may lack good men for
their enforcement. The great end of the Frame
of Government was declared to be "to support
power in reverence with the people and to secure
the people from the abuse of power."

The opposition of the Quakers to taking the
oath and to participation in war involved them
at times in difficult situations. It was charged
by their enemies that their unwillingness to take
an oath frequently resulted in failure to convict
criminals, since in some communities no sworn
jury could be secured. This seems, however, to
have occasioned no serious difficulty, and the
matter was finally settled by granting the Quakers
the privilege of affirming instead of taking the
oath.i

The refusal of the Friends to take up arms was
a matter of greater importance. During the inter-
colonial wars, frequent requisitions were made upon
them for a quota of troops. All such requests were
refused, however, even when the colony was itself
threatened with invasion by the enemy. They
steadfastly declined to send any soldiers, or to grant
any money for the conduct of the military opera-
1 Cf. Sharpless, op. cit.. Chap. V.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 31

tions. It was urged that if they could maintain a
local police force and take human life in punish-
ment for crime, they might properly take up arms,
at least in self-defence. But the Quakers main-
tained that a distinction must be drawn here. It
was one thing, they said, to kill a soldier fighting in
obedience to the commands of his sovereign, and
another to kill a burglar who maliciously steals
one's goods in wilful violation of laws human and
divine.^ Although they declined to send troops
or vote money for the war, the Quakers did not
put themselves in the position of absolutely refusing
assistance to the government to which they owed
allegiance. They were willing to contribute money
to the home government, provided it was not used
for military purposes, but for other governmental
needs. For example, in 1 709 the Assembly voted
;£Soo, "as a present for the Queen." ^ In 1745
they voted ;£4000 for "bread, beef, pork, flour,
wheat, and other grain." "We have ever held it
our duty," they said, " to render tribute to Caesar," ^
and therefore made the contribution. Their attitude
occasioned earnest remonstrance and bitter criti-
cism, but the Quakers remained unmoved, and uni-
formly refused to appropriate men or money for
the war, except in the indirect way just described.
When no other alternative seemed possible, the

^ Minutes of the Provincial Council, IV, 371 (1739).
2 Ibid. II, 466.
» Ibid. IV, 769.

32 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

strict Quakers refused to try for seats in the As-
sembly, and allowed that body to pass under the
control of those who had no scruples against mili-
tary operations.

The rapid growth of the democratic spirit was
not peculiar, however, to the Puritan and Quaker
colonies. The conditions did not favor aristocracy,
and the experiments made in that direction showed
conclusively that its establishment was impracti-
cable. The resources of the colonies would not
support the necessary expenditure, nor was the
temper of the people favorable in any greater
degree. Something in the environment seemed to
arouse the spirit of liberty and inspire the assertion
of individual and colonial rights in the most ag-
gressive fashion.

To this there are many witnesses whose testi-
mony, biased though it was, shows unmistakably
the nature of the new movement. Take, for ex-
ample, the indignant references of Governor Spots-
wood of Virginia to the election of " representatives,
persons of narrow fortunes and mean understand-
ings," and to the general opinion " that he is the
best patriot that most violently opposes all over-
tures for raising money, let the occasion be what it
will" and to the " mobish candidates " who " always
outbid the Gentlemen of sence and principles, for
they stick not to vow to their electors that no con-
sideration whatever shall engage them to raise

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 33

money." ^ He was particularly aggrieved because
"some of them have so little shame, as publicly
to declare that if, in Assembly, anything should be
proposed which they judged might be disagree-
able to their constituents, they would oppose it,
though they knew in their conscience, it would be
for the good of the country." ^ He denounced
those who "inflame the common people with
notions of the ruin of their Libertys," and charged
that " the liberty of doing wrong is none of ye
least contended for here."

In Pennsylvania the same leaven was at work,
even under the proprietorship of one so little
disposed to arbitrary rule as was William Penn.
In 1704 it was said that the people think "all
that can be grasped to be their native right."
It was alleged that "some people's brains are
as soon intoxicated with power as the natives
are with their beloved liquor, and as little to
be trusted with it." ^ Significant was the de-
nunciation of one Guest, because "a desire to
be somebody, and an unjust method of craving
and getting, seems to be the rule of his life."
Penn himself observed this "excess of vanity"
on the part of the Americans. "Having got

1 Spotswood Letters, in Virginia Historical Collections, New
Series, Vol. II, 134 (1715).

2 Ibid.

8 Penn-Logan Correspondence, in Memoirs of the Historian
Society of Pennsylvania, Vol. IX, 299.
3

34

AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

out of the crowd in which they were lost here,"
said he, " upon every little eminencey there, (they)
think nothing taller than themselves but the
trees." ^

What the governors or royal agents character-
ized as stubbornness or stinginess, or quibbling
over technicalities, or playing into the hands of
upstarts and demagogues was, however, merely
the expression, often indeed very crude, of the
widespread democratic sentiment slowly gaining
strength for the outburst in the Revolution.

The storm centre of the democratic movement
during the colonial period was the conflict be-
tween the governors and the colonial legislatures or
assembUes.^ For this contest there was EngHsh
precedent in the action of Parliament during the
seventeenth century, and local reason in the colo-
nial desire to escape administrative control by
the home government. Especially in Massachu-
setts and New York the conflict was hard-fought,
bitter, and long protracted, but the difficulty was
by no means confined to these provinces. In the
course of this battle, the assembly constantly
gained on the governor, and steadily enlarged

^ Penn-Logan Correspondence, in Memoirs of the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania^^. IX, 374. Cf. Maryland Archives, IX,
177-178 (1758); Carroll, Historical Collections of South Carolina,
II, 164.

'^ On this point see E. B. Green, The Provincial Governor, in the
Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. VII, 1898. In this connection
see Jeremiah Dummer, Defence of the New England Charters, 1745.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 35

its power at the expense of his. The control of
the finances, especially, gave them the opportunity
to direct or influence the governor's activity in
many ways. Appropriations might be withheld
to the embarrassment of the administration, or,
if granted, might be made for specific and de-
tailed purposes. The salary of the governor was
determined by the assembly, and voted by that
body at its pleasure, thus making it master
of the governor's financial situation, — an advan-
tage more than once used to extort his assent to
measures favored by the assembly. The appoint-
ing power was also in many cases wrested from
the governor and assumed by the representatives
of the people. This was especially true as to the
treasurer, who, as financial agent of the colony,
was exposed to attack. The movement was not
confined, however, to this officer, but the assembly
appointed in some cases nearly all of the agents
of administration, as in Pennsylvania and South
Carolina.

In other ways the assembly asserted its
power by assuming the direction of matters of
public policy which had generally been consid-
ered a part of the prerogative of the executive.
Indian affairs, for example, it sometimes man-
aged by means of commissions appointed for that
purpose; intercolonial relations were also treated
in the same fashion; military affairs the legis-
lature sometimes controlled by granting supplies.

36 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

prescribing the operations to be undertaken, ap-
pointing and removing officers, and even interfer-
ing with the discipline of the troops. So far had
these encroachments gone, that in 1757 it could
be said of Massachusetts that " almost every act
of executive and legislative power, whether it be
political, judicial or military, is ordered and di-
rected by the votes and resolves of the General
Court, in most cases originating in the House of
Representatives." ^ More than anything else, this
conflict served to bring out the spirit of democracy
which was everywhere ready for action. It was
a rallying point around which tendencies favorable
to independence and popular government could
gather, and as the intercolonial wars helped to
teach the colonists military science, so these politi-
cal battles afforded them indispensable training in
the art of statecraft.

On the whole, it may be said that during the
colonial period the democratic spirit made remark-
able progress. The colonies passed out of the
stage in which they were religious experiments or
industrial ventures of a rather hazardous character,
and became prosperous communities eager for
governmental autonomy. The individuals within
these colonies were filled with a democratic en-
thusiasm, and ready for an advance in the direc-
tion of popular government. Until the decade

1 Board of Trade to Governor Pownall, cited by Green, op. cit.
194.

POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COLONISTS 37

preceding the Revolution there was, however, little
systematic discussion of the problems of political
theory, with the exception of the indirect contribu-
tion made by the Puritans. A steady democratizing
process was going on under the influence of the
new conditions, but there was Uttle conscious re-
flection accompanying this process. With the agi-
tation preliminary to the Revolution came a group
of leaders who sought a philosophical basis for
their policies, and accordingly made frequent use
of the formulae of political theory in their great
struggle for independence.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
PERIOD

The most important and significant statement of
American political theory is that made at the time
when the United States asserted the right to an
independent existence. The Declaration of In-
dependence has been generally regarded as the
corner-stone of the American poHtical system, and
the ideas of the "Fathers" of 1776 as a correct
statement of the typical American political phi-
losophy. These doctrines have undoubtedly ex-
erted a profound influence in determining the
course of American political thought. Even down
to the present day, they are the standards by
which must be measured all that is attempted in
the world of politics. No study of American polit-
ical ideas, or of American poUtical institutions,
would be complete without a careful analysis of
the characteristic doctrines of 1776.

It is, then, the purpose of this chapter to exam-
ine carefully the nature and origin of the political
ideas prevalent during the score of years covering
the Revolutionary period; that is, from about 1763
to about 1783. The exposition of the doctrines of
38

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 39

this period is rendered somewhat difficult by the
fact that there was no systematic presentation of
political theory made during this time. There was
an unlimited amount of discussion from platform
and pulpit, in pamphlets, resolutions, addresses,
and newspapers, but a scientific statement of the
popular beliefs was not made. It was natural that
under the conditions no scientific shape could be
given to any body of doctrine. Men wrote and
spoke with eloquence and force, and they were
men of intellectual keenness and power; they
spoke, however, not as philosophers, but as parti-
sans and promoters of a concrete revolutionary
program.

Among the most important sources of informa-
tion for this period, despite their unsystematic form,
are the speeches and writings of such men as Otis,
John and Samuel Adams, Dickinson, Paine, Jeffer-
son, and Hamilton. Many indications of the Patriot
theory are also found in the various declarations of
colonial rights that were made on numerous occa-
sions by legislatures or other less formal public
assemblages. Finally, in the Revolutionary state
constitutions are expressed, in legal form, the prin-
ciples that were dominant among the people.
From this material the ideas of this time may be
reconstructed, and a fairly adequate and compre-
hensive view of its political theory obtained.

At the outset a few words may be said in re-
gard to the historical situation under which was

40 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

developed the theory to be considered. The result
of the French and Indian wars removed a great
obstacle to American independence, and from
1763 on the drift of political conditions was
steadily in the direction of separation from the
mother country. The long experience of the
colonies in the art of self-government, their re-
moteness from England, and the difficulties of
successful administration from so distant a base,
the clash of colonial interest with Britain's nationalist
policy, — all were conditions likely to find expression
at a favorable opportunity, in terms of political
independence. The crisis came when the home
government in England endeavored to tighten the
long-relaxed bonds of union and to establish over
the colonies a more complete administrative con-
trol.i

The immediate occasion of the conflict was a
question of colonial taxation. In 1764 came the
Declaratory Resolves, indicating the intention of
the ministry to levy a tax on America. This was
followed in 1765 by the famous Stamp Act, which
aroused the opposition that found best expression
in the Stamp Act Congress. This act was re-

' The following works are especially useful in the study of this
period : Richard Frothingham, Rise of the Republic of the United
States; George Bancroft, United States, Vols. Ill and IV ; W. E.
H. Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Century; M. C. Tyler, Lit-
erary History of the American Revolution; W. M. Sloane, Tht
French War and the Revolution.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 41

pealed the next year, but at the same time the
significant declaration was made that Parliament
possessed the undoubted power to bind the colonies
"in all cases whatsoever." The excitement over
this assertion of Parliamentary authority had not
died away before the Townsend Act was passed
(1767), imposing taxes on such commodities as glass
and tea, and providing means for the enforcement
of the same. Though this act also was repealed
(1770), with the exception of the duty on tea,
the resistance continued to be as bitter as before.
In 1773 the colonists instituted what proved to
be a powerful agency in the development of their
organization, namely, the Committees of Corre-
spondence between the colonies. In the meantime
fuel was added to the flames of colonial discon-
tent by the instructions sent to the royal govern-
ors and by the Regulating Act for Massachusetts.
The Boston Port Bill, passed in 1774, aroused uni-
versal indignation and sympathy, and led up to the
first Continental Congress of 1774. In the follow-
ing spring came the clash of arms at Lexington ;
in May, 1775, the Continental Congress made
its declaration on taking up arms against Great
Britain ; and finally, all hope of reconciliation hav-
ing been destroyed, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence was issued. During this period of thirteen
years there was incessant debate upon questions
of colonial policy, of constitutional law, and of
political theory. These were topics of absorbing

42 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

interest among the colonists, and occupied the
minds of the ablest thinkers of that day. In 1776
began the work of constitution-making in the various
states, and opportunity was given for the develop-
ment or application of constructive theory. This
process was completed by 1784, and with this date
the epoch of the Revolutionary theory may be said
to have closed.

The argument with which the colonists began
their resistance was constitutional in nature, in-
volving the legal relations between the home
government and the colonies. To this doctrine
brief notice must now be given, in order that
the full significance of the Revolutionary politi-
cal theory may appear. The contention of the
Patriots was that the course of the British Parlia-
ment, in taxing the American colonies, was not
merely inexpedient and unjust, but actually con-
trary to the principles of the British Constitution.
Consequently they affirmed that the government,
in attempting to enforce such legislation, was
wholly outside of legal and constitutional right.
The basis for this claim was not always clearly
stated, and was sometimes shifted, but the main
features of it may be noted here.

It was asserted, on the one hand, that the colo-
nists owed their allegiance, not to ParUament, but
to the king. From him they had received their
charters, and to him, and not to Parliament, they
were accountable. Britain and the colonies, it was

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 43

said, are distinct states, as were England and Scot-
land before the union ; they are bound together
only by their common allegiance to a common
king. " The fealty and allegiance of the Ameri-
cans," said John Adams, "is undoubtedly due to
the person of the King George III, whom God
long preserve and prosper." ^ In accordance with
the charters received from him and of other ex-
press or implied contracts, the colonists owe obe-
dience to the king, although not to Parliament.
This body has no authority to tax, it was urged,
except for the regulation of colonial trade, and
this is not strictly a right, but exists " merely by
the consent of the colonies, founded on the obvious
necessity of a case which was never in contempla-
tion of that law, nor provided for by it."* The
various Acts of Trade were even compared to
commercial treaties between the colonies and
Great Britain.

By some of the Patriots a distinction was drawn
between acts of Parliament levying external taxes

1 See John Adams, Works, IV, 146; Answer of the Massachusetts
House of Representatives to the Speech of the Governor, 1773,
in Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, 287-294;
Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of the Colonies Examined (1764), re-
printed in R. I. Records, VI, 416; Richard Bland, An Inquiry into
the Rights of the British Colonies (^Ij66) ; Jefteison, Summary View
of the Rights of the Colonists (1774). See Adams's reply to the
argument that the king owed his position to an act of Parliament,
Works, IV, 1 14.

2 Adams, IV, 33. Cf. Hopkins, R. I. Records, VI, 420.

44 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

for the purpose of general regulation of the trade
of the kingdom, and on the other hand acts levy-
ing internal taxes on the colonies. ^ The authority
of ParUament to levy the former was conceded on
the ground of necessity for the general interest,,
but it was denied that the imposition of an in-
ternal tax was a constitutional exercise of power.

Another line of reasoning was that by the terms
of the charters the colonists were entitled to all the
rights and privileges of native-born English citi-
zens. They were to be as free in America as if
they had remained in England. As Hopkins said,
" There would be found very few people in the
world, willing to leave their native country and
go through the fatigue and hardship of planting
in a new and uncultivated one for the sake of
losing their freedom." On this basis the asser-
tion was made that the colonists possessed the
right of Englishmen to be taxed only in case they
were represented. This, they held, was the most
fundamental of all the rights of Englishmen, and
one of which they could not be deprived by any
act of Parliament. Inasmuch as the colonists were
not represented in Parliament, it followed they were
not liable to internal taxation by that body.

It was also argued that, owing to the local condi-
tions, American representation was impracticable
or impossible, and consequently that such taxes

1 This idea was developed most clearly by Ktt in the House of
Commons.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 45

must be levied through the colonial legislatures, —
the only channel through which consent could
legitimately be given.^ Formal recognition of this
doctrine was embodied in the resolutions of the
Stamp Act Congress in 1765, which declared that
"it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a
people and the undoubted right of Englishmen,
that no taxes be imposed on them without their con-
sent, given personally or through their representa-
tives." Later this doctrine assumed a still bolder
form in the Declaration of the Congress of 1774,
to the effect that the colonists " are entitled to
life, liberty and property, and they have never
ceded to any sovereign power whatever a right to
dispose of either without their consent."

Such was the constitutional argument upon
which resistance was at first based. This line of
attack proved to be vulnerable, however, in at least
two points. First, the contention that the colonies
were dependent upon the crown alone and inde-
pendent of Parliament, so far as internal taxation
was concerned, was not in harmony with the
opinion of the ablest jurists of the time, notably
Mansfield. Again, the doctrine that no English-
man could be taxed when unrepresented in Parlia-
ment was not in accord with the system of that
day, which left totally unrepresented such popu-

1 John Adams enumerated the objections to colonial representa-
tion. Works, IV, 139. Cf. Samuel Adams, Natural Rights of the
Colonists, Wells, I, 507 ; also Bland, op. cit.

46 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

lous and important communities as Sheffield, Bir-
mingham, and Leeds. From this point of view it
appears that the colonists were advocating a new
theory and practice of representation, and not de-
fending an old and well-established one.^ They
had in short an antiquated theory as to the position
and power of Parliament, and a premature theory
of Parhamentary representation. Doubtless the
colonists were influenced by certain seventeenth
century opinions that the courts had the power to
declare void an act of Parliament contrary to the
common law.^ But in the eighteenth century, the
opinion of crown lawyers was undoubtedly to
the effect that Parliament did have the power to
bind the colonies " in all cases whatsoever." The
earlier idea crept into the law books, however, and
hence came to be used for poUtical purposes, after
it had ceased to have any real value as a legal
principle.

Such was the nature of the constitutional argu-
ment which gave legal color and character to the
first resistance against the British government.^
Concurrently with this reasoning appeared much

1 Mansfield's argument in favor of Parliamentary supremacy is
sketched by Bancroft, Vol. Ill, 190 ff. (last revision, 1 891).

2 See Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 118 a.

° On this subject see an article by H. L. Osgood, " England and
the Colonies," in the Political Science Quarterly ^ II, 440-69 ; also
Sir Frederick Pollock on " Sovereignty in English Law," in tha
Harvard Law Review, Vol. VIII, 243 ff.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 47

that was based on more abstract doctrines. The
fundamental principles of the political theory of
the "Fathers " were similar to those of the English
revolutionists in the seventeenth century. The
leading propositions in this philosophy were these.
Before the establishment of civil government, men
exist in a " state of nature," are subject only to the
" law of nature," and possess a number of so-called
"natural rights." How far these rights extend
every man determines for himself, and each en-
forces his own judgment. Government is created
by means of a contract in which every one sur-
renders enough of his natural rights to permit the
establishment of an organized authority, — "a
common umpire." But in case the government
becomes oppressive, the people may then exercise
the reserved right of resistance and overthrow the
established authority.

The colonists believed, then, in a pre-govern-
mental state of nature. In this condition no man
is subject to another, but each protects and defends
himself — is perfectly free and independent. In
the state of nature, moreover, all men are equal,
not in the physical or intellectual sense, but so far
as concerns jurisdiction or authority. No man is
born ruler or governor of others, but all are created
free to rule themselves, and equal in the right to
rule themselves.

All men possess, it was further maintained, a
group of what were called " natural rights." No

48 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIKS

subject was more frequently a topic of discussion
than the rights of the colonists. These were to a
great extent regarded as legal or constitutional
rights against Parliament or against the crown, and
elaborate arguments were made from this point of
view. The colonists were not content, however, to
stop with this kind of reasoning, but carried the
discussion beyond the boundary line of public law.
They declared that there exists a body of natural
rights antedating the existence of government and
superior to it in authority. These natural rights, it
was held, are the real basis of political rights, and
hence the action of the Britis'i government, even
if strictly legal, was still regarded as contrary to
the inherent rights of man. This idea was boldly
and forcibly expressed by many of the Patriot
lep'lers. Dickinson declared that " our liberties do
not come from charters ; for these are only the
declaration of preexisting rights. They do not
depend on parchments or seals ; but come from
the King of Kings and Lord of all the earth."
John Adams said that rights do not come fronv
princes or parliaments ; but are coaeval with these.
They are founded " in the frame of human nature,
rooted in the constitution of the intellectual and
moral world," derived from "the Great Legislator
of the universe." Even more vividly the youth-
ful Hamilton asserted that "the sacred rights of
mankind are not to be rummaged for among
old parchments or musty records. They are

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 4g

written as with a sunbeam in the whole volume of
human nature, by the hand of the Divinity itself
and can never be erased or obscured by mortal
power."

What constitutes these rights was best stated in
the Declaration of Independence, where it was
asserted that all men are " endowed with certain
inalienable rights ; among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness." In the state con-
stitutions the same idea appeared, clothed in differ-
ent phraseology. For example New Hampshire
stated that there are "certain natural, essential,
and inherent rights, among which are the enjoying
and defending life and liberty ; acquiring, possess-
ing and protecting property ; and in a word, of seek-
ing and obtaining happiness." These are rights
which belong to every man by virtue of his exist-
ence. They are antecedent to the formation of
political society, and the necessary basis of all just
government. The colonists proposed, therefore, to
base their claim on the rights of British subjects,
but if these were not recognized, then they would
go deeper down and rest their contention on the
natural rights of man.

The belief in the state of nature, and in the
freedom, equality, and natural rights of man, was
accompanied by the theory of contract as the
necessary basis of all legitimate government. If
men are born free and equal, then no government
can claim allegiance and obedience from them,

50 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

unless they agree to it. ^ It appeared to the men
of this time as indisputably true that a just and
free political society could rest on no other basis
than the consent of the individuals to be ruled.
This seemed the only rational way to explain the
existence of government with coercive power over
individuals who might otherwise live as independent
sovereigns. Hence some form of contract was re-
garded as a necessary step in the establishment of
all legitimate government. This idea was taken
up the more readily by Americans, because of the
prominence it had enjoyed when the early New
England settlements were formed. Hence it is not
surprising to find in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence the statement that " governments derive their
just powers from the consent of the governed " ; or
in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights that, " the body
politic is formed by a voluntary association of in-
dividuals; it is a social compact by which the
whole people covenants with each citizen and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall
be governed by certain laws for the common
good."

The exact nature of this contract was little dis-
cussed. Thomas Paine in his Common Sense gave
a fanciful sketch of early patriarchs assembling
to form a government. Another authority agreed
with Locke that the contract dates back so far that
we have no record of it. "What eye," he said,
" could penetrate through gothic night and barba-

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 51

rous fable to that remote period ? " 1 In general,
however, there was a wise indifference to the
details of the original contract. The Patriots were
content with the understanding that governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed, as a working hypothesis. This was
accepted as one of the axioms in political philoso-
phy, which no one in his political senses would
question.

Closely connected with the theory of the social
contract, was the proposition of the Americans,
that " taxation without representation is tyranny,"
and the more general idea into which this was
often merged ; namely, that all legitimate legisla-
tion must rest upon representation or consent.
This was discussed from the point of view of Par-
liamentary authority and the rights of Englishmen ;
but this was not the only angle from which the ques-
tion was approached. The right to be represented
was regarded not only as the right of Englishmen,
but as the right of all men existing under a free
government ; ^ indeed it seemed to be considered
as the most fundamental of all rights, the sine qua
non of political liberty. The principle was looked
upon as one of general application, and not peculiar

1 Boston Orations, in Niles's Principles and Acts of the Revolution
in America, pp. 51-52. Cf. Samuel Adams, in Wells, I, 429; Hop-
kins, in R. I. Records, VI, 416. Otis's idea of the contract was
somewhat different.

"^ Adams said that " English liberties are but certain rights of
nature reserved to the citizen by the English constitution." IV, 124.

52 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

to English constitutional law. \ John Adams main-
tained that " the very definition of a freeman is one
who is bound by no law to which he has not con-
sented." ^ Dickinson repudiated in strong terms
the right to levy taxes, where the taxpayers are
not represented. " Craft and cruelty," he said,
" are striving to brand us with marks infamously
denoting us to be their property as absolutely as
their cattle." ^ In accordance with this line of
argument was Hamilton's assertion that "civil
liberty cannot possibly have any existence, where
the society for whom laws are made have no share
in making them."

The principle of consent to taxation and law-
making in general was the strategic point, which
the Patriots defended with all the resources of con-
stitutional law and political theory at their com-
mand. If natural rights and the social contract
have any vital force at all, they reasoned, they
must be capable of use in the defence of a man's
own property. If all that one has can be taken
away by laws passed by a distant legislature in
which one has no voice, then there is an end of
natural right and the subversion of the social con-
tract. This question of taxation appeared to the
Patriots as the central point in the whole contro-
versy, theoretically as well as practically. It
mattered not what the amount of the tax was, nor

1 Works, IV, 28.

3 Hid., XIV, 495. Cf. S. Adami, in WeUs, I, 154 B.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 53

how easily it might be paid; the principle was
essentially the same. Hopkins declared ^ that
" one who is bound to obey the will of another is
as really a slave, though he have a good master,
as if he had a bad one." The men of the Revo-
lution saw only the two alternatives: freedom or
slavery; taxation and representation, or taxation
without representation.^ They recognized no mid-
dle ground either in constitutional law or in
political theory : they must be either wholly slave
or wholly free, and the test of this was whether
they were or were not afforded an opportunity
to consent to taxes levied upon them. This was
the theoretical point upon which the Revolution
turned.

Related to the theory of natural rights and the
"consent of the governed," was the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. That the people are the basis
of all legitimate political authority was a proposi-

1 R. I. Records, VI, 423. Cf. Dickinson, XIV, 356 ff.

* Dickinson evolved an elaborate syllogism to prove that taxation
without representation is tyranny.

(i) God gave no one a right to make others miserable ; hence
the right to be happy.

(2) There can be no happiness without freedom; hence the
right to freedom.

(3) There can be no freedom without security of property ;
hence the right to such security.

(4) Property is not secure if it can be taken without one's con-
sent ; hence the right to be taxed only when consenting, personally
or through representatives. Memoirs of the Historical Society 0/
Pennsylvania, Vol. XIV, 262.

54 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

tion which was little disputed at this time. Since
all men are born with the same natural rights,
and inasmuch as all legitimate government must
be based upon the consent of these individuals,
it is evident that the great mass of the people
are the foundation of the state. No sovereignty
can come into existence or continue to exist, unless
the people consent to and authorize it. The in-
herent and inalienable sovereignty of the people
was therefore assumed as a political principle of
incontestable validity, — a premise which could not
be assailed. Although frequent reference was
made to this doctrine, there was little attempt at
scientific discussion of the idea : it seemed, indeed,
to be so generally recognized that elaborate argu-
ment upon the question was superfluous.

In the Declaration of Independence the doctrine
was stated in the familiar form, " governments de-
rive their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned." A more explicit statement was that con-
tained in the Massachusetts Proclamation (1776),^
to the effect that the sovereign power " resides,
always, in the body of the people ; and it never was,
or can be, delegated to one man or a few, the great
Creator having never given to men a right to vest
others with authority over them, unlimited either
in duration or degree." Similar declarations found
their way into the state constitutions. Thus North
Carolina said that " all political power is vested in

' Force's American Archives, Fourth Series, Vol. IV, p. 834.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 55

and derived from the people only"; New Hamp-
shire, that " all government of right originates from
the people"; and the same sentiment was expressed
elsewhere with slight variation in the phraseology.
The constructive applications of this doctrine will
be considered later. The destructive application
of the doctrine took the form of the right of resist-
ance, — naturally one of the most conspicuous of
the doctrines of 1776. The Revolutionary move-
ment rested upon a theoretical basis which served
as a justification for the necessarily illegal conduct
of the Patriots. In the preceding century two
revolutions had occurred in England, and the
theory of revolution had received classic formu-
lation in the treatise of John Locke. The Ameri-
cans were thus supplied with ample precedent from
England in both historical events and philosophic
formulae.

Even before the conflict with England had be-
gun, a decidedly independent spirit had been mani-
fested in many of the colonies, and there were not
lacking corresponding expressions of opinion. A
bold statement of the right of resistance was made
by Rev. Jonathan Mayhew on the anniversary of
the execution of King Charles (1749). Mayhew
referred to the experience of England and to the
theory of Locke. He denounced unjust and tyran-
nical magistrates in the most unsparing terms, de-
claring that when they cease to perform their
functions properly, they " cease to be the ordinance

56 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

and ministers of God, and no more deserve that
glorious character than common pirates and high-
way-men." 1 Mayhew admitted that this principle
might be perverted to bad ends, but maintained
that this is true of all principles, including that of
passive obedience.

When the opposition to the English policy
became widespread, and it seemed that open re-
sistance must be made, arguments in favor of the
right of revolution appeared upon every hand. A
general belief in such a right was vital to the suc-
cess of the Revolutionary movement, for nothing
could be done if it was believed that government
was something too sacred to be touched. History
and philosophy were therefore drawn upon, to
support the justice of resistance to government in
extreme cases. All of the Patriot leaders defended
the right of revolution with earnestness and vigor.
Samuel Adams turned the argument against rulers,
by asserting that kings and magistrates may also
be guilty of treason and rebellion, and on the whole
have been guilty more often than their subjects.^
Dickinson took strong ground against the doctrine
of passive obedience, urging that Parliament might
sometimes do wrong, and in such cases resistance
was advisable. Although praising the king and the
royal line, he showed that even a father may do

1 Sermon at the West Meeting House in Boston, 1749-1750, con-
tained in The Pulpit of the American Revolution, by J. W. Thornton,
a WelU, I, 433 (1771).

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 57

injury to his child : — "If my father, deceived and
urged on by bad or weak men, said he, should offer
me a draught of poison and tell me it would be of
service to me, should I be undutiful, if, knowing
what it is, I refuse to drink it ? " ^ Samuel Langdon,
President of Harvard, declared before the Congress
of Massachusetts (1775) that if magistrates forget
their duty, "reason and justice require that they
should be discarded and others appointed in their
room, without any regard to formal resignations
of their forfeited power." * Seldom was there dis-
pute as to the right of revolution ; the greatest dif-
ference was in the form of statement, or, on the
part of others, in regard to the expediency of re-
sort to it at that particular time.

As might be expected, the Revolutionary idea
found at times rather radical expression. An ex-
ample of this type is the following statement made
in one of the annual Boston orations. The speaker
here defined civil liberty as " a power existing in
the people at large, at any time, for any cause, or
for no cause but their sovereign pleasure, to alter
or annihilate both the mode and essence of any
former government and adopt a new one in its
stead." Benjamin Church declared that "where
a degrading servitude is the detestable alternative,
who can shudder at the reluctant poignard of a
Brutus, the crimsoned axe of a Cromwell, or the

1 Cf. Hamilton, Works, edited by J. C. Hamilton, II, 95.
» Thornton, op. cU., 250.

58 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

reeking dagger of a Ravillac ? " ^ The more
moderate form of the Declaration of Independence
is f amiUar to all : " Whenever any form of govern-
ment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
right of the people to alter or to aboUsh it, and to
institute new government, laying its foundations on
such principles and organizing its powers in such
form, as shall seem most likely to effect their safety
and happiness."

Frequently this philosophy found a channel of
expression in the constitutions of the states. New
Hampshire asserted that the doctrine of non-re-
sistance is " slavish, absurd, and destructive of the
good and happiness of mankind." Pennsylvania
said that "the community hath an indubitable, in-
alienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or
abolish government in such manner as shall by
that community be judged most conducive to the
common weal." Delaware stated that "persons
entrusted with the Legislative and Executive power
are the trustees and servants of the publick, and as
such are accountable for their conduct ; wherefore,
whenever the ends of Government are perverted
and publick liberty manifestly endangered by the
Legislative singly or a treacherous combination of
both, the people may and of right ought to estab-
lish a new or reform the old Government."

The theory of the state of nature, natural rights,
and the contract were all steps leading up to the
1 NUes, op. cit., 10.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 59

right of revolution. If all these premises were
accepted, as they generally were, the conclusion
was easy. One might doubt the expediency or
advantage of revolution ; but that it was logically
justifiable in theory was hardly questioned. The
right of resistance was one of the "fundamentals"
over which there was but little dispute. The colo-
nists firmly believed that their natural rights had
been violated, and that they were wholly justified
in the best self-defence possible. These rights
were not to be infringed by the government, but
to be protected ; if, on the contrary, these inherent
and inalienable rights were attacked and abused
by government, then there was undoubted justifi-
cation for armed defence of them. Such defence
was not only a right, but even a duty for all free
men or those who loved freedom.

This argument was of course closely related to
the constitutional plea made in behalf of the Patri-
ots. There was thus a twofold justification for their
resistance; first, that the action of Parliament in
regard to the colonies was unconstitutional ; and
second, that even if constitutional, this action was
in violation of the natural rights of the colonists.
In the early period of the struggle the constitu-
tional defence was most conspicuous ; in the later
period the plea of natural rights was more promi-
nent. If their rights as British subjects could not
be maintained, they could at least defend their
rights as men. The argument from the constitU'

6o AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

tion was not abandoned, but the doctrine of natura\
right was less open to attack and was consequently
more effective. Hence the increasing complaints
of the colonists that their inalienable rights as
men were being attacked, and that they were in
danger of being reduced to abject slavery. In
some cases it was claimed, following the prece-
dent set by the House of Commons in 1689,
that the king had broken the contract with the
people.^ In others it was asserted that the
social contract had been broken, and the state
of nature restored.'* To all, however, it was plain
that their sacred rights were being assailed, and
that they had a counter-right to resist to the last
extremity.

In an examination of the revolutionary theory,
some attention must be given to the prevailing

1 Judge Drayton's charge to the grand jury (Charleston, S.C),
in Niles, 75 ; James Wilson in the Philadelphia Convention of 1775.

' Thacher, in Boston Orations, Niles, 23. In the first Congress,
the theory was advanced that after the disavowal of allegiance to
Great Britain, in 1776, the people were reduced to a state of nature
and formed an entirely new social compact. The seat of one Smith,
of South Carolina, who was abroad at that time, 1776, was con-
tested on the ground that he had not taken part in their compact
and hence was not a citizen. Mr. Jackson said that " many of the
states were a considerable period without establishing constitutions
of government, and during that period we were in a little better
state than that of nature ; and then it was that every man made his
election for an original compact, or tie, which by his own act, or
that of his father for him, he became bound to submit to." Annals
of Congress, 1, 407. See Madison's argument to the contrary, 1, 404.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 6l

conception as to the purpose of government
There is not to be discerned, however, any Careful
analysis of this idea, for the men of this day were
concerned with the purpose of government only in
so far as they could use it to show that England
was perverting this purpose. So far as they rea-
soned at all about the function of government in
general, their theory was in line with the individu-
alistic and democratic character of their other
philosophy.

The chief end of government was considered to
be the welfare of the people, by whom and for
whom it is instituted and maintained. Massachu-
setts said that "the end of the institution, main-
tenance, and administration of government, is to
secure the existence of the body politic, to protect
and furnish the individuals who compose it with
the power of enjoying in safety and tranquillity
their natural rights and the blessings of life."
Again, the function of the government as the
guardian of the general interest is contrasted with
the " special privilege " idea. Thus it was urged
in the constitution of Vermont that " the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people,
nation, or community, and not the particular emolu-
ment or advantage of any single man, family, or
set of men who are a part only of that community,"
is the proper end of government.

The "good of the people," if more closely ex-
amined, was found to consist in the protection of

62 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

person and property. The prevalent idea was
forcibly expressed by John Hancock when he said :
" Security to the persons and properties of the
governed is so obviously the design and end of
civil government, that to attempt a logical proof of
it, would be Uke burning tapers at noonday to assist
the sun in enlightening the world." ^ Samuel
Adams asserted that " the security of right and
property is the great end of government. . . .
Such measures as tend to render right and prop-
erty precarious tend to destroy both property and
government." 2 That such were the great purposes
for which government was instituted appeared
self-evident, and extended defence of the proposi-
tions was deemed unnecessary and superfluous.
Government must on the one hand protect the in-
dividual from the danger of foreign attack, and on
the other maintain the security of his property and
the safety of his person.

On the whole, there was a much more definite
idea as to what the government should not do than
as to what it should do. This is evident from the
denunciation of the arbitrary conduct of English
officials on certain occasions, and from the limita-
tions placed upon the power of the state govem-

1 Niles, 13.

2 Wells, I, 154. In the theory of Paine, a distinction was made
between society and government. Society is regarded as a blessing,
government as an evil; society is a "patron"; government a
" punisher," Works, I, 69.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 63

ments in the state constitutions. Interference with
freedom of person, security of property, free
speech, freedom of religion, equality before the
law, — these were things which were expressly for-
bidden to the government. It was the negative
side of government with which the Patriots were
most concerned. They did not reason about the
purpose of government further than to assert that
whatever the state does, a large measure of civil
liberty should be left to the individual.

It is not to be presumed, however, that there
was entire unanimity of opinion among the peo-
ple upon these questions of political science.
Loyalist feeling was strong among the colonists
and with many was predominant. The num-
ber of Tories is of course difficult to esti-
mate, but it must have been large. In some
localities the Tory element was in the majority
and in others constituted a strong minority.
Many of the Loyalists were opposed to the Revo-
lution on grounds of expediency, others from
personal reasons, but still others on political
principle. A striking type of this latter class was
Jonathan Boucher,^ a clergyman in Virginia and
Maryland from 1759 to 1775, and finally driven
out for his too decided expression of Loyalist sen-
timent. His ideas are contained in a collection of

1 Born in England, 1738 ; removed to America, 1759 ; rector in
Virginia and Maryland to 1775 ; died in England, 1804.

64 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

his addresses under the title, A View of the Cause
and Consequences of the American Revolution

(1797)-

Boucher's opposition to the colonial theory way

clear-cut and distinct. There was no attempt to
evade the issue or to conceal his true sentiments
on the political questions of the day. He was
squarely opposed to the doctrines of the Revolu-
tionary leaders, and his boldly enunciated ideas
stand in striking contrast to those defended by the
Patriots.

Boucher had little love for the people, and saw
nothing to admire in the prevailing democratic
tendencies. Never was there a time, he declared,
when there was a greater lack of steady and fixed
principles than now. The irreverence of the chil-
dren, the infidelity to the marriage relation, the at-
titude of the rich toward the poor, afforded him
evidence of a sad decline in general virtue.
I The doctrine that government rests on the con-
sent of the governed, he regarded as wholly un-
founded. If there were such consent given, it
could be withdrawn at the option of the one who
had given it. Consent, therefore, is an utterly im-
practicable basis for the existence and maintenance
of any settled government. If the principle were
logically carried out, no authority of any permanent
character would be possible. The contract theory,
as he saw it, involved assumptions which could
not legitimately be made. "The supposition,"

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 65

said he, "that a large concourse of people, in a
rude and imperfect state of society, or even a ma-
jority of them, should thus rationally and unani-
mously concur to subject themselves to various
restrictions, many of them irksome and unpleasant
and all of them contrary to their former habits, is
to suppose them possessed of more wisdom and '
virtue than multitudes in any instance in real life ''
have shown."

That men are in any sense equal he also denied. '^
Individuals are not equal, as is often presumed, but
differ from each other in everything that can be
supposed to lead to supremacy and subjection —
" as one star differs from another star in glory."
The foundation principle of government is not any
such alleged natural equality of men, but, on the
contrary, the very fact that there are inequalities
among them makes possible the superiorities and
inferiorities implied in any governmental system.

Boucher's theory was that government is from
God. " It would be unreasonable," he said, " to
suppose that God, having created men, should turn
them loose in the world with no other guide than
their own passions ; that like so many wild beasts,
they might tear and worry one another in their
mad contest for preeminence." He therefore
rejected emphatically any such theory of govern-
mental genesis, and declared that the power of
government was given by God to the first man.
The first father, therefore, was the first king, and

^ AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

all kings and princes derive their power from God,
the source and centre of all power. Though they
govern for the benefit of the people, they are not
created by the people. Their tenure of oiifice they
owe to God, and they reign independently of the
people.^ Nor did Boucher agree that government
is an evil, as alleged by some of the democratic
writers. Government, he declared, is no more an
evil than is medicine. The evil is not in the gov-
ernment, but in the conditions which are such as
to render the coercive action of government neces-
sary. To political authority, men owe some of the
greatest blessings they enjoy. It has brought
them out of the original state of sin, misery, and
barbarity, and enabled them to reach the high
position they now occupy. Lawful government is
the greatest blessing that mankind enjoy, and is
the very life and soul of society.

All government, according to Boucher, is essen-
tially absolute and irresistible. It is not within the
competence of the supreme power to limit itself ;
for such limitation must come, if at all, from a
higher source, i.e., from a superior. The govern-
ment which ceases to be absolute, ceases to be
government by elimination of the very element
upon which its governmental character depends.
This theory Boucher would apply to government
by the many as well as by one. He does not limit

' For the English origin of Boucher's theory, see Sir Robert
Filmer's Patriarcha, the classic defence of divine rights in England.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 67

the doctrine to any particular form of rule, but
maintains it as true of any and all government,
as such.

The obvious corollary of these fundamentals
in Boucher's theory is the denial of all right
of resistance to authority. Government being
based, not upon natural right, nor upon popular
consent, but upon the will and the ordinance of
God, every man is consequently bound to render
to the government under which he lives an obedi-
ence either active or passive, — active obedience in
all cases where not forbidden by God and passive
wherever forbidden by God's command ; for no
governmental order has any force against the ex-
press word of God.

Resistance to government Boucher held in
the deepest abhorrence. Lucifer, he declared,
was the author and founder of rebellion. He con-
demned in set terms " the damnable doctrine and
position that any government, lawfully established,
may be denounced or resisted by any self-commis-
sioned persons invested with no authority by law,
on any pretence whatsoever." Government was to
him something sacred and inviolable, deserving the
respect and obedience of all citizens. The charac-
ter and the acts of rulers should not be defamed
and decried, for such conduct is unbecoming toward
the divinely sanctioned authorities. Every citizen
owes and should pay strict obedience, except in the
case already cited. Kings are not infallible ; rulers

68 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

may on occasions do wrong, but even in such rare
instances, obedience is better than revolt against
the law and against the rulers. " A non-resisting
spirit," he declared, "never made any man a bad
subject." For one to rebel against an insignificant,
unimportant tax on tea, is entirely unjustifiable on
legal grounds and on the theory of the church, as
well as on considerations of general expediency.

Boucher could not see that any substantial benefit
could arise from opposition to the government's
policy. He did not even concede that the oppo-
sition party in Parliament afforded any real ad-
vantage to the state as a whole. While some
good might result from this opposition in a Par-
liamentary way, yet, on the whole, more evil than
good was likely to issue from it. The policy of
opposition is in general unwise, as it leads to a
low opinion of government, and tends in that way
to destroy the prestige and power of the rulers.
Moreover, people are seldom competent to criticise
the acts of those who are over them. Even if
flaws are discovered in the administration's policy,
it is better not to make violent complaint against
those in authority.^

Of any popular participation in government he
was profoundly distrustful. Democracy was, in
his eyes, almost the equivalent of anarchy. It
signified to him a desire for equality of possessions,
a destruction of all motives to industry, and an

1 Cf. Samuel Johnson, Taxation no Tyranny (1775).

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 69

end to all security. His attitude toward the peo-
ple is well summed up in his sermon on Absalom,
in which he declared : " Mankind have seldom
been assembled in great numbers for any useful
purpose. Whenever we see a vast multitude, we
may well exclaim with Jacob, O my soul, come
not thou into their secret; unto their assembly,
mine honor, be not thou united."^

Further light on the ideas of 'jQ is given by
an examination of the attitude of the colonists
toward monarchy and the hereditary principle.
In the early days of resistance there was no show
of contempt for monarchy or for the British con-
stitution. On the contrary, there was frequent
expression of admiration for this type of political
organization. Otis accurately voiced this popu-
lar feeling when he said that the British constitu-
tion was the best in the world, its king the best,
and his subjects the happiest. John Adams
pointed out the strong features of the British con-
stitution and praised its many excellencies. Even
Samuel Adams was on record as having strongly
indorsed the English system : " In none that I
have ever met with is the power of the governors
and the rights of the governed more nicely ad-

1 In the preface to his volume Boucher suggested that the people
of Great Britain remove to the East, where " undisturbed by repub-
lican projects, so abhorrent to the genius of Asia," they might lir«
at peace with all the world.

70

AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

justed, or the power which is necessary in the
very nature of government to be intrusted in the
hands of some, by wiser checks prevented from
growing exorbitant." ^ The colonists wished to
show that they were not at all in opposition to the
British constitution, but only to its abuse by un-
scrupulous and designing men. Their position
was, that if the constitution were only properly
interpreted and applied, there would be no ground
for complaint.

But when once the war had actually begun, the
latent democratic sentiment appeared, and it then
became evident that the British model was no
longer to be regarded as the most perfect instru-
ment of government in the world. By far the
most striking expression of this democratic idea
was Thomas Paine's remarkable pamphlet Common
Sense, which appeared in 1776. ^ This was a
bitter and violent criticism of the British constitu-
tion, of monarchy, and everything connected there-
with ; and it was indicative of a striking change
of sentiment in America.

In the institution of monarchy, Paine could
discern nothing whatever that was worthy of ap-
proval, much less of imitation. Every king was

1 Wells, I, 21.

^ See the discussion of " Paine's Political Theories," Political
Science Quarterly, September, 1899. Cf. also Paine's The For-
ester's Letters (1776), and The American Crisis (i 776-1 783).
References are to Conway's edition of Paine's writings.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD yi

to him a George III and a George III at his
worst. The whole vocabulary of abuse he ex-
hausted in the effort to render monarchy odious
and ridiculous. " Sceptred savage," " royal brute,"
"breathing automaton," are his attempts at accu-
rate characterization of kings. Monarchs, in his
estimation, are really only useless and expensive
figureheads, the sooner dispensed with the better.
In an absolute monarchy a king may possibly
have some function to perform, even though it be
an odious one ; but in the so-called constitutional
monarchy the king is neither judge nor general;
he is only a superfluous figurehead. His duties
consist in giving away places for ;£8oo,ooo a year,
and being worshipped in the bargain. Paine ridi-
culed the idea of the divine right of kings, holding
up, as an example of the absurdity of this, William
the Conqueror. Kings are chosen in general, he
thought, because of their " ruffianly preeminence,"
rather than by divine approval. Paine's opinion
of monarchy may be summed up in the one brief
statement : " Of more worth is one honest man to
society, and in the sight of God, than all the
crowned ruffians that ever lived." ^

For the principle of hereditary succession, Paine
had an unconquerable antipathy. In Common
Sense he discussed and refuted three alleged
methods of its origin, — namely, lot, election, and
usurpation. If the first ruler were chosen by lot,
1 Works, I, 84.

72 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

said Paine, then this establishes a precedent foi
such a method of choice, and the next one should
be chosen in the same way. The fact that the
first was chosen by lot is also an argument that
the second should also be so selected. If by
election, then this does not destroy the right of
the succeeding generation ; for, if the first genera-
tion had the right to choose, then the second must
have the same right. The only parallel to the
doctrine that after the first election the element
of choice disappears, is the theological tenet of
original sin : " In Adam all sinned, and in the
first electors all men obeyed ; in the one all man-
kind were subjected to Satan, and in the other to
sovereignty; our innocence was lost in the first
and our authority in the last."^ Usurpation, as a
basis for hereditary succession, he refused to con-
sider seriously, declaring it beneath the dignity of
a refutation.

Specific arguments were also made against the
system in question. Such an institution is unwise,
it was urged, because of the training of the pro-
spective ruler in idleness and luxury ; because of
the danger involved in the accession of an infant
monarch ; and again because of the likelihood of
wars to determine who is the proper heir. Nor
was Paine able to see any justification for the sys-
tem in utility. He was blind to all elements of
strength it might contain, and could find scarcely
1 Works, I, 8i.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 73

anything good in hereditary descent; it seemed
to him an absurd method of selecting officials.
The plan is contrary to nature and reason ; and
it is, in fact, hardly conceivable how apparently
sensible people ever came to adopt it. We do
not think of attempting to establish an hereditary
wise man, or an hereditary mathematician, or an
hereditary poet. Why, then, an hereditary ruler,
who is no more certain of possessing the necessary
governing qualities than the hereditary wise man
of possessing the proper amount of knowledge.'

Even the much lauded checks and balances found
in the British constitution did not elicit any praise
from Paine. He inquired why such a device as
balances should be necessary at all. If the king
is trustworthy, why need he be checked .■' if not
trustworthy, why should he be king at all } In
any event the heaviest weight will always be the
governing power, and in the British constitution
this is the crown. The other departments may
check or retard its motion, but cannot prevent its
ultimate action. The strongest power will finally
prevail, and what it wants in speed is supplied by
time. Paine was therefore unwilling to join in the
general worship of the English check and balance
system. In fact, he maintained that the security
and happiness of the English are not due to the
form of the constitution, but to the characteristics
of the people. So far as the government alone
is concerned, it might be as despotic as in Turkey.

74 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

The essential and fundamental fact is the habit
and custom of the people, and this it is that makes
England a free country.

Paine's reasoning, however, presented a style of
argument new to the colonists. There was now
displayed no love of, or even respect for the king,
or for the institution of monarchy ; no praise was
bestowed on the English constitution. It was no
longer intimated that the old institution with some
modification would prove perfectly acceptable, but
there was a bold demand for separation from gov-
ernment by the mother country and from the form
of government in the mother country. The Com-
mon Sense seemed to mark the turning-point in
American policy. From that time on, the advo-
cates of independence triumphed ; the " Fathers "
turned against George III, and from the institution
of monarchy as well, and at about the same time.

More light on the political ideas of the " Fathers "
is given by a further study of the extension and
application of the doctrines already considered.
The fundamentals of the revolutionary theory
were almost altogether reproductions of the Eng-
Ush political philosophy of the preceding century,
but the founders of the Republic did not halt at
the point reached by their fore-fathers. They
advanced the line of democratic theory and prac-
tice in accordance with the jnore democratic con-
ditions. The English movement of the seventeenth

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 75

century culminated in the establishment of a con-
stitutional monarchy ; the American movement
went far beyond this in a democratic direction.
To these changes our attention will now be di-
rected.

In the construction of state constitutions, the
monarchic and many of the aristocratic elements
found in the British constitution were omitted.
The frame of government became more democratic
in nature. Privileged aristocracy had never been
able to obtain a foothold in the colonies, and 1776
was no time to gain one. Monarchy was identified
with George III and the English system of admin-
istration, and consequently no place was made for
such a governmental feature.

Many expressions of dislike for special privilege
and hereditary rank are found in the first constitu-
tions adopted in the states, and no stronger evi-
dence as to the nature of the prevailing sentiment
could be given than is offered by these early
declarations. Massachusetts, for example, asserted .
that government is instituted for the common good ^
and happiness of the whole people ; — " not for the
profit, honor or private interest of any one man, fam-
ily or class of men." Virginia declared that " no
man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or sepa-
rate emoluments or privileges from the community,
but in consideration of public services ; which, not
being descendible, neither ought the offices of mag-
istrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary."

76 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

The democratic environment had rendered special
privilege unwelcome, and the legislators were anx-
ious to give the prevailing sentiment constitutional
recognition. There still remained a controlling
class of gentry, but they possessed no hereditary
title, office, or privilege. There had never been
anything more than a theory of nobility in Amer-
ica; with the Revolution, even this was swept
away and the overwhelming sentiment declared
against the institution.^

In the formation of state governments, the
doctrine of delegated powers was everywhere
prevalent. Assuming that the people were, orig-
inally, and continue to be the only source of
political power, it follows that all governmental
authority is only delegated by the people and is held
in trust for them. Governmental authority has no
inherent force in itself ; it is not the creator, but the
creature ; it is not the master, nor even the partner
of the people, but their agent or servant ; it acts in .
the name of and in behalf of some one else and
not for itself. Not only is government the ser-
vant of the people, but it is an untrustworthy and
unreliable servant. It cannot be given a free hand
in caring for the affairs of its master, on the con-
trary, it must be limited in many ways ; it must be
checked at every possible point ; it must be at all
times under suspicion. Otherwise it will cease to

* Ga., N.C., S.C, Penn., declared against the entailment of
estates.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD JJ

be servant and take the place of the master. Too
much emphasis cannot well be laid upon the fear
which the " Fathers " had of government. To
them the great lesson of history was, that govern-
ment always tends to become oppressive, and that
it is the greatest foe of individual liberty.

To the end that government may be properly
held in check, the " Fathers " developed an elabo-
rate system which it was thought would adequately
safeguard the rights of the people. In the first
place, government should not be granted much
power; in the next place, such powers as were
given should be balanced and played against each
other; and finally even these powers should be
held for short terms only. By these means it was
thought that political authority might be kept close
to the people from whom it emanates, and by whose
grace it stands.

More specifically, it was an opinion of Revo-
lutionary times that government should not be
too strongly organized, lest its strength be turned
against the people. Hence a large military force
was always under suspicion. A standing army
was looked upon as a constant temptation to the
ruler and a perpetual menace to the citizen. It was
necessary for the government to have at its dis-
posal a certain amount of military strength, but
this should be kept within strict limits, and in sub-
ordination to the civil power. Again, every kind
of centralized government was steadily opposed.

78 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

It was believed that liberty was safer in the care
of the local communities, where it could be kept
under the eye of the people, and any attempt at
usurpation be instantly detected and checked.
The idea was that the farther the government is
removed from the community, the more likely it
is to tyrannize over that community. The classic
illustration of this would be, of course, the conduct
of England toward the colonies. There was, con-
sequently, great jealousy of centralized govern-
ment within the states, especially in New England,
and everywhere there was opposition to a strong
government over the states. A perfect expression
of this latter feeling was the organization of the
central government effected under the Articles of
Confederation. Following out the principle of
limiting the government as much as possible, there
were many restrictions on its action in the state
constitutions. In long and eloquent bills of rights
notice was served on government not to trespass
on certain fields of individual activity. Govern-
ment must not interfere with freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, freedom of assembly and
petition, or freedom of person and property, except
through the recognized and prescribed forms of
law.

In these various ways, then, a strong effort was
made to restrict the government to the minimum
of strength : by the subordination of military to civil
power, by the decentralization of political author-

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 79

ity, and by the enumeration of specific guaranties
against invasion of personal liberty and property.

In the same connection comes another theory
widely entertained by the " Fathers," namely, that of
the separation and balance of governmental powers.
This doctrine had been formulated by Montesquieu
in the Spirit of Laws (1748),^ basing his reasoning,
however, on observation of English conditions ;
both the theory, therefore, and the facts were well
known among the Americans. They valued highly
the division and balance of powers among king,
lords, and commons, and saw in this piece of
mechanism the strongest support of English lib-
erty. Consequently they readily accepted and
acted upon Montesquieu's theory. They firmly
beUeved that unless the three classes of govern-
mental power — the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial — were separated and a distinct organ
of government provided for each class, there could
be no certainty of political liberty.

In the state constitutions the idea of the sepa-
ration of powers found the clearest expression.
Massachusetts asserted that "in the government
of this commonwealth, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers
or either of them ; the executive shall never exer-
cise the legislative and judicial powers or either of
them ; the judicial shall never exercise the legisla-
tive and executive powers or either of them — to
1 Book XI.

8o AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIUS

the end that it may be a government of laws and
not of men." A less doctrinaire statement was
that of New Hampshire, to the effect that there
should be such a separation of powers " as the
nature of free government will admit, or as is
consistent with that chain of connection that binds
the whole fabric of the constitution in an indissolu-
ble bond of union and security."

Though the separation and balance of govern-
mental powers, was accepted in theory there was
in practice no such equilibrium established as the
theory called for.^ On the contrary, there was an ex-
altation of the function and position of the legisla-
ture and a corresponding depression of the others,
particularly the executive. Everywhere there was
manifested great jealousy of the state executive,
and numerous restrictions were thrown around his
tenure, term, and prerogatives. In many cases
the governor was elected by the legislature,^ his
term of office was limited to one year,^ restrictions
were placed upon his appointing power, and in
only a few cases was the veto allowed.* The
judiciary was declared independent by some states,
but was generally dependent in respect to appoint-

^ On the Revolutionary State Constitutions see " The First State
Constitutions," by W. C. Morey, in Annah of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, Vol. IV ; also, in Vol. IX, " Revolu-
tionary State Constitutions," by W. C. Webster.

2 N.J., Del., Md., Va., N.C., S.C, Penn., Ga.

8 N.H., N.C., Va., Mass., N.J., Penn., Ga., Conn., R.I., Md.

* Mass., S.C. (1776), N.Y. (v^ith Council of Revision).

THEORY OF RE VOL UTIONAR Y PERIOD 8 1

meiit and salary upon the governor and council,
Dr even directly upon the legislature.^ When it
is further considered that in many states almost all
of the important officers were appointed by the
legislature; that in two states there was a uni-
cameral legislature ; 2 and that the constitution-
amending power was often vested in the ordinary
legislature,^ — it becomes evident that the predomi-
nant position was held by that body. The strong
dislike of the English crown and of the royal
governors had led to a reaction against executive
authority in general that resulted in the practical
supremacy of another of the three coordinate
branches of government, namely, the legislature.
There was naturally greater readiness to intrust
the necessary governmental powers to this body,
inasmuch as the legislators were regarded as the
immediate representatives of the sovereign people.
In the long and bitter struggles of colonial days,
the Americans had learned to trust and rely upon
the legislature, and to suspect and antagonize the
executive. They, therefore, reduced to a mini-
mum the powers of the executive and intrusted
such authority as seemed necessary for the estab-
lishment of government to the legislature. They

1 Va., N.H. ('76), N.C, S.C., N.J., Del., R.I., Conn.

" Penn., Ga., Vt.

' In Ga., Mass., and Penn. provision was made for amendment
by a convention ; in the other states where mention was made of
amendment, the power was vested in the legislature.
G

82 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

did what the EngUsh ParUament had done and
was yet to do still more emphatically, — asserted the
superiority of the legislature over the executive.

In addition to the separation of powers, another
method used for the purpose of holding in check
the government was the grant of power for a
short term only. To guarantee security, it was
thought that power must be kept close to its true
basis, the people. In this way the rise of arbi-
trary rulers could be prevented and the officers
intrusted with power be made responsible to the
people. As John Adams once said, " where annual
elections end, there tyranny begins." ^ This idea
was conspicuous in the constitutions of the states,
where frequency of election received both theo-
retical and practical support. Maryland declared
" a long continuance in the first executive depart-
ments of power or trust is dangerous to liberty;
a rotation, therefore, in those departments is one
of the best securities of permanent freedom." Of
like import was the statement of Massachusetts:
" In order to prevent those who are vested with
authority from becoming oppressors, the people
have a right ... to cause their public officers to
return to private life." In general, officers were
allowed short terms only. Governors were in
many cases annually elected, legislatures for the
same period, and other officers, with the exception of
judges, followed the same rule. This requirement
^ Cf. the Pennsylvania Constitution, Sec. 19.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 83

was made still more rigid by the provision in many
instances that the office-holder should be ineligible
to the same office for a certain period of years, as
one in three, two in four, or some like ratio. Thus
the officer was not only limited to a short term, but
was forbidden continued reelection, and constitu-
tionally forced to retire, even though his adminis-
tration had been of the ablest kind. The evils arising
from the existence of a permanent or hereditary
office-holding class, it was determined to prevent
even at the cost of administrative efficiency.

In these different ways, then, the attempt was
made to keep alive the principle of popular sover-
eignty, and to prevent the development of a tyran-
nical government. What was feared at that day was
not the incapacity or inefficiency of those conduct-
ing the administration, but the tendency of the rul-
ing class to oppress in some way or other the class
to be ruled. To the theorist of that time, every
officer appeared to be a possible foe to the secu-
rity of the individual and his property. The great
guaranty of liberty was, therefore, to give the rulers
as little power as possible and then to surround them
with numerous restrictions, to balance power against
power, to compel a frequent return to the people
for renewal of the tenure of authority. This was
the mechanism devised to carry out the democratic
theory, and to prevent the recurrence of govern-
mental tyranny.

It is essential to notice, however, that while the

84 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

revolutionary theory was democratic on its destruc
tive side, and to a certain extent on the constructive
side, there were also present aristocratic tendencies
of a pronounced character. Democracy had by no
means reached the degree of development that was
attained in the following century.

The most marked of these aristocratic features
in the government of the " Fathers " was the limi-
tation upon the suffrage. In actual practice the
basis of their democracy was not very broad, or,
at least, was relatively narrow when compared with
that of the present day. The principle was laid
down in some of the state constitutions that those
were entitled to the suffrage who showed "sufficient
evidence of attachment to the community." This
evidence, however, generally consisted in the pos-
session of a certain amount of property, preferably
real estate. In discussing the subject of represen-
tation, Franklin said that " as to those who have no
landed property, ... the allowing them to vote for
legislators is an impropriety." i Hamilton consid-
ered that those who possessed no property could
not properly be regarded as having a will of their
own.2

In drawing up the state constitutions the prop-
erty qualification was adopted, as a guide for de-
termining who should be entitled to participate in
the choice of officers. The accepted idea was that

1 Works, IV, 221, 1766.

" Ibid, II, 62 ff., The Farmer Refuted.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 8$

the political people were the land-holding class.
^The states either required the possession of a free-
hold, or accepted a property equivalent of some
kind. All the states agreed in requiring some evi-
dence that the voter had a financial interest in the
community, — either a free-hold of a certain value,
or other estate, or the payment of some public
tax. The man who was not able to qualify in this
way could not cast a vote under the laws of any of
the states. He was not regarded as sufficiently
attached to the community to justify participation
in its political life. In this way the voting constit-
uency was limited to a fraction of the adult male
population, much less than half.

The same tendency is evident in the require-
ments for office-holding. Here also the property-
holding class has the privileged position. It was
provided in many states that the governor must be
a freeholder, thus showing a preference not only
for property in general, but for landed property
in particular. In some instances the value of the
freehold was fixed at a very considerable figure;
in Massachusetts, for example, at £\QO0, in Mary-
land at ;^Scoo, and in South Carolina at ;£ 10,000.
High property qualifications were also required for
many other offices, although not for all.^ Gen-
erally speaking, therefore, participation in political

1 An interesting discussion of legal qualifications for office in
America is given by F. H. Miller in the Annual Report of tht
American Historical Association for iSgg, Vol. I.

86 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

life was limited to the most prosperous eJerpent in
the population, and the government of that day
was a government of and by the propertied classes.

In addition to these limitations upon the political
people of 1776, there were also important religious
restrictions. Notwithstanding the rationalistic ten-
dencies of such leaders as Benjamin Franklin,
Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine, religious
qualifications held a conspicuous place in the state
constitutions. The principle of toleration for all
sects was generally recognized, but the requirement
of some religious test for public officers was not
condemned by public sentiment. In certain states
it was necessary that the governor be a Protestant,^
in others that he be a Christian.^ It was often
specified that a member of the legislature must be
a Protestant,^ in some cases he must be a Christian.*

Freedom of worship was recognized in strong
terms, with the qualification that the exercise of
the right should not disturb the public peace. For
example, in Maryland freedom of worship was
granted, " unless under color of religion any man
shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the
state, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure
others in their natural, civil, or religious rights."

1 N.H., N.J., N.C., S.C. ('78). 2 Md., Mass.

8 Ga., N.H., N.C., S.C, N.J.

* Mass., Md. Pennsylvania required belief in God, future re-
wards and punishments, inspiration of Scriptures. In Delaware
there was a similar requirement.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 87

This grant of general toleration was not con-
strued, however, as prohibiting the financial assist-
ance of the church by the state. In some cases
the legislature was allowed to levy a tax for reli-
gious purposes, allowing the taxpayer to designate
the religion to which he wished his contribution to
be given.i This did not estabUsh any one religion
in preference to another, but was a political recog-
nition of all the accepted religions. On the whole,
there were but two states in which no religious
qualifications or tests of any kind were required
for office, namely. New York and Rhode Island.

On the other hand, however, there was inserted
in the constitution of almost every state a clause
forbidding the clergy to hold office under the state.
This disqualification was sometimes absolute, ex-
tending to all civil offices, or it was sometimes
applicable only to a seat in the legislature. The
limitation was imposed for the benefit of both
church and state, that there might arise no diffi-
culties for either from too intimate a union.

It appears, then, that despite the assertion that
all men are equal, the " Fathers " in framing their
constitutions felt no reluctance about conditioning
political rights upon certain financial and religious
considerations. These restrictions operated to
throw the control of political affairs into the hands
of the freeholders who were at the same time

1 Religious establishments were constitutional in Conn., Mass,
Md., N.H., S.C, Va. during the Revolutionary period.

88 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES^

Christians and preferably Protestants. This was
the contemporary interpretation of the Declaration
of Independence. The field of political privilege
appears narrower still, when it is considered that
the negro element of the population was held in
slavery and had no political recognition at all.
Evidently the " Fathers " themselves did not regard
property, religious, or racial limitations as incon-
sistent with the rights of man or those principles
of political philosophy to which such frequent
reference was made.

It is necessary to turn now to a brief considera-
tion of the source of the theory of this time. The
origin of the dominant ideas during the Revolution
is not difficult to find. As the Patriots were guided
by the historical precedents estabUshed by Eng-
land in the seventeenth century, so they followed
the political theory developed at that time by the
revolutionary party. The rejection of two kings
within half a century was sufficient warrant for
the refusal to obey George III. The colonists
were not striking out upon a new and wholly un-
tried path, but were following in the way broken
by their ancestors of a few generations before.
If revolution were wrong, then the House of
Hanover had no legitimate claim to rule, and re-
sistance to its members could not constitute rebel-
lion. The same kind of reasoning used in
justification of the revolution that drove out the
Stuarts, might fairly be applied to the successors

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 89

of the Stuarts. The jure divitw theory had been
repudiated in England, leaving only the argument
from expediency, as the support of an existing
constitution, and in accordance with this argument
the colonists decided that independence from
Britain was better than union with her.

The advanced stage of development of English
political speculation from the democratic point of
view is often overlooked.^ The doctrines of nat-
ural rights, the contract, popular sovereignty, the
right of resistance, had been worked over and
over by the popular leaders of the seventeenth cen-
tury. The contract theory was advanced and de-
fended by many able writers, conspicuous among
whom were: Milton, in his Areopagitica (1644),
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), and first
and second Defence of the English people ( 1650-
1654); Sydney, Discourses concerning Government
(1698); and above all John Locke in his Two
Treatises of Government (1689). These men
stated the revolutionary doctrines in the boldest
form.

The Patriots were familiar with this philosophy
of their English predecessors and they followed it
closely. They referred to these writers, quoted
from them, and adopted the substance of their
argument, and in some cases the form as well.

1 This theory is analyzed by G. P. Gooch, in English DemocratU
Ideas in the Seventeenth Century, in Cambridge Historical Se..es,
Vol. X, 1898.

90 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Locke, in particular, was the authority to whom
the Patriots paid greatest deference. He was
the most famous of seventeenth century demo-
;ratic theorists, and his ideas had their due weight
with the colonists. Almost every writer seems to
have been influenced by him, many quoted his
words, and the argument of others shows the
unmistakable imprint of his philosophy. The
first great speech of Otis was wholly based upon
Locke's ideas ; Samuel Adams, on the " Rights
of the Colonists as Men and as British Subjects,"
followed the same model. Many of the phrases
of the Declaration of Independence may be found
in Locke's Treatise ;^ there is hardly any impor-
tant writer of this time who does not openly
refer to Locke, or tacitly follow the lead he had
taken. The argument in regard to the limitations
upon Parliament was taken from Locke's reflec-
tions on the " supreme legislature " and the nec-
essary restrictions upon its authority.^ No one
stated more strongly than did he the basis for the
doctrine that " taxation without representation is
tyranny." No better epitome of the Revolution-
ary theory could be found than in John Locke on
civil government. The colonists claimed no origi-

' See Sees. 220, 222, 225, 230.

^ See Sec. 1 35 ff. The four limitations upon the legislature, named
by Locke were : i . It cannot be absolutely arbitrary. 2. It must
rule by standing laws. 3. " Cannot take from any man part of
his property without his own consent." 4. Cannot transfer the
power of making laws.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 91

nality for the fundamental doctrines they preached ;
in fact they declared that these ideas were at least
as old as the days of Greece and Rome. John
Adams said : " These are what are called Revolu-
tion principles. They are the principles of Aris- :
totle and Plato ; of Livy and Cicero, and Sydney,
Harrington and Locke; the principles of nature
and eternal reason ; the principles on which the
whole government over us now stands." ^ The
Patriots did not profess to have discovered a
hitherto unknown system of political theory; on
the contrary, they appealed to an old and long
accepted theory, — a theory indeed upon which
rested the legitimacy of the English political sys-
tem of that day.

The French radical influence upon the Revolution
was comparatively small. Montesquieu's Spirit of
Laws (1748) was known to the colonists, and the
doctrines therein contained were frequently quoted.
But many of the features admired in Montesquieu
were derived from his study of the English consti-
tution and the EngUsh political system. This was
eminently true of his celebrated doctrine of the
tripartite division of governmental powers, which
he had found or thought he found in the EngUsh
constitution. M any of the other pr 03 ects advocated
by him were also derived from his study of English
institutions. The greatest of the revolutionary
philosophers of France, Rousseau, did not write
1 Works, IV, 15.

92 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

his classic work, The Social Contract, until 1762,
whereas the revolutionary doctrines of Otis were
uttered in 1761. The general philosophy of the
colonists shows little likeness to that of Rousseau,
and but infrequent reference to his theory is
made. Indeed, the fundamental ideas of the
French writer were very similar to those of
Locke.^ There is little evidence to show that the
bent of the revolutionary theory in America was
determined by the great apostle of the French
Revolution ; but on the other hand very much to
prove that the theory of Locke and the English
school was predominant.

On the whole, the theory of the Revolution was
in direct line with English political precedent and
philosophy. In their destructive or revolutionary
doctrine the "Fathers" of 1776 simply followed
their " Fathers '' of the preceding century. But in
their constructive theory, notably in their substitu-
tion for monarchy and nobility of the many demo-
cratic features embodied in their state constitutions,
they were striking out on new lines of political ex-
periment. Many of these ideas, perhaps all of
them, had been already suggested in the seven-
teenth century ; but they had been unable to win a
definite place for themselves in the English system

1 Cf. D. G. Ritchie, " Contributions to the History of the Social
Contract Theory," in Political Science Quarterly, VI, 664. In
this connection see Georg Jellinek, Die Erklarung der Menscherf
und Biirgerrechie, Leipzig, 1895.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 93

of that day,^ and were left to be realized in prac-
tice by the American democracy of the next cen-
tury.

In conclusion, then, it appears that the funda-
mental political ideas in vogue among the Patriots
were not the product of American soil, and were
not original with the men of the Revolutionary day,
but were the inheritance of English political expe-
rience and philosophy in the preceding century.
The form in which they were expressed was strik-
ing and dramatic, but the ideas themselves were
not new ; on the contrary they were, from the view-
point of political theory, doctrines long familiar.
The teaching that all men are by nature equal is
found in the Roman law,^ while the idea that
governments derive their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed, is a long accepted maxim.
Professor Gierke, the distinguished German author-
ity, says that "from the end of the thirteenth
century it was an axiom of poUtical theory that
the legal basis of all authority lay in the voluntary
subjection through contract of the community
ruled." 3 The doctrine of the right of resistance
was stated with greatest emphasis by the political
theorists of the revolutionary type in the sixteenth

1 Cf. "The Agreement of the People," 1647, in Gardiner's Con-
stitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, p. 270.

* Digest, L, 1 7, 32. Quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines
sequales sunt; from Ulpian, who died circa 328 A.D.

" Otto Gierke, Johannes Altkusitts und die Entwicklung det
nmturrecitlichen SlaatstAetrieu, Breslau, 1880.

94 AMERICA:'! POLITICAL THEORIES

and seventeenth centuries.^ To attribute the orig
ination of these ideas to the men of 1776 is, there-
fore, simply to ignore the historical development of
political theory. But in respect to the practical
application of these doctrines, what has just been
said does not apply; for a set of principles like
those involved in the construction of state consti-
tutions had never before received such public rec-
ognition. The destructive democratic theory of
the day was old, but the constructive democratic
theory as worked out in the state governments
was the product of new conditions.

By way of summary, it may be said that the
leading doctrines of the Revolutionary period were
those of what is known as the Naturrecht school
of political theory. They included the idea of an
original state of nature, in which all men are born
politically free and equal, the contractual origin
of government, the sovereignty of the people, and
the right of revolution against a government
regarded as oppressive. The latter doctrine, in
particular, was stated in the boldest and most
uncompromising form, since this was the ultimate
argument upon which the Revolution rested for its
justification.

On the constructive side, an elective executive
was substituted for hereditary monarchy, and the
institution of hereditary aristocracy abolished.
1 Cf. Rudolph Treumann, Die Monarchomachen, Leipzig, 1895.

THEORY OF REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 95

The greatest danger feared was an oppressive
government, hence numerous restrictions were
placed on the action of its organs. Many rights
were expressly reserved to the people, the tripartite
separation of governmental powers was accepted,
officers were made responsible to the people
directly or through the legislature at frequent
intervals, and often constitutionally disqualified for
a term of years. Distrust of centralized govern-
ment was shown at every point, with the exception
of the legislature, which escaped popular sus-
picion.

It will be observed that the spirit of this reason-
ing was decidedly individualistic. The starting-
point was the independent and sovereign individual,
endowed with a full set of natural rights. He
consents to give up a part of these natural rights
to form a government by means of a contract. On
this basis, political society and the state are con-
structed, and in this spirit political institutions are
interpreted throughout. This was the general
character of the revolutionary theories of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and from
this tendency America was no exception.

CHAPTER III

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT

After independence from Great Britain had been
won and formally recognized, two broad tendencies
appeared during the formative period of the Un-
ion, — the reactionary and the radical. The theory
of the first party is well expressed in the Constitu-
tion itself, in the Federalist, and in the writings
of John Adams and Alexander Hamilton. The
theory of the radical element is best stated by
Thomas Jefferson, the central figure in the practi-
cal politics as well as in the political philosophy of
, the democratic school.

What may be called the reactionary theory was
the outgrowth of certain conditions which must
now be briefly noticed. The eleven years that in-
tervened between the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitutional Convention witnessed rapid
and extensive changes in the political conditions of
America.^ The Declaration of Independence was
followed by seven years of war, resulting in the
recognition of the independence of the American
states. The common danger which had bound

^ On this period see such standard histories as Schouler, Hil-
dietb, McMaster, Curtis.

96

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 97

the colonies in a united whole was thus removed
and the forces of disintegration and disunion began
their fatal work. The Articles of Confederation,
adopted in 1781, signally failed to express the
sentiment of nationality evident at the outset of
the war, and resulted in a federal government
which was so hampered and crippled at every turn
that its power and prestige soon disappeared.

With a constitutional requirement of unanimity
for amendment and of an overwhelming majority
for the passage of any measure of importance, and
at the same time with the actual existence of discord
upon almost every subject of common interest, the
Congress was soon reduced to a condition of pitiful
impotence. Most of the states refused to pay the
requisitions levied on them. There were serious
difficulties with foreign powers, involving the ful-
filment of treaty obligations to England, the atti-
tude of Spain toward the Mississippi, and the
payment of the debt to France. By 1785 the cen-
tral government had literally fallen to pieces, shat-
tered by the blows received from the jealousy and
particularism of the individual states. Between
the states themselves there was a feeling of hostil-
ity that resulted in the restriction of trade by the
imposition of unfriendly tariffs.

Moreover, there was widespread financial dis-
tress throughout the various states of the con-
federacy. The long strain of the eight years' war
had left a large and clamorous debtor class ready

98 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

for any measures to relieve their sufferings,
while an epidemic of paper money added to the
general distress. Massachusetts had felt the force
of social disorder in the proceedings of the mal-
contents who followed Shays ; and in the suppres-
sion of courts, plundering of towns, and armed
intimidation of officers, the commonwealth came
face to face with the problems of anarchy and
social revolution. By 1786 it was apparent that
the Articles of Confederation, as an instrument of
government, was utterly ineffective. It was seen
that it must be supplanted by some other and more
effective form of political organization ; but the
shape which the government was to take could be
foretold by none. The wisest statesmen and leaders
feared for the safety and security of the country
and looked with the very gravest fears upon the
impending crisis. Under these circumstances the
movement for a constitutional convention forced
itself into acceptance, and in May, 1787, the
ablest political thinkers in America met to amend
the old form of government. The result of their
deliberations was the Constitution.

Accompanying these changes in political condi-
tions, there were also pronounced differences in the
tendency of political thought. The period of the
Revolution had been largely one of destruction;
the new era was one of constructive effort. The
period of 1776 required a philosophy of politics to
justify rebellion against the mother country ; that

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 99

from 1783 on was guided by the great purpose of
establishing a firm national government on the
ruins of a feeble confederacy. In response to the
necessities of the case, there were consequently
modifications of the old theory ; emphasis on
points before passed lightly over ; failure to
emphasize points upon which the greatest stress
had been laid.

In the Constitutional Convention there were
clear-cut expressions of the change in sentiment
since the days of 1776. These utterances present
a striking contrast to the democratic enthusiasm
of a few years before. For example, Gerry as-
serted that " the evils we experience flow from the
excess of democracy," ^ and expressed a belief that
the people were the " dupes of pretended patriots."
He confessed that "he had been too republican
heretofore ; he was still, however, republican, but
had been taught by experience the danger of the
levelling spirit." ^ Randolph said that in tracing
the evils of the day to their origin, every man had
found it " in the turbulence and foUies of democ-
racy."^ Mason could only say that "notwith-
standing the oppression and injustice experienced
among us from democracy, the genius of the peo-
ple is in favor of it, and the genius of the people
must be consulted."* These statements are sig-
nificant of the change in attitude among the promi-

1 The Madison Papers, II, 753. " Ibid-

^Ibid-Jl^. ^^ Ibid. "]?&.

lOO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

nent men of the time. They had not abandoned
their belief in the ultimate sovereignty of the
people, but their faith in popular administration
of the government had received a severe shock.

Evidence of the change of sentiment is given by
the Constitution itself. Its structure was in many
respects less democratic than that of the states.
The judiciary received broader powers and a life
tenure of office; the executive was clothed with
far more ample powers than those given to the
state governor, was assured of a four-year term
and made reeligible indefinitely ; the senate was
based on a six-year term ; there was not even a bill
of rights, such as was found in the state constitu-
tions. Although there were no religious or prop-
erty qualifications, the general tendency of the new
instrument of government was decidedly conserva-
tive, and even reactionary, in its leading features.

The submission of the Constitution for ratifica-
tion or rejection was the signal for a discussion
of the principles of political theory and of govern-
ment, in which the ablest minds in the states
participated.^ Of all the defences of the proposed
Constitution, the Federalist is universally conceded
to be the ablest and the most important. The
eighty-five numbers of this series were published
■between October 27, 1787 and August 15, 1788,
above the signature of "Publius." The authorship

1 Cf. Pamphlets on the Constitution, edited by P. L. Ford.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 101

of the papers was divided among Hamilton, Madi-
son, and Jay ; but the number produced by each
is still a subject of some controversy.

In considering the political theory of the Feder-
alist, allowance must be made for the fact that it
makes no pretence to the dignity of a carefully
developed, well-matured treatise on the science of
politics. On the contrary, the papers were pre-
pared in haste and were written in defence of a
particular system of government at that time
before the people of New York for their consid-
eration. The Federalist was an advocate's plea
for the Constitution, not the dispassionate system
wrought out by some thinker upon the general
principles of politics. Such references as are
made to political science in the general sense,
are incidental to the discussion and subordinate to
the main purpose, which was the persuasion of the
popular mind to the adoption of the Constitution.

In^^exainining the Federalist one soon notices
that the revolutionary tone of unrestrained demo-
cratic enthusiasm has disappeared. The dominant
note is that sounded by the statesman, not the;
alarm bell of the revolutionist. The experience of
the past ten years has taught that even where it
is recognized that all men are created equal, an4
endowed with certain inalienable rights, there may
be difficulties of the most perplexing character in
actual administration. Unmistakable is the mean-!
ing of the statement that "the citizens of America

I02 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

have too much discernment to be argued into
anarchy ; . . . experience has wrought a deep and
solemn conviction in the public mind that greater
energy of government is essential to the welfare
and prosperity of the community." -^ A govern-
ment of law alone and without any coercive power
would be good, but such a system has " no place
but in the reveries of those political doctors, whose
sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental
science."^

Proceeding to the more systematic doctrines of
the Federalist, that of the origin and basis of gov-
ernment may be first noted. Here it is discovered
that the Federalist indorses the same views as
were prevalent during the Revolutionary times.
It suggests an original state of nature in which
every man is endowed with a full equipment of
natural rights ; and finds the institution of govern-
ment arising from the cession of certain of these
natural rights through the familiar form of the
social contract.^

The basis of government is the consent of the
people, "that pure, original fountain of all legiti-
mate authority."* The nature of government
receives the same Revolutionary characterization
already noticed, especially in the theory of Paine.
Government is necessary, because the passions of
men are so unruly as to require restraint. Pure

1 No. 26, Dawson's edition. ^ No. 28.

* Nos. 2, 43, 50. * No. 22.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT lOJ

reason must be reenforced by a coercive authority.^
And again it is announced that " government is the
greatest of all reflections on human nature. If men
were angels, no government would be necessary."

In short the Federalist accepts the fundamentals
of contemporary political theory without much pro-
test. The original state of nature, the social com-
pact, the necessary-evil theory of government —^'^
the staple of eighteenth century political science —
none of these doctrines was openly called in ques-
tion. In fact it could hardly have controverted
these ideas, even if so disposed, so deeply were
such notions impressed upon the public mind, and
so universally were they recognized in the political
instruments of the time. So far, however, as the
main argument of the Federalist is concerned, it
rests in no way on these ideas, and is but little
related to the political theory embodied in them.
There is not very much said, after all, about the
rights of man, the natural equality of men, the
tyranny of kings, and the other doctrines of
the philosophy that characterized the Revolution.
The proportion of Revolutionary theory has notice-
ably declined.

It is now proposed to examine the theory of the
Federalist at those points where it showed more or
less deviation from the lines of the revolutionary
argument. The doctrine first discussed concerns

» No. 15.

I04 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIEb

the relation between the territorial extent of a
country and democratic government. One of the
most frequent, and, indeed, one of the most trouble-
some, objections, that the supporters of the Constitu-
tion were obliged to meet, was the contention that
a republican form of government could not be
successfully operated over so large a territory as
would be included in the United States. The
only form of government capable of adminis-
tering the affairs of so vast a country, would
necessarily be a despotic one. In support of
this doctrine the eminent authority, Montesquieu,
was quoted to the effect that "it is the nature of
a republic to have only a small territory ; without
this it could scarcely exist." ^ Exceedingly jealous
of their local liberties, many of the citizens of the
various states regarded the establishment of a
strong central government as practically equiv-
alent to the erection of a despotism over them.
To consent to such a government as that proposed
by the Philadelphia convention, they considered as
simply fastening the chains of slavery around them.
Historical precedent was against the proposed gov-
ernment, for the great democracies of the past had
been confined to limited areas of territory. Greece,
Rome, the Italian Republics, so called, were all
of small extent. It was necessary, therefore,
for the defenders of the Constitution to present

1 Esprit dts Lois, Book VIII, 16. But he expressly indorsed the
federation composed of small republics, IX, i .

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT lOj

an explanation and justification of the new con-
ditions.

The Federalist's argument in defence of the
Constitution was directed along the following lines.
It was urged that the modern system of represen-
tation enables government to extend over far
wider limits than would otherwise be practicable.
While in ancient times it was true that the limit
of a democracy was that size which would allow
all the citizens to assemble in order to exercise the
necessary public functions, by the modern plan
the limit is that extent which will allow the repre-
sentatives of the citizens to assemble.^ Again, as
between large and small republics, the larger state
has the advantage in this respect, that its officers
are chosen from larger numbers, and hence the op-
portunities are greater for the selection of able men.
The broader the field or range of choice, the greater
the chance for a good selection, is the argument."
A third reason in favor of a large state is that in-
creased size will afford a wider variety of interests.
Now, the larger the number of these, the greater
the difficulty of forming such a combination as will
lead to the tyrannical rule of any one f action.^ Hence
the greatest possible security for the rights of the
individual is found where there is a large number
of different interests in the given community;
and the larger the number, the greater the diffi-
culty of forming a dangerous combination. In
1 Nos. 14, 62. « No. 10. ' No. 50.

I06 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Rhode Island, for example, there is only a small
extent of territory to be ruled and only a few
groups to be considered. Under these conditions
it seems that any particular interest is in the high-
est degree insecure. But in the United States,
with its vast area and great variety of occupa-
tions, there must of necessity be such a balancing
of claims as will render the domination of any
one, or even of a few interests, impossible.^

The Federalists discussion of forms of govern-
ment is interesting and suggestive, particularly in
respect to the "Republic."^ This is defined as
" a government which derives all its powers,
directly or indirectly, from the great body of the
people, and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period,
or during good behaviour." ^ The essential fact
is that the government derives its authority from
the great body of the society and not from any
particular class. The method of election may be
indirect, the tenure of office may be almost per-
manent, but these facts do not detract from the
republican character of the government, provided
the ultimate responsibility rests with the great
body of the people. The distinction between a
pure democracy and a " republic " consists, accord-
ing to the Federalist, mainly in two points : first,

^ This was a favorite idea of Madison.

^ The discussion of the federal-national character of the new
Union is given in Chap, VII, infra. * No. 38.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT lO?

in the more complete development, in the republic,
of the representative idea; and, secondly, in the
greater territorial extent of the republic.

The common division of governmental powers
into legislative, executive, and judicial was adopted
by the Federalist as one of the axioms of political
science.^ The advocates of the pending constitu-
tion were forced to meet, nevertheless, the ob-
jection made by certain jealous admirers of liberty,
that the proposed plan of government did not re-
spect this fundamental principle — that, on the con-
trary, the three classes of power were dangerously
confused. It was pointed out that the legislature
might impeach and convict the executive, that the
executive would appoint the judiciary, and that
the senate would confirm appointments and ratify
treaties. To these plausible arguments the Federal-
ist replied by a closer examination of the theory of
the tripartite division of powers. This doctrine,
it was held, does not imply or require that each j
of the several departments is to be absolutely
and entirely isolated from the others ; or that one;
department is to have no influence whatever on
the determinations of another. The only danger
to be averted is that the whole power of any tw^p
or more departments might pass into the sames
hands, as would be the case if one governmental'
organ should obtain both the law-making and the ',
law-executing power, or the executive and the ;
> No. 46.

I08 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

judicial power. This, it was claimed, was the
proper interpretation of the doctrine, and the view
actually taken by the states in framing the Revo-
lutionary constitutions. Not only was the radical
theory deemed incorrect, but it was regarded as
wholly impracticable and even dangerous. It is
not possible, so argued the Federalist, to separate
governmental organs in any measure whatever
unless they are so connected and related as to give
each one a certain control over the others. It is
entirely insufficient to delineate "parchment bar-
riers " against the encroachments of one depart-
ment upon another. There must be provided
some constitutional means by which each depart-
ment may exercise a certain restraint on the en-
croaching tendencies of the others. It is well
enough to write down in the Constitution the
declaration that the three sets of powers must
be distinct and independent, but unless the de-
partments are interrelated there will be no separa-
tion whatever. ^ In other words, the greatest and
strongest barrier against consolidation and con-
centration of power is the mutual interrelation
and interdependence of the various departments.
The Federalist abandoned the doctrinaire theory
of the absolute separation of the functions of gov-
ernment, as it was stated, for example, in the Mas-
sachusetts constitution. In fact, it was definitely
admitted that it was wholly impossible accurately to
1 Nos. 46-50. Cf. James Wilson, Works, I, 368.

The reactionary movement 109

define the boundary lines between the various de-
partments, and consequently the true policy was to
devise such a balance of interests and motives as
would insure, not an absolute separation, but a sub-
stantial and enduring interdependence of the three
classes of powers.

In addition to the threefold division of powers,
the Federalist called attention to another method
of securing a constitutional equilibrium. The
new theorj now advanced was that the states
and the Federal government would be balanced
against each other, while within both state and
Federal governments there would be a balance of
legislative, executive, and judicial organs. The
different governments would control each other,
and at the same time each would be controlled by
a division of powers within itself. This unique
arrangement, it was urged, afforded additional
guaranty that the government would not easily
become an instrument of tyranny.^

The discussion in detail of each of the three
classes of power — the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial — is a masterly treatment from the side
of constitutional law, and also reveals many devia-
tions from the radical political theory of the pre-
ceding decade. In the Revolutionary constitutions,
as already seen, the executive power was in dis-
repute, and the legislative the object of popular
confidence. The executive authority suggested

1 No. 50.

1 10 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

both the provincial governor and the English
crown, and consequently an effort was made to
get as far as possible from the establishment of a
powerful head of the administration. The legis-
latures, however, had been left almost entirely free
from restraint. Independence from England hav-
ing been gained, it appeared that the greatest
danger was not the undue predominance of the
executive, but the aggressive disposition of the
legislature. This view the Federalist adopts and
expounds in the discussion of the three classes of
powers.

It was made clear that in republican governments
the greatest danger to Uberty arises from the ex-
panding power of the legislative body. The
legislature, being chosen directly by the people,
seems to fancy itself the people, and to consider
itself as the superior of the other branches of gov-
ernment. The legislators come to believe that the
" exercise of rights by either the executive or
judiciary, is a breach of their prerogative and an
outrage to their dignity." ^ Hence it is exceedingly
difficult for the other powers to maintain the con-
stitutional and governmental equilibrium desired.
Instances of this are given, notably the case of
Pennsylvania. The testimony of Jefferson is cited
to the effect that in Virginia " all the powers of gov-
ernment result to the legislative body," and that
" 173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one."

1 No. 70. Cf. James Wilson, II, 286, 393.

THE REA CTIONAR Y MO VEMENT 1 1 \

This dangerous superiority of the legislature is
attributed, first to the fact that its constitutional
power is generally more extensive and also is less
susceptible of precise limitation than that of the
other departments ; secondly, to the fact that the
legislature has access to the pockets of the peo-
ple, on the one hand, and on the other exerts an
influence on the pecuniary rewards of the other
departments.

The Fediralisfs observations on some other
features of the legislative power are also worthy
of note; for example, on the subject of the bi-
cameral system. All single legislative bodies, it is
said, are apt to be impulsive, passionate, violent.^
They are liable to be drawn by unscrupulous
leaders into hasty and intemperate measures, which
on more mature reflection would never have been
indorsed, and of which they will afterward re-
pent.^ On such occasions as this, when the
assembly is carried away by its passions and led
to the verge of unwise action, we require the in-
fluence of " some temperate and respectable body
of citizens to check the misguided career . . .
until reason, justice, and truth, can regain their
authority over the public mind."^ Such a body
the United States Senate was to be.

The basis of representation in the lower House,
it was said, is not individuals, or even all interests.*
The representation of every class is impossible;

1 No. 6i. ' No. 62. » Hid. * No. J3.

112 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

but that of certain general interests is both prao
ticable and prudent. The Federalist holds that
this representation will be included under three
classes: (i) merchants, (2) landed interests, (3)
learned professions. The merchants will natu-
rally represent the artisans and manufacturers, as
their interests are to a great extent identical. The
mercantile class will be opposed by the landed
interests, while the learned professions will hold
the balance between the two. Thus the Federalist
outlines an equilibrium of interests, on the basis of
the natural antagonism between the mercantile
and agrarian groups, and the assumption that the
learned and professional classes have the power to
mediate between them.

Another interesting argument employed at this
time was that in regard to the proper size of the
legislature. It was frequently urged against the
Constitution that the number of representatives,
particularly in the lower House of Congress, was by
far too small. It was pointed out that in a house
of 65 members, 33 would form a quorum, and 17
might then pass a bill ; and that in the Senate, 8
members might pass a bill. The constitutional
provision was consequently denounced as utterly
inadequate for the purposes of effective representa-
tion of the people and security of their interests.
There was only the shadow of representation, it
was said, not its substance.

The Federalist replied to this criticism by calling

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 113

attention to the fact that a large legislature may be
less faithfully representative of the people than a
small one. After reaching a certain number in
the assembly, — that is, a number sufficient " for the
purposes of safety, of local information, and of
diffusive sympathy with the whole society," ^ — the
addition of other members will defeat the attaui-
ment of the very ends desired. It will be found
true that the greater the number of legislators, the
fewer will be the number of those who actually
direct the proceedings ; and furthermore that the
greater will be the ascendency of passion over
reason. Or, as the Federalist sums up the situa-
tion : " The countenance of the government may
become more democratic, but the soul that ani-
mates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will
be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more
secret, will be the springs by which its motions are
directed." 2

Passing from the discussion of the legislature,
it is important to observe the Federalists theory
of the executive. While the burden of suspicion,
in the minds of many leaders at least, had been
largely transferred from the executive to the legis-
lature, there was still a lively anxiety on the part
of others lest the President of the Union might
acquire powers that would in time become equiva-
lent to those of a monarch. Both the amount
of authority vested in the chief executive and the

iNo. 57. Cf. 55,56. 2 No. 58.

I

1 14 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

tenure upon which it was held were objects of
pronounced hostility.^

The Federalist, however, contended boldly for
an energetic executive, maintaining that this is
essential to any efficient government.* A vigorous
/executive, it was said, is by no means contrary to
./the genius of republican government. There is
> nothing in the nature of free institutions making
it necessary that the executive should be subject
to every impulse that sways the popular mind.*
Republican government, the argument continued,
does not and should not signify a political system
in which the popular voice is to be obeyed instanter.
It is right that the will of the people should pre-
vail, not immediately, however, but ultimately;
for while the people are generally desirous of the
public good, it is not true that they always reason

^ This is vividly illustrated by a quotation from the Federalist :
"The authorities of a magistrate, it is said, in a few instances
greater, in some instances less, than those of a governor of New
York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He
has been decorated with attributes, superior in dignity and splendor
to those of a king of Great Britain. He has been shown to us with
a diadem sparkling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in
his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions
and mistresses, giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates,
in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic des-
potism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the
exaggerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at the ter-
rific visages of murdering janizaries, and to blush at the unveiled
mysteries of a future seraglio." No. 66.

» No. 70. » No. 70.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 115

correctly about the means of obtaining that good>
In the construction of a governmental system
we ought, therefore, so to dispose the organs of
government as to enable us to consult the reason
of the people ; not their temporary, transient emo-
tions, but their deliberate judgment. And there
should be certain persons whose duty it is to stem
the tide of popular passion, and give cooler judg-
ment opportunity to assert itself. One of the most
important organs for the accomplishment of this
purpose is the executive department of the gov-'
ernment.

On the whole, the Federalists discussion of the
legislative and executive powers indicates a decided
change in political theory since the days when the
legislature had been implicitly trusted and the '
executive degraded and despised. There is now /
manifested a decided suspicion of the legislature, I
and great anxiety as to the possible extent of I
its encroachments. On the other hand, there is a
strong disposition to revive the executive depart- i
ment and intrust it with substantial powers.

As to the judicial department, the general phi-
losophy of the Federalist was as follows. The
judiciary was regarded as always the least dan-
gerous to the liberties of the people.^ This de-
partment has neither force nor will, as have the
other two organs, but possesses the power of judg-
ment only. Hence the maintenance of good gov-
i No. 70. » No. 77 ff.

Il6 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

ernment has never been much imperilled by the
courts, unless in combination with one of the other
two departments. There is, however, great need
that the judiciary be kept as far as possible inde-
pendent in its position. This is particularly im-
portant in a country which is governed under a
limited Constitution. Here the function of the
court is to act as final interpreter of the Constitu-
tion, and to decide upon the conformity of all laws
with that instrument. This does not mean, ex-
plains the Federalist, that the judicial is superior"
to the legislative power, but that the authority of
the people is superior to both. For this reason,
then, and in order to protect the rights of individ-
uals against governmental oppression, the tenure
of the judges should be permanent, in order that
they may possess the proper independence. As
in a despotic country this kind of a tenure serves
as a barrier against the prince, so in a republic
it is a useful protection against the encroachments
of a despotic legislative body.

The Federalist recognizes, as every observer of
political phenomena must, the great difificulty in
securing an energetic, stable government, and at
the same time preserving the liberties of the peo-
ple.^ The problem of the correct relation of liberty
and authority is perennial. If governmental power
is not granted in large measure, the safety of the
state is endangered. If such authority is granted,

1 No. 36.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 117

there is likelihood of its abuse. The great argu-
ment against the Constitution was, that it would
endanger the liberties of the people.

Admitting, however, that governmental power
is liable to such abuse, the defence was made that
inasmuch as confidence must be placed somewhere,
it was better to risk its abuse by regularly constituted
authorities than to embarrass the government and
endanger the public safety by the imposition of
unwise restraints upon all authorities. The Ameri-
can people, said the Federalist, cannot be " argued
into anarchy " by objections raised against all ener-
getic government. Although the necessity of popu-
lar vigilance over rights and Uberties is recognized,
it must be remembered that, however useful jeal-
ousy may be in a republic, " yet when, like bile in
the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic,
the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived
by the delusive appearances which that malady
casts on surrounding objects." ^ Love of liberty,
then, does not always require a bilious jealousy of
all government.

The Federalist was not an advocate of bills of
rights such as were found in the Revolutionary
state declarations. The preamble to the Constitu-
tion, it was said, is " a better recognition of popular
rights, than volumes of those aphorisms, which
make the principal figure in several of our state
bills of rights, and which would sound much better
1 No. 63.

Il8 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

in a treatise of ethics, than in a constitution of
government." ^ No statement better expresses the
marked change of attitude since the days of the
Revolution. In 1776, to have referred to the dec-
larations of rights as " aphorisms " which properly
belong only to the domain of ethics, would have
been almost equivalent to high treason, but in a
few years the inalienable rights of man are thus
lightly passed over.

V Furthermore, it was argued that bills of rights
are in general inapplicable to constitutional gov-
ernments. They originated as agreements between
ruler and subjects — abridgments of royal prerog-
ative. In a popular government, however, "the
people surrender nothing ; and as they retain
everything, they have no need of particular reser-
vations." ^ Such specific restrictions have no
application to governments which are founded
directly on the act of the people and " executed
by their immediate servants and representatives."
This is true of all types of popular government,
but is more than ever applicable to a confederate
government, where the central authority has no
power except that conferred upon it by the Consti-
tution. In such a case the Constitution is itself
the "bill of rights of the Union," and a separate
declaration would be not only unnecessary but
dangerous. "Why declare things should not be
done, which there is no power to do } " ^

1 No. 84. 2 Idid. » liui.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 119

But the Federalist goes beyond this, maintain-
ing that the whole scheme of securing liberty by
mere constitutional restraints is a mistaken one.
All such precautions as these are mere paper bar-
riers vainly raised up against the spirit of en-
croachment.^ The true guaranty of liberty in a
republican government lies in the fact that the
political power belongs to the representatives
chosen by the people themselves.^ The govern-
ment is in the hands of agents who derive their
power from and are responsible to the people. If
these chosen delegates betray their trust, there is
then no resource left but the exertion of that
" original right of self-defence, which is paramount
to all positive forms of government." The guar-
anty that free institutions will be maintained, rests
in the last analysis on the " general genius of the
government." This alone can be relied upon for
enduring results: "particular provisions, though
not altogether useless, have far less virtue and
efficacy than are commonly ascribed to them."'
It is the spirit and temper of the people in which
confidence must be placed, rather than the written
word embodied in an instrument of government.

In judging the political theory of the Federalist,
it cannot escape notice that the "natural-right"
philosophy lies at the basis of its system. But
no more can it pass unnoticed, that the doctrines
of natural rights and the social compact, while
IN0.47. *No. 28. »No. 83.

I20 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

formally accepted, are but infrequently employed
in the course of argument. The truth is that
popukr interest in these doctrines, so widely
proclaimed during the period of Revolution, had
suffered a pronounced decline. The enthusiasm
of the first resistance, the spirit of which was
so eloquently expressed in the Declaration of
Independence, had died down. The country
had passed through the trying years of the
war and the critical period, had come close up
to the edge of anarchy, and was now ready for
the establishment of government and law at any
cost.

Nowhere is the change in the dominant senti-
ment of the people more deeply marked, nowhere
more clearly expressed, than in the Federalist, which
may fairly be taken as representative of the class
or classes of people whose support secured the
adoption of the Constitution. Comparison of the
writings of 1763- 1776, and their bold and sweep-
ing generalizations about the rights of man, with
the conservative utterances of the Federalist, re-
veals an unmistakable change of feeling and opinion.
The contrast is strongly marked. The Revolu-
Itionary period emphasized the rights of man, the
Federalist the necessity of government ; the Revo-
ilutionary period demanded government of a more
democratic character, the Federalist asked for a
government of a less democratic nature. Annual
elections, the feeble executive, the omnipotent legis-

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 121

lature, the absolute division of governmental powers,
with other planks in the ultra-democratic platform,
were discredited by the leaders of the new school.
In fact, the democratic philosophy of the eighteenth
century was a perfect expression for the men and
times of 1 776 ; for it was essentially a philosophy
of revolution. With the needs of 1 787-1 789, how-
ever, it did not harmonize and could not easily be
made to agree. The Declaration of Independence
represented the political theory of the American
people when it had " become necessary to dissolve
the political bands which had connected them with , ;
another." y The Federalist represented the timei
when it had become necessary "to form a more
perfect union." Its authors did not reject, bulj
largely ignored, the rights of man. There was ful|
recognition of the sovereignty of the people, but an'|
impressive warning, reenforced by cogent examples
from recent American history, was sounded against^
excessive democracy. |

In addition to this there were substantial contri-*
butions made toward the solution of new problems in
political science. The federal state was discussed
with remarkable acumen, the theory of the separa-
tion of governmental powers was restated, the
possibility of extending republican government
over a large area asserted and argued, the doc-
trine of government under a constitution developed
and applied. In all this the authors of the Federal-
ist were not in advance of the political facts of the

122 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

time. The old theory was outgrown; they were
formulating political theories adapted to the new
state of things.

The Federalist, however, was not the only expres-
sion of the reactionary tendency in the theory of this
time. Much more suggestive in this respect was
the doctrine advanced by the great leader of the
Federalist party — John Adams.^ During the
earlier part of his life, Adams had been one of
the most outspoken and enthusiastic advocates of
the radical movement. In these days he thought
that government is "a plain, simple, intelligible
thing, founded in nature and reason, quite com-
prehensible by common sense." He indorsed the
maxim that "where annual elections end, there
slavery begins " ; favored stripping the governor
of the " badges of slavery called prerogatives " ;
and was vigorous in his declaration of the rights
of man.^

In little more than a decade, however, there was
evident a pronounced change in the general char-
acter of Adams's theory.^ Influenced by the turn
that events were taking in America and by the

1 See his life by C. F. Adams ; also the essay by Mellen Qiamber-
lain. See also "The Politics of John Adams," by Anson D. Morse,
in the American Historical Review, January, 1899, and the Works
of Adams in ten volumes, edited by C. F. Adams.

2 "Thoughts on Government," 1776, Works, Vol. IV.

' Some symptoms of a reaction appeared as early as 1776. See
Adams's Works, IX, 410, 435, 451.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 123

fear that certain principles of the French philoso-
phy might obtain the ascendency here, Adams was
led to formulate a system of political theory widely
different from that which he held in earlier days.
In the first period Adams was the bold champion
of the Revolution, in the second period he was
equally fearless in his advocacy of strong govern-
ment and of aristocratic principles.

The theory of Adams during this second period
is contained in the two once famous, but now almost
forgotten works, A Defence of the Constitutions of
Government of the United States of America (1787-
1788) and the Discourses on Davila (1790). The
Defence was written in view of recent occurrences in
Massachusetts, and also as a reply to an attack on
the American system made by Turgot in a letter
to the famous English theorist. Dr. Price (1778).!
One of the principal points to which Turgot took
exception was the policy in the state constitutions
of dividing the powers of government and institut-
ing a system of checks and balances, instead of
concentrating all governmental powers in a single
sovereign body. Adams's reply was a defence
of the American system of balanced government
against the French theory of centralized and un-

1 Printed with Dr. Price's Observations on the Importance of the
American Revolution, and the Means of making it a Benefit to the
World. An extract from Turgot's letter is given in Adams's Works,
IV, 278-281. Considerable attention was also given in the Defence to
refutation of a radical English work by Marchamont Nedham, Thi
Excellency of a Free State (1656), reprinted 1767.

124 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

divided power. The first part of this book was
published in time to find its way into the hands of
the members of the Constitutional Convention, and
doubtless exerted an influence there. The work,
although hastily put together, was effective, and
was widely read. That the author of so conserv-
ative a treatise could be elected Vice-President
of the United States shortly after, shows that its
principles were not unfavorably received.

The Discourses on Davila ^ was written in reply
to the Four Letters of a Citizen of New Haven
by Condorcet.^ These two works, the Defence and
the Discourses, though now generally neglected,
contain the substance of Adams's ideas, and are
invaluable for an understanding of the aristocratic
theory of his time.

Adams's treatment of political theory evidences a
wide acquaintance with political history and with
the results reached by the greatest political thinkers.
He discusses, in the course of his work, the his-
tory of democratic governments in Greece, Sparta,
Carthage, Rome, Italy, Switzerland, and the United
Provinces. In the field of political theory he was
familiar with the writings of Plato, Machiavelli,
Harrington, Montesquieu, Sidney, Milton, and
Hume. His conclusions were based upon an ex-

1 Davila, DeW Jsioria delle Guerre civile di Francia.

' Quatre Lettres d'un bourgeois de New Haven a un citoyen
de Virginie, sur I'inutilite de partager le pouvoir legislatif entre
plusieurs corps, 1788.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 125

tensive study (more extensive than intensive) of
the world's classics in political theory and practice.^
This transition from a philosophy based on the
" rights of man " to one emphasizing the historical
method within little more than one decade is
certainly impressive ; yet it was paralleled by the
change of attitude seen in Edmund Burke dur-
ing the same time. Adams's change of opinion
was by no means so radical, however, as that of
Burke, although it followed the same direction.

The chief points of interest in Adams's theory
may be included under three heads ; first, his dis-
trust of unlimited democracy ; second, his defence
of aristocracy ; third, his system of checks and
balances. An analysis of these three leading doc-
trines will be presented here.

The great wave of democratic sentiment which
had swept over the country during the latter
part of the eighteenth century, the triumph of
this movement in the Revolution, Adams's own
participation in the struggle, had been by no
means sufficient to keep awake in him the senti-
ments of an enthusiastic democrat. Such feel-
ings had been excited, but they soon gave way
to other and more characteristic tendencies of
the man. Adams was not wholly anti-democratic,
but he certainly did not share in that unqualified
approval of democratic government which was
so common, in theory at least, among his con-
1 See Defence, Chaps. I-IX.

126 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

temporaries. His comparative study of republican
states had inspired in him a profound distrust
for an unqualified democracy, which manifested
itself throughout his later life. Some of his criti-
cisms on the general theory of democratic govern-
ment may be considered here. In the first place,
Adams strongly objected to the common assertipn
that the people are incapable of tyrannical and
oppressive conduct. " We may appeal," said he,
" to every page of history we have hitherto turned
over, for proofs irrefragable, that the people, when
they have been unchecked, have been as unjust,
tyrannical, brutal, barbarous and cruel as any king
or senate possessed of uncontrollable power. The
majority has eternally and without one exception
usurped over the rights of the minority." ^

The people, moreover, are not only prone to
tyranny ; they are jealous, exacting, and suspicious
to the last degree. They not only demand out-
ward submission to their commands, but cannot
endure even a mental dissent from their will.
They " will not bear a contemptuous look or dis-
respectful word ; nay, if the style of your homage,
flattery, and adoration is not as hyperbolical as
the popular enthusiasm dictates, it is construed
into disaffection " ; and as a result the popular
suspicion is aroused and their fury breaks out "into
every kind of insult, obloquy, and outrage."'
Again, the people are no less given to luxury than

1 Defence, VI, lo. « IHd. VI, 89.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 127

are kings and nobles, although the latter are usually
charged with the greatest extravagances. A free
people, says Adams, is most addicted of all to the
vices of luxury.^ The simple democracy is, of all
governments, most exposed to tumults and disorder,
and such disturbances are most likely to be fatal in
this kind of a state.^ In short, it seems that no stable
government can be built upon the foundation of an
unlimited democracy. " All projects of govern-
ment, formed upon a supposition of continual vigi-
lance, sagacity, virtue, and firmness of the people,
when possessed of the exercise of supreme power,
are cheats and delusions." ^

There is, says Adams, no such thing as an ab-
stract love of equality. There can be no love of
democracy as an abstract conception, but only in so
far as it stands for a certain advancement of individ-
ual interest and advantage. Democracy is not de-
sired for itself, but for what it brings with it, or for
what it makes possible in the form of personal wel-
fare. Or as Adams elsewhere says, " Mankind in
general had rather be rich under a simple monarchy
than poor under a democracy." * In brief, Adams
maintains that there never was and never can be a
pure democracy. In reality, " democracy signifies
nothing more nor less than a nation of people, with-
out any government at all and before any constitu-
tion is instituted." ^

1 Defence, VI, 95. « IHd. 151. * Ibid. 166,

<IHcl.gi. ^ Hid. 211.

128 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

It is, nevertheless, unfair to reckon Adams
among the opponents of free government. The
attacks which he made were directed chiefly
against immediate or unlimited democracy, and he
was far from being hostile to popular government,
properly checked and restrained. The common
charges against him to this effect were founded
upon a misapprehension of his true position. Al-
though his assaults on democracy pure and simple
were vigorously sustained, no language could be
clearer than that in which he asserts the doctrine
of popular sovereignty. " The suprema potestas,"
he declares, " the supreme, sovereign, absolute, and
uncontrollable power is placed by God and nature
in the people, and they can never divest themselves
of it." ^ All government depends upon and repre-
sents the people. No government can exist longer
than the people will to support it; they are the
fountain of political power, and may vest authority
wherever they choose. Adams held to the theory
of popular sovereignty as the basis of government ;
upon this point he was never uncertain, but he
did not favor democratic government of the type
which the French thinkers desired. All free
government, he thought, ought to contain certain
limitations upon the direct action of the people, in

1 Works, 469. Cf. VI, 113, to the effect that there can be no
constitutional liberty, " where the people have not an independent
equal share with the other two orders of the state, and an absolute
control over all laws and grants of money."

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 129

order to render excesses on their part difficult, if
not impossible.

The charge that Adams was opposed to demo-
cratic institutions received support from the bitter-
ness of his invective against unlimited democracy,
and his not unfriendly attitude toward monarchy.
For example, he said on one occasion that " a
hereditary first magistrate at once would perhaps
be preferable to elections by legislative representa-
tives." ^ Yet this was not the final opinion of
Adams, for he said later of kings that he would
" shut them up like the man in the mask, feed
them well, and give them as much finery as they
please, until they could be converted to right
reason and common sense." ^ But because of his
criticism of certain phases of popular government,
Adams was made the object of the bitterest denun-
ciation, particularly by Jefferson and his associates.
The object of his criticism, however, was not
popular government as such, but certain evils aris-
ing from the direct and unrestrained rule of the
people. It is quite likely that if obliged to choose
between this type of popular government, and mon-
archy, he would have accepted the latter without
much hesitation. This was particularly true in the
days when the Constitution was being formed.
After the Constitution was adopted and the gov-
ernment established, he accepted the government

1 Ibid. 122.

« X, 409 (1825). Letter to Jefferson.

K

130 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

fully and without reserve. It was not a govern-
ment of just the kind that he or Hamilton would
have established, but it was far enough removed
from extreme democracy to justify a fair trial.

The political creed with which Adams is most
closely associated is that of aristocracy, and to this
phase of his theory we now turn attention. No one
better expressed than he the theory of the " well-
born," and its wide divergence from the canons of
political philosophy laid down in the Revolution.
It has already been pointed out that the contem-
porary interpretation and application of the prin-
ciples of the Declaration offered many evidences
of departure from its philosophical spirit. Adams
goes farther than this, however, and attacks certain
parts of the theory itself. He takes exception to
the doctrine that all men are created equal. This,
Adams declares, is not in accord with the facts,
since "nature . . . has ordained that no two objects
shall be perfectly alike and no two objects perfectly
equal. . . . No two men are perfectly equal in
person, property, or understanding, activity, and
virtue." ^ This is a clear contradiction of the Dec-
laration, and even of his own earlier statements
It is to be observed, however, that Adams does not
deny that all men are born with equal rights;
" every being," said he, " has a right to his own, as
clear, as moral, as sacred as any other being has." *

» Works, VI, 285-286.

» Ibid. 453. Letter to John Taylor (1814).

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 131

This he does not wish to dispute, confining his
protest to the teaching that all men are created
with equal powers or faculties. Such a doctrine
seems to him " as gross a fraud ... as ever was
practised by Druids, by Brahmins, by priests of the
immortal Lama, or by the self-styled philosophers
of the French Revolution." ^

Adams held firmly to the idea that men are
essentially unequal. If we take a hundred men at
random, he says, we shall find among them, on the
average, six wealthy, six eloquent, six learned, six
having the gifts of eloquence, learning, and fortune,
and six having art, cunning, and intrigue.^ Thus
we have an aristocracy of thirty among the hun-
dred, — thirty men gifted with certain extraordi-
nary quahties which enable them to rise above
their fellow-men. The following quotation gives a
good picture of Adams's aristocrat: "Whenever I
use the word aristocrat," said he, " I mean a citizen
who can command or govern two votes or more in
society, whether by his virtues, his talents, his learn-
ing, his loquacity, his taciturnity, his frankness,
his reserve, his face, figure, eloquence, grace, air,
attitude, movements, wealth, birth, art, address,
intrigue, good-fellowship, drunkenness, debauch-
ery, fraud, perjury, violence, treachery, pyrrhonism,
deism, or atheism." ^

The inequalities upon which Adams lays great-
est stress in his theory are those of wealth, birth,

1 Ibid. » Ibid. 456, • Ibid. 457.

132 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

and education. These are the criteria by which
the natural aristocracy may be most readily deter-
mined. The people in general may be divided into
two groups, the gentlemen and the simplemen.^
Gentlemen are those who " have received a liberal
education, an ordinary degree of erudition in lib-
eral arts and sciences," and it will usually be
found that those so endowed are also "well-born
and wealthy." The simplemen, on the other hand,
or the common people, are " laborers, husbandmen,
mechanics, and merchants in general, who pursue
their occupations and industry without any knowl-
edge in liberal arts or sciences, or in anything but
their own trades or pursuits." Some of these may
be true aristocrats, as some of the first class may
be in fact common people, but in general the two
classes may be divided by the line drawn.

These two groups are to be found in every soci-
ety, and inasmuch as they exist should be recog-
nized in the government of the state. " There is,"
says Adams, " a voice within us, which seems to in-
timate that real merit should govern the world, and
that men ought to be respected only in proportion
to their talents, virtues, and services." ^ The incor-
poration of this aristocracy inlQ the government, he
regards as one of the greatest problems of political
organization. The policy of Europe, he suggests,
has been to connect " lands, offices, and families "
and to have them all descend together, and along

» Ibid. 185. * Ibid. 249.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 133

with them, " honor, public attention, consideration,
and congratulation." ^ To this policy Europe owes
its superiority over Asia and Africa. Adams as-
serts that no well-ordered commonwealth has ever
existed without hereditary nobility, and it is an easy
inference that he considered such an institution
advisable for this country as well, or at least looked
with suspicion on the experiment of proceeding
without an order of nobility.

Adams would seem, then, to favor some system
of hereditary nobility as the surest way of obtain-
ing recognition for the virtue and talent of the
community. This disposition leads him naturally
to condemn the policy of rotation in office. It
appears to him that such a requirement is really
"a violation of the rights of mankind."^ It is a
violation at once of the rights of the candidate and
of the voter ; for one has a right to be chosen again,
if efficient, and the elector to choose the officer for
further service, if deemed advisable. No policy
is so disastrous to the pubUc interest as that of dis-
charging, at fixed and arbitrary intervals, tried and
experienced servants. Hereditary tenure is in
general not inadvisable, and a life term of office is
certainly commendable. The maxim " non diurnare
imperia " does not, in Adams's opinion, apply to
a free government. Where there are republican
institutions, authority may be safely given for a long
term of years or even for life, without danger to
1 Ibid. 351. " Ibid. 52.

134 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the liberties of the people. On the contrary, such
a policy of intrusting power in the hands of officers
for long terms would really be one of the guaran-
ties of continued free government.

For the United States, Adams seemed to be
not averse to a life tenure for the chief executive,
or even an hereditary tenure. He indicated that
terms of office may be extended until they reach
the life limit, and if this is not found sufficient,
they should be made hereditary. "The delicacy
or the dread of unpopularity," said he, " that should
induce any man to conceal this important truth
from the full view and contemplation of the people
would be a weakness if not a vice."^ The elective
method, wherever tried, has been found to be a
failure; the system of hereditary tenure has the
sanction of history — the prestige that comes
from years of successful operation. The inference
is that Adams looked to see the old system restored
in this country.^

From these passages, then, it is clear thai Adams
had no sympathy with the radical ideas of human
equality, rotation in office, and unlimited demo-
cratic government. He was essentially aristocratic
in his ideas. Birth, wealth, education — these
were the points on which his eye was fixed, these
were the elements for which he desired recognition

1 Ibid. 67.

* Cf. Hamilton's proposition in the constitutional conventioa
See his Works, II, 393 ff.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 135

and to which he would accord supremacy in the
administration of political affairs. He believed
in popular sovereignty as the basis of poUtical insti-
tutions, and the popular welfare as their goal ; but
he had very little confidence in the ability of the
mass of the people to administer the government
successfully, or even to choose their rulers properly.
The common people are the basis of the state, but
the guiding hand in the affairs of government
must be that of the gentlemen, the " well-bom."

The relation of John Adams to the radical theory
of his day is well illustrated by a correspondence
upon this very question, between him and Samuel
Adams (1790).^ This interchange of views was oc-
casioned by recent events in France, and it brings
out clearly the markedly aristocratic tendencies of
the one, and the equally pronounced democratic
opinions of the other. John Adams, in his letters,
defends the institution of nobility, upholds the
superiority of the well-born, hints at hereditary
rather than elective tenure of office, and betrays
throughout a profound distrust of the self-govern-
ing capacity of the people.

Samuel Adams, replying, upholds the doctrine
of popular rule, and criticises John Adams's state-
ment that the people should have merely a share in
the government. He asserts that the selection of
rulers by frequent elections is superior to the sys-
tem of hereditary tenure ; for, conceding that people

1 Wells, Samuel Adams, III, 297 ft.

136 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

may be occasionally (Jeceived, the evil is not incura
ble and certainly will not long endure. The requi-
site remedy will be near at hand, whereas under an
aristocratic system there is no easy way out of the
difficulty.

John Adams suggests doubts as to the practicabil-
ity of democratic government, because of the high
degree of popular intelligence and virtue required
for the successful operation of such a system.
The rejoinder is that the American people do
possess this extraordinary capacity for govern-
ment ; and furthermore, that these qualities may be
strengthened by means of general education. The
theory of the " well-born," Samuel Adams dissents
from emphatically. The natural aristocracy, he
maintains, is likely to be found among men of all
ranks and conditions, regardless of birth. The
cottager may beget a wise man ; the noble a fool ;
hence the boundary lines of natural aristocracy are
exceedingly difficult to draw, and cannot on the
whole be safely marked out.

Probably the most conspicuous idea in John
Adams's theory is that of an elaborate system of
checks and balances in the organization and opera-
tion of the governmental system. The Defence was
written, as already pointed out, in reply to Turgot's
attack on the American plan and apology for the
French idea of the centralization of powers, after-
ward illustrated in the French Revolution. To re-
fute this argument, Adams collected evidence from

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 1 37

the days of the Grecian and Roman republics down
to modern time's, and from the opinions of eminent
philosophers beginning with Plato. He endeavored
to show that unlimited and unchecked government /
had been everywhere attended by disaster, particu-
larly when such government rested upon a popular
basis. The earnestness of his belief in the neces-
sity of a system of balances is indeed accountable
for what is taken as dislike of democracy. In
reality, his point of attack was not popular govern-
ment in general ; but that particular type of democ-
racy lacking the necessary restraints.

The subject next claiming consideration is, then,
Adams's system of checks and balances. Here his
arguments meet the French theory advanced by
Turgot, that an equilibrium of governmental
powers is necessary only under a monarchical gov-
ernment and not required where republican insti-
tutions exist. In every state there must be, said
Adams, a first magistracy, a senate or little coun-
cil, and a larger assembly.^ These three classes
represent respectively the monarchical element in
the government, the aristocratic element, and
the democratic element. No constitution lacking
these three elements can remain secure. Their
existence and balance is essential to the main-
tenance of peace and liberty.^ They have, he
declares, "an unalterable foundation in nature."

1 Works, IV, 379. Cf. Harrington, Oceana (1656), (Morley's
edition), 29 et seq. ^ I^id- 579-

138 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

The best expression of this idea is found in
the British Constitution, which he looked upon
as "the most stupendous fabric of human inven-
tion." 1

The people alone, as Adams reasons, are un-
worthy of trust, unless restrained by the balances
which are advocated, and aristocracy and the mon-
archy alone are also prone to abuse the power in-
trusted to them. Adams takes particular pains to
combat any objection to placing power in the hands
of the monarch. An alliance between monarchy
and democracy, he points out, has been necessary
in order to make headway against the encroaching
tendencies of the aristocracy ; and it is in reality
the people themselves who have supported the
absolute king against the petty lords. Monarchy
and aristocracy he considers as natural foes. It is,
therefore, Adams suggests, the best policy on the
part of the common people to intrust the whole
executive power to one man, so that he may stand
out as a distinct order in the state. There will
then inevitably arise a jealousy between him and
the aristocracy, and this very jealousy will force
the monarch to ally himself closely with the com-
mon people, to become their guardian and their
protector, and to keep in check all who might
otherwise endanger the safety of the state. Adams
saw what few Americans of his day perceived,
namely, that absolute monarchy had rested upon a

1 Works, IV, 358.

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 139

popular basis and had really constituted an alliance
between crown and people against the aristocracy.

Adams's plan is, then, to provide for the repre-
sentation of the aristocracy in one branch of the
legislature ; in another for the representation of
the people ; and finally to place as an umpire and
arbiter between them a strong executive power.
This arrangement of governmental authorities will
secure the equilibrium of forces necessary to the
welfare of the state. It will obviate the grave
difficulties presented by a simple and wholly unified
plan of government, by preventing the extrava-
gances to which any one of these powers alone and
unchecked is prone.

This, however, was not the only balance of
powers which Adams discussed. In later years
he called attention to the organization of govern-
ment under the Constitution of the United States,
which presents a system of checks and balances
even more intricate and complex than the tripar-
tite plan just examined. In the federal govern-
ment Adams discovery no less than eight different
kinds of balances/^ These are as follows: ist,
the states~a^d territories, against the federal gov-
ernment; ad, the House against the Senate;
3d, the jpl/ecutive against the Legislature; 4th,
the Judiciary against the House, the Senate, the
Executive and the state governments ; 5th, the
Senate against the President in respect to appoint-
ments and treaties; 6th, the people against their

I40 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

representatives ; 7th, the state legislatures against
the Senate; 8th, the electors against the people.
Here are certainly ample guaranties against hasty
action on the part of any organ of the federal
government, and it is apparent that Adams so
considered them.^

When Adams entered into active political life
under the new federal Constitution, he no longer
gave expression to sentiments which could so
easily be interpreted as unrepublican in character.
It is likely that he considered the new government
as embodying in many of its features the prin-
ciples he had laid down. The new Constitution
was certainly more in harmony with Adams's ideas
than with thos^of the French theorists whom
he combated. /In his inaugural address of 1797
Adams declared that no change in the existing
government waVintended. He commented on the
essentially popular basis of the government with
evident satisfaction and pride. He declared his
preference for free republican government, and
his firm attachment to the United States Constitu-
tion. In terms that suggest the inaugural of four
years later, he discoursed fluently on his regard for
virtuous men of all parties, and his love for equal
laws, for justice, and for humanity.^ It would,
therefore, be unfair to maintain that after the Con-
stitution was once put in force, Adams demanded
a monarchy and hereditary aristocracy.

- JVorks, VI, 467 (1814). 2 ix_ ,05 g;

THE REACTIONARY MOVEMENT 141

He even denied that any such idea could, by fair
construction, be deduced from his writings, and as-
serted that " they were all written to support and
strengthen the Constitution of the United States." ^
He continued to defend with unabated vigor, how-
ever, the doctrine of the inequaUty of men, and the
necessity of elaborate checks and balances. To
Jefferson he wrote (181 5) : " The fundamental prin-
ciple of my political creed is, that despotism, or
unlimited sovereignty, or absolute power, is the
same in a majority of a popular assembly, an
aristocratical council, an oligarchical junto, and a
single emperor." 2 This was, in fact, the funda-
mental proposition in Adams's political philosophy,
and explains his frequently undemocratic phrases.
He feared the unlimited power of the people as
well as the unlimited power of either nobility or
king ; and was steadfastly opposed to any system,
popular or otherwise, which was not so constructed
as to limit and restrain the governing powers. In
America he considered that the despotism imminent
was that of the people, hence his criticisms were
directed mainly against them.

Such was the character of the reactionary theory
prevalent during the early years of the repubhc.
With some modifications this doctrine continued
to manifest its existence during the first quarter

1 X, 54. Cf. VT, 463, stating that they were written in defence
of the Massachusetts constitution. ' X, 1 74.

142 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

of a century of the newly established Union.
It found expression in the demand for a strong
central government, in a pronounced dislike for
the French Revolution, particularly in its later
phases, in a certain liking for form and ceremony.
It would be wide of the mark to say that the Fed-
eralists accepted all of the theory of Adams as
stated in the works just analyzed. This he did not
do himself in his later years. But the spirit of this
work — the distrust of democracy and the tender-
ness for the "well-born" — was characteristic of
them.^

' Cf. Publicola, a series of letters by John Quincy Adams in reply
to Paine's Rights of Man, 1791.

A careful exposition of early American principles is preserved
in the lectures given by James Wilson before the Law School in
Philadelphia, 1790-92. See Wilson, Works, edited by J. D.
Andrews, 2 vols., 1896.

Wilson laid great stress on the theory that law and political
obligation do not come from a superior, but are created by the vol-
untary agreement of individuals, — "the consent of those whose
obedience the law requires" (I, 88). He regarded even a private
contract as really constituting a law. " Why not," said he, " if it
had all its essential properties ? " He denied that there was any
contract between king and people or between governor and gov-
erned, maintaining that the agreement is one between the individual
and the whole society.

CHAPTER IV

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY

No sooner was the new Constitution put into
actual operation than there began a decided move-
ment away from strong government and toward
individual and states rights. It seemed almost
as if the people were alarmed at what they had
done, and were anxious to neutralize its effect.
In addition to this perhaps natural reaction after
the violent agitation in favor of a strong govern-
ment, there was the powerful stimulus given to
democracy by the French Revolution, especially in
its earlier years. This great event aroused the
democratic spirit throughout Europe, and was not
without its effect on America.^ Nor should it be
forgotten that just at this time Jefferson returned
to his native land, ready to organize and give form
to the scattered democratic tendencies. Under
these auspices the new movement rapidly gained
strength, and in little more than a decade was able
to triumph over the Adams-Hamilton party. ,

The most marked characteristic of this move-
ment was the antipathy shown toward everything

' On this subject see the interesting study by Charles D. Hazen,
Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution (1897).

>43

144 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

suggestive of monarchy, hereditary aristocracy, oi
strongly centralized government. Objection was
made, for example, to any exceptional formality in
addressing the President, to stamping his likeness
on the coinage, to any elaborate ceremony at the
seat of government. Opposition was made to the
size of the standing army, to the establishment of
the United States Bank, to the assumption of the
state debts. Particularly was there denunciation
of the administration because of its refusal to
take up the defence of republican France against
monarchic England. To favor Britain or even to
remain neutral in the contest, it was said, was really
equivalent to upholding the British form of govern-
ment against the free institutions of the Revolution.
The theory of this movement is represented in
such works as Thomas Paine's Rights of Man,
which was used as an answer to the writings of
Adams; in Tucker's Commentaries on Blackstone^
(1803); in Tz.-^\ox'& Inquiry"^ {\^\if); and the various
writings of Joel Barlow.^ But by far the most

^ H. St. George Tucker, Cojnmeniaries on Blacksione,
2 John Taylor, An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of
the Government of the United States. A considerable part of this
discursive work is taken up by a criticism of Adams's theory of
aristocracy. By the same author, Construction Construed and the
Constitution Vindicated (1820); Tyranny Unmasked (1822);
New Views of the Constitution (1823).

^ Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Several States of Europe
( 1 792) ; Joel Barlow to his Fellow Citizens in the United States of
America (i8oi); and various other letters. See Life and Letters
of Joel Barlow, by Charles Burr Todd.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 145

influential of the leaders in this group was Thomas
Jefferson, and to a consideration of his doctrines
we now turn.

No name is more often or more intimately
associated with American democracy than that of
Thomas Jefferson. During his lifetime he was the
American democrat par excellence ; on his death
he was politically canonized, and his words are still
quoted with confidence and received with respect
in the consideration of almost all political questions.
Brought into prominence as the author of the
Declaration of Independence, identified with the
growth and triumph of the Republican party, in-
augurated as its first President, framing its policies
and providing its philosophy, Jefferson was un-
doubtedly the central figure in the early develop-
ment of American democracy. ^

Though regarded as the great advocate of de-
mocracy, Jefferson bequeathed to posterity no
systematic treatise on the principles of politics.^
His Summary View (1774) and Notes on Virginia
(1782) are the nearest approach to this,^ and they
can scarcely be considered an approximation. More-
over, he was not a great orator, and there is no

' For the life of Jefferson, see H. S. Randall's work in three
volumes; also Morse's volume in the American Statesmen Series.

^ A useful classification of Jefferson's ideas on a great variety of
subjects is made by J. P. Foley, in The Jeffersonian Cyclopcedia.

^ See also his Autobiography (to 1790) and The Anas (1791-
1806).

L

146 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

collection of addresses in which his ideas arc
embodied. He was, however, a great correspond-
ent, and we have a large collection of his letters,
written to such persons as Madison, John Adams,
Lafayette, Dupont de Nemours, Taylor, Kercheval,
Johnston, and others. From this extensive corre-
spondence, in which topics of political theory
frequently appear, together with some of his official
papers, it is possible to reconstruct the theory of
Jefferson, if not in minute detail, at least in general
outline.^

The first important statement of Jefferson's
political theory is contained in the Declaration of
Independence. Here are eloquently expressed the
now familiar doctrines of human equality, of the
natural and inalienable rights of man, of the guar-
anty of these rights as the first cause of govern-
ment, and of the right and duty of revolution when
they are subverted. These doctrines, it is perhaps
needless to say, were not original with the writer
of the Declaration. They were the common prop-
erty of his time, were on the lips of every patriot
orator, and found copious expression in resolutions
throughout the colonies. It was later charged that
the substance of the Declaration had been " hack-

' References are to Ford's edition of Jefferson's writings (ten
volumes), unless otherwise specified. The Washington edition con-
tains some material not found in Ford, and vice versa. See also
" The Jefferson Papers," in Collections of Massachusetts Historical
Society, Seventh Series, Vol. I, edited by J. Franklin Jameson.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 147

neyed in Congress for two years before." ^ Jeffer-
son himself was fully conscious that the originality
of the statements lay in their form, rather than in
their content, and his own explanation of his work
is excellent : " Neither aiming at originality of prin-
ciple or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particu-
lar or previous writings, it was intended to be an
expression of the American mind, and to give to
that expression the proper tone and spirit called
for by the occasion."* Jefferson crystallized the
common sentiment into a very effective form, but
he could not and did not claim for himself the
merit of presenting to the world a series of new or
hitherto undiscovered truths. This is not to say,
however, that the authorship of the Declaration
was not a signal distinction ; it merely changes the
category in which the distinction lay.

Inquiring more closely into Jefferson's theory ol
inalienable rights, we find him protesting against
the idea that we surrender any of our natural rights
on entering into society. Jefferson argues that
these rights are not given up, but, on the contrary,
are rendered more secure.' He holds that the

1 Works, X, 267. This was alleged by Pickering and Adams, who
abo charged that " its essence was contained in Otis's pamphlet."
R. H. Lee maintained that it was copied from Locke.

2 Ibid. X, 343. Cf. X, 268 : " I did not consider it as any part
of my charge to invent new ideas altogether and to offer no senti-
ment which had ever been expressed before.'' — Letter to Madison.

*md. X (1816), 32 ff. Cf. Locke, Two Treatises of Govern-
ment.

148 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

state should declare and enforce our rights, but
should take none of them from us. Reasoning in
this way, it is possible, he thinks, to mark out the
proper sphere of state activity. Thus, as no man
has a natural right to interfere with the rights of
others, it is the duty of the law to restrain every one
from such interference. Every man should contrib-
ute to the necessities of society ; therefore the law
should see that he does so. No man has a natural
right to judge in his own cause ; therefore the law
must judge. Thus it appears that one does not
lose his natural rights under government, but
obtains a better guaranty of them.

Government is estabUshed, however, by the " con-
sent of the governed," or at least a just government
is so supported. What, then, is the nature of this
consent, and how is it to be made effective amid
constantly changing conditions ? Jefferson was not
satisfied with a contract made once and for all, Uke
that of Hobbes, or with a merely hypothetical con-
tract or even with a presumption of tacit consent
from the fact of residence. He looked upon the
contract as a necessary foundation for legitimate
government, and he considered that the agreement
should have historical as well as logical validity.
The principle of the social contract must be sacredly
preserved in the life of the people, and Jefferson
proposed two ways of insuring this end : first, by
revolution ; second, by periodical renewal of the
agreement

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 149

Revolution, Jefferson did not regard with great
horror, if principle were involved in the process.
He did not believe in government as something so
sacred in nature as to be above human criticism.
He did not " look at constitutions with sanctimo-
nious reverence and deem them like the ark of the
covenant, too sacred to be touched." ^ Government
appeared to him as an institution existing for the
governed ; and if it failed to serve this purpose,
then it might be overthrown and another erected
on its ruins. So far did he go in this direction that
the beneficent elements in government were at times
almost lost to view. He declared his dislike of
energetic government because it is always oppres-
sive.^ He was on one occasion doubtful whether
the first state of man, without government, as he
says, would not be the most desirable, if the society
were not too large.^ He thought that republics
should not be too severe in their treatment of rebel-
lions, lest the free spirit of the people be suppressed.

Rebellion, he argued, is a medicine necessary to
the health of government, and its use must not
be denied. It is wholesome, though bitter; or,
using another figure, it clears the air like a thunder-
storm.* Shays's Rebellion in Massachusetts Jef-
ferson regarded with great composure, even with
complaisance. The motives of the rebels were
good, he thought, though doubtless they were ill

1 Works, X, 42. " Ibid. IV, 479.

> Ibid. IV, 362. * IHd. IV, 362.

I50 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

informed on the situation. Better, however, that
they should take up arms than tamely submit to
what they deemed oppressive ; for, after all, it is
not rebellion that destroys a republic, but the dull
lethargy that creeps upon and paralyzes the public
spirit — " God forbid, that we should ever be twenty
years without such a rebellion." There have been,
he continues, thirteen states independent for eleven
years, and during this time only one rebellion.
This amounts to one in one hundred and forty-three
years for each state — by no means an excessive
number. How is it possible for a country to pre-
serve its liberties if the rulers are not occasionally
warned of the existence of a spirit of resistance
among their subjects .■" " What signify," he asks,
" a few lives lost in a century or two .'' The tree
of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with
the blood of patriots and tyrants." ^

The idea of adherence to the principle of the
social contract finds a less violent expression in
Jefferson's argument for periodical renewals of the
agreement. Rebellion or revolution serves to keep
alive the public spirit ; but it acts through irregu-
lar and illegal channels, and hence is best adapted
to countries where the government is tyrannically
inclined. For a free state, however, there are
other plans that may be followed, without passing
outside the boundaries of the law. A convention,
reconsidering the organic law of the land and sub-
1 Works,\yi (1789), 467.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 151

mitting the result of its deliberations to the people,
really constitutes, he maintains, a renewal of the
fundamental agreement. In this way the " consent
of the governed " may be again invoked and the
government reestablished on a just foundation.
Each generation, such is the argument, has a right
to estabUsh its own law. " The earth belongs in
usufruct to the living; the dead have neither
powers nor rights over it." ^ It follows, then, that
no generation of men can pass any law binding for
a period longer than the lifetime of that generation,
because their law-making power ceases with their
existence. If one generation could bind another,
the dead and not the living would rule. Since
conditions change and men change, there must be
opportunity for corresponding change in poUtical
institutions, and also for a renewal of the principle
of government by consent of the governed.^

Having established this proposition, Jefferson
proceeded to determine the exact period for which
a law or a constitution might be considered as an
expression of the will of the community. By the
use of certain tables of M. de Buff on, he found
that in any given society one-half of all those over
twenty-one years of age will have passed away in
eighteen years and eight months.* Therefore, he

^Md.\, 116.

' Cf. the theory of Thomas Paine as discussed in Political
Science Quarterly, XIV, 389 (September, 1899).
» Works,V, 118-119.

152 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

reasoned, no society can make any constitution,
law, or contract of binding force for any period
longer than nineteen years. Hence, if the society
is to adhere to the principles upon which just gov-
ernment is founded, there should be a revision
of the fundamental law, or at least an opportunity
for revision, every nineteen years. This plan was
defended by Jefferson as a reasonable and practi-
cable method of maintaining a free government in
its integrity. " At first blush," said he, " it may
be rallied as a theoretical speculation, but examina-
tion will prove it to be sohd and salutary." ^ He
urged that the first revenue law enacted by Con-
gress should contain in its preamble a statement
of this theory, and that the period for the granting
of patents be limited to nineteen years ; and he
manifested much concern at Virginia's failure to
adhere to the policy of periodical constitutional
revision.

Such, then, were the two methods by which the
consent of the governed might be made the con-
stant basis of government — by periodical renewal
of the contract, or, if this were impossible, by
rebellion or revolution. Neither of these methods,
however, was novel in political speculation when
Jefferson propounded them. The idea of a " fre-

1 Works, V, 123. See VI (Washington edition), 136, 197;
VII, 1 5, 359. Madison, in reply to Jefferson (in Madison's Writings,
I> 503-506), urges the debt owed by the living to the dead and
advocates the doctrine of " tacit consent."

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1 53

quent recurrence to fundamental principles " was
common to the time and was often expressed in
the Revolutionary state constitutions ; ^ while the
plan for a revision of the Constitution was not so
radical as the provision actually made in Vermont
and Pennsylvania for a council of censors and a
septennial constitutional revision.^

Having considered Jefferson's theory as to the
basis of the government, it is now in order to exam-
ine his position as to the various classes of govern-
ment.* What, then, was his opinion of monarchy ?
The government of a king Jefferson regarded, at
least in the earlier part of his life, with utter abhor-
rence. Though not the equal of Paine in the vigor
of his invective against kings, he was but little
inferior. He declared that " no race of kings has
ever presented above one man of common sense
in twenty generations." * Again : " There is not
a crowned headMn Europe whose talents or merit
would entitle him to be elected a vestryman by the
people of any parish in America."^ Writing in
1 8 10, he stated that, to his personal knowledge,

1 Massachusetts (1780), Art. 18; Pennsylvania (1776), Art. 14;
New Hampshire, Art. 38; North Carolina, Art. 21; Vermont,
Art. 16.

2 See Jameson, Constitutional Conventions (4th ed.), sec. 544.
» Works, IV, 362. Jefferson classified societies into three

groups: (l) those destitute of government; (2) those in whose
government the will of every one has a just influence; (3) those
whose governments rest on force. Letter to Madison (1787).
* Ibid. IV, 426. ' Ibid. V, 8.

154 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Louis XVI was a fool; and in the same category
were included the kings of Spain, Naples, Sardinia,
and Denmark, and the queen of Portugal; while
the successor to Frederick the Great he charac-
terized as a mere hog.^ Moreover, he thought
that if there were any efficient hereditary monar-
chies, their power would decay in the course of a
few generations. Jefferson's favorite and perhaps
most effective form of attack upon his opponents
was to arouse the suspicion that they were at heart
monarchists, longing for the restoration of royalty.^
In later years, however, after the failure of the
European revolutions to establish democracy, he
was inclined to concede that under certain condi-
tions a monarchy might really be the most desirable
form of government.^

The next point of inquiry is Jefferson's opinion
of aristocracy. Judging from his famous utter-
ance, " All men are created equal," he is generally
regarded as the great champion of human equality.
Against this is sometimes urged the fact that the
ownership of slaves is hardly in keeping with ideas
of universal equality. It should not be forgotten,
however, that Jefferson was really opposed to the
institution of negro slavery and more than once

1 Works, V (Washington), 515.

' In 1824 he said that he had charged the Federalists with ad-
herence to the forms, that is, the ceremonies, of the British gov-
ernment, not with a desire to introduce the British form, i.e. the
monarchy. Works, X, 309-310.

» See letter to Lafayette (1823) in Works, X, 279 ff.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 155

went on record against it, as in his proposition for
a Virginia constitution ^ (1776) and in the report
on the " Government for the Western Territory "
(i784).2 Later in life he was forced to abandon
his early hope that slavery would soon cease to
flourish in America, yet he still believed in the
ultimate extinction of slavery and declared (1814)
that " the love of justice and the love of country
plead equally for the cause of these people." ^ He
said that the hour of emancipation was advancing
with the march of time and urged continual effort,
" softly but steadily."

Aside from this point, however, it is easy to show
that Jefferson was not at all a believer in the ab-
solute equality of men.* In this connection it is
interesting to examine his correspondence with
John Adams upon this very question of aristoc-
racy. Adams denounces in set terms the theory
of the equality of all men, declares that society is
divided into two classes, " gentlemen " and " simple-
men," and demands the legal recognition of this
difference in ability.® Jefferson does not deny the

1 Works, II, 26.

* Ibid. Ill, 429. In this report occurs the provision : " Aftei
the year 1800 of the Christian sera, there shall be neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states otherwise than
in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been con-
victed to have been personally guilty." ' Ibid. IX, 477 ff.

* With the Declaration of Independence should be read Jeffer-
son's proposed constitution for Virginia (1776), II, 7ff. See also
the propositions of 1783, 1794, and 1816. ' See ante.

156 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

existence of an aristocracy among men, but dis-
tinguishes between the natural aristocracy and the
artificial aristocracy. One is based upon virtue
and talent, the other upon wealth and birth. The
" natural aristocracy " appears to him as the " most
precious gift of nature," and highly useful for the
purpose of instructing and governing society. He
even goes so far as to say, " That form of govern-
ment is the best which provides the most effec-
tively for a pure selection of these natural aristoi
into the offices of government."^ The "artificial
aristocracy," based on wealth and birth, is mischiev-
ous, even dangerous, and should not receive legal
recognition. In reply to Adams's proposition that
the aristocracy should be represented in one legis-
lative chamber and the people in the other,^ he
urges that the separation of the pseudo-aristocracy
from the genuine should be left to the people them-
selves. Some mistakes will doubtless be made,
but the really good and wise will generally be
selected.^ Jefferson, it may be said, believed in
an aristocracy, but only in the sense that the best
fitted for governing should rule, and that the selec-
tion of the aristoi should be made by popular elec-
tion rather than on a basis of birth or wealth. He
wanted aristocratic rulers democratically chosen.

1 Works, IX, 425.
^ Works of John Adams, IV, 379.

' Works, IX, 426. See Jefferson's explanation of the difference
in opinion between Adams and Iiimself.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1 57

But in this connection it must be remembered that
the democracy of his day was not the democracy
of ours. As late as 1824, Jefferson estimated that
a majority of the freemen in Virginia were excluded
from the franchise, and there were many inhabit-
ants who were not even freemen.^

Having reviewed his ideas on monarchy and
aristocracy, it remains to consider Jefferson's doc-
trine of democracy. What was the theory of " Jef-
fersonian democracy " } The doctrines of natural
rights and the " consent of the governed " have
already been examined ; but, more specifically,
what was his idea as to the characteristic features
of a democratic government ? This is not easy to
determine ; for, in the first place, his notions were
never systematically and not always clearly ex-
pressed ; and, in the second place, there are con-
tradictions between his political theory and his
practical politics. The theory of Jefferson, the
political scientist, and the practice of Jefferson,
the man of affairs, are not always free from incon-
sistency. An effort will be made here, however,
to show as clearly as possible from the scattered
sources at command what Jefferson's theory of
democracy really was.

Jefferson defines a republic as "a government
by the [its] citizens in mass, acting directly and
personally, according to rules established by the

1 On Aristocracy, see Taylor, Inquiry, passim ; Tucker's
Blackstone, Appendix to Vol. I, 37 ff.

158 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

majority." ^ Governments are republican in pro-
portion to the degree of direct action on the part
of the citizens,^ and there are of course many vary-
ing degrees. This is, however, only a very general
statement and lacks definiteness of outline. One of
the best supplementary explanations is that found
in Jefferson's first inaugural address.^ Here are
laid down the main principles which should obtain
within a democracy. They include, among others,
the following propositions: equal and exact jus-
tice; jealous care of the right of election by the
people ; the rule of the majority ; * the preserva-
tion of the guaranties of civil liberty, such as free-
dom of religion, freedom of the press, the habeas
corpus and jury trial ; the subordination of the
military to the civil authority; and economical
administration. In these phrases are summed up
his democratic program, and under his type of
government they would all be found in operation.
Further evidence as to Jefferson's notion of

1 Letter to Taylor, in Works, X, 28. See also letters to Dupont
de Nemours X, 22 ff.; to Judge Johnson, X, 226; and to Gerry,
VII, 327.

^ " Action by the citizens in person, in affairs within their reach
and competence; in all others by representatives chosen immedi-
ately and removable by themselves, constitutes the essence of a
republic." — Letter to Dupont de Nemours, X, 24.

8 Works, VIII, I ff.

* Ibid. VIII, 4. " Absolute acquiescence in the rule of the
majority, the vital principle of republics from which there is no
appeal but to force."

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1 59

democracy is given by examination of what he
once termed the " two hooks " upon which repub-
lican government depends.^ These were an edu-
cational system and a scheme of local government.'
Keenly appreciating the necessity of popular in-
telligence as a basis for successful popular govern-
ment, Jefferson was a constant advocate of all
measures for the diffusion of knowledge among
the masses. If government rests upon public
opinion, he said, then our first and foremost care
is to see that this opinion is kept right.^ Opinion
that is unenlightened and unsound would be the
death of free government. He once said that, Lf
forced to choose between a government without
newspapers and newspapers without a government,
he would not hesitate to choose the latter alterna-
tive, assuming that every man received the papers
and were capable of understanding them. Jeffer-
son exerted himself in behalf of educational insti-
tutions in his own state, and to his earnest efforts
was largely due the establishment of the Univer-
sity of Virginia.^

The second " hook " was local government.
Referring to his experience at the time of the
Embargo Act, Jefferson said : " I felt the founda-
tions of the government shaken under my feet by
the New England townships." * He recommended

1 Ibid. IX, 453. Ibid. IV, 360.

» See Randall's /^«rjo», III, 461.

* Works, VI (Washington edition), 544.

l60 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

for Virginia a system of local government mod-
elled quite closely after the New England type, to
take the place of the " large and lubberly divisions
into counties." "Wards" were to take charge of
the elementary schools, to care for the poor and
the roads, and to have a system of justices, con-
stables, and police.-^ But the " ward " was merely
one step in the scheme of governmental gradation
which Jefferson had in mind. He conceived that
liberty should be secured, not only by a tripartite
division of governmental powers, but also by a
further distribution among a series of organizations
extending from ward to nation. First should come
the elementary republics or wards, then the county
republics, then the states, and finally the nation.
Governmental powers should be delegated " by a
synthetical process to higher and higher orders of
functionaries, so as to trust fewer and fewer pow-
ers in proportion as the trustees become more and
more oligarchical." ^ Local government would thus
be made a part of the complicated "check and
balance " system in the intricacies of which des-
potism would be entangled and rendered powerless.
Another feature in the Jeffersonian program
should perhaps receive mention at this point;
namely, the plea for the subordination of the mili-
tary to the civil authority. He argued against a
large standing army as a likely instrument of

1 Works, VII (Washington edition), 357; also V, 524.

2 Ibid. VI (Washington edition), 543.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY l6l

oppression. Absolute governments must depend
upon force, but a free state, he held, should place
its confidence in the good-will of its citizens. So
far as military power is necessary for purposes of
defence, the need should be supplied by a well-dis-
ciplined militia. A standing army was associated
with monarchical power, and it was, therefore, a
part of the republican policy to reduce the army and
the navy to as low a footing as possible. Under
Jefferson this was the line of conduct followed by
the administration. In this way an alleged monar-
chical tendency was checked and at the same time
the expenses of government were reduced, although
the Embargo Act involved an exercise of power
like that of a " consolidated government." The sup-
pression of the miUtary power was undoubtedly one
of the features in the Republican plan for govern-
mental regeneration — indeed, it has been urged that
this was the real significance of the transition in
1801 ;^ but Jefferson did not present any very elabo-
rate arguments upon the question, and it did not oc-
cupy a very prominent place in his political theory.
Thus far this inquiry has extended into Jeffer-
son's definition of a republic and an examination
of various features included in the program of
such a government. Yet all these considerations
fail to show what was the real essence of Jeffer-
sonian democracy. They reveal in part his policy,
but his policy was never complete either in theory

1 Ford, The Rise and Growth of American Politics, 131.
M

l62 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

or in actual practice. That which gave life and
color to all these measures for democratic reform
was the article in the Jeffersonian political creed
which must now be considered. The distinctive
and characteristic feature of his doctrine is most
clearly expressed in his correspondence with John
Adams ; here may be seen the real difference that
divided these two great leaders, one the advocate
of the "well-born," the other the apostle of democ-
racy — their opinions characteristic of two great
parties and of two great schools of political thought.
This difference has already been indicated, but
may here be better explained and more appropri-
ately emphasized.

It has been shown that Adams was anxious for
a balanced government of the most complex na-
ture, including, as one of its elements, a legal
recognition of the aristocracy, and that he ap-
peared to doubt and distrust the capacity of the
people for any high degree of self-government.

Against such a theory, Jefferson maintained that
men are naturally divided into two classes: (i)those
who fear and distrust the people ; (2) those who
identify themselves with the people, have confi-
dence in them, consider them as the most honest
and safe, although not always the most wise, de-
positories of public interests.^

1 Works, VII (Washington edition), 376. Cf. Madison, Dialogue
between a Republican and an anti- Republican (1792), in Works,
IV, 483.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 163

In the opinion of the first class, the masses
must be held in check by physical and moral
force, and can be restrained in no other way ;
men are essentially incapable of ruling themselves,
and must be governed by authorities independent
of their will and not subject to their judgment.
But the second class, on the other hand, argues
Jefferson, place their trust in popular capacity for
self-government, maintaining that man is a rational
animal, possessing a natural and innate sense of
justice, and that for the preservation of peace and
order he does not require restraint from above or
outside, but is competent to choose his own rulers
and hold them dependent on his will. The same
idea as to the two classes of opinions is expressed
in a letter to Dupont de Nemours, in which Jeffer-
son says : "We both love the people, but you love
them as infants whom you are afraid to trust with-
out nurses, and I as adults whom I freely leave to
self-government." ^

The essence, then, of Jefferson's democracy was
confidence in the self-governing capacity of the
great mass of the people — a belief in the ability
of the average man or of average men to select
rulers who will conduct the administration in gen-
eral accord with the interests of the society. The
divergence of opinion just here made Adams an
aristocrat and Jefferson a democrat — not that

1 Works, X, 23; one of the best of the statements of democratic
principles.

1 64 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Adams had no confidence, or that Jefferson had
all confidence, in the people, but the degrees of
confidence differed widely. We might say that
one looked with suspicion on the people first of
all, the other distrusted first the government and
after that the people. Both favored a balanced
government ; but Adams desired primarily to pre-
vent violent action on the part of the people,
whereas Jefferson's first aim was to prevent op-
pression by the government; one reasoned that
the people should be watched, the other that the
government should be kept in constant view.i
Confidence in the people was, therefore, the dis-
tinguishing characteristic in the theory of Jeffer-
sonian democracy. In practice, however, the early
"democracy" was aristocratic in the nature of its
rule and continued to be so until the time of Jack-
son, when the democratic theory found a more
complete expression in political institutions.

It must further be noted that Jefferson's theory
of democracy was by no means so doctrinaire as
is often supposed. He did not argue that democ-
racy was equally adapted to all times, places,
conditions, and peoples, as some have assumed.
Confident of the ultimate triumph of democratic
principles, he was not eager for their immediate

1 Letter to Dupont de Nemours, in Works, X, 22. Cf. also VIII,
127 : " What is practicable must often control pure theory, and the
habits of the governed determine in great degree what is practi-
cable."

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY l6S

and universal application. Nothing could be
clearer than his statement that "the excellence
of every government is its adaptation to the state
of those who are governed by it." The Sage of
Monticello was not so blind a devotee of democ-
racy as to believe that civil and political liberty
need no firmer basis than a paper constitution.
To Lafayette he said that liberty becomes, "with
an unprepared people, a tyranny still of the many,
the few, or the one." ^ Again, he expressed doubt
" whether the state of society in Europe can bear
a republican form of government," and therefore
advised " a hereditary chief strictly limited." ^ The
cause for the failure of the continental revolutions
is discovered in the fact that "the mob of the
cities, the instrument used for their accomplish-
ment, debased by ignorance, poverty, and vice,
could not be restrained to rational action."^ Dis-
cussing American conditions, he comes to the con-
clusion that the Spanish-American states are not
ready for republican institutions, since their expe-
rience " has disqualified them for the maintenance
or even knowledge of their rights." * Louisiana

1 Works, IX (1815), 505.

2 Ibid. X (1823), 280, "A hereditary chief strictly limited, the
right of war vested in the legislative body, a rigid economy of
the public contributions and absolute interdiction of all useless
expenses, will go far toward keeping the government honest and
inoppressive."

' Ibid. VI (Washington edition), 227.

* Ibid. IX (181 1), 322; also IX, 430, 435.

l66 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

is not ready (1803) for the exercise of complete
political liberty and should obtain it only " in propor-
tion as we find the people there riper for receiving
the first principles of freedom." 1/ Jefferson points
out that in America economic Vconditions favor
democracy.^ Here every one owns property or
is at least so well situated as to be interested in
the maintenance of law and order. 5 It seems, then,
that " such men may safely and advantageously
reserve to themselves a wholesome control over
their public affairs and a degree of freedom, which,
in the hands of the canaille of the cities of Europe,
would be instantly perverted to the demolition and
destruction of everything public and private." Else-
where he remarks that the Americans will continue
to be virtuous and retain their democratic form of
government as long as they remain an agricultural
people ; but " when they get piled upon one another
in large cities, as in Europe, they will become cor-
rupt as in Europe."^ In one instance he even
goes so far as to say that the people here "would
go on as well under an absolute monarch while
our present character remains of order, industry,
and love of peace." *

[Jefferson believed fully in democracy and was
confident of the ultimate triumph of the system,
but he was too keen and careful an observer to

1 Works, VIII, 275. Cf. Paine, to the same effect.

8 Ibid. IX, 428; IV, 479.

« Ibid. IV, 479. * Ibid. X, 31.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1 67

think that all people were capable of adopting the
American system in his day. This may not have
been in harmony with his ideas on natural rights ;
but as he himself said, theory and practice are not
always in accord, and " the habits of the governed
determine in great degree what is practicable, y

Some interesting light is thrown on Jeffefson's
philosophy by noticing upon what systematic politi-
cal theorists he was most dependent, and which of
them, in his opinion, best expressed the true prin-
ciples of political science. From the classical
writings, Jefferson apparently derived little in-
spiration. Aristotle he knew,^ but thought of little
value ; and Plato's writings he considered as so
much worthless " jargon." ^ The chief source from
which Jefferson drew his inspiration is commonly
supposed to have been the philosophers of the
eighteenth-century democracy in France. It is
often said that his head was turned by French
ideas, that he was a " Rousseauist," and that the
speculative Jefferson was really a Frenchman.
The extent of the French influence upon Jeffer-
son was, however, far less than is generally sup-
posed. Montesquieu and Rousseau, who might
be presumed to have had a large share in deter-
mining his views, seem to have affected him very
little. Montesquieu he held in no high esteem.
"I am glad," he says, "to hear of anything which

1 Ibid. VII (Washington edition), 31.
» Ibid. IX, 462.

1 68 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

reduces that author to his just level, as his predi-
lection for monarchy, and the English monarchy
in particular, has done mischief everywhere, and
here also to a certain degree." ^ Rousseau is not
discussed or recommended for reading by Jeffer-
son ; nor do the latter's theories show as much re-
semblance to Rousseau as to other French writers.
Jefferson recommended Condorcet's Esquisse dun
Tableau Historique des Progrks de V Esprit Hiimain,
and probably obtained from this source his ideas
on human " improvability." The only French
work cited with enthusiasm is that by Destutt
de Tracy, Commentaire sur V Esprit des Lois, of
which Jefferson had a translation made into Eng-
lish (1811), so that it might circulate freely in this
country. He referred to Tracy's work as the
" most precious gift the present age has received," ^
" giving the most correct analysis of the principles
of government which has yet been offered ; " al-
though he did not agree with all the theories
contained in it, notably the doctrine of a plural
executive.^ But this work did not appear until
long after the early and more radical period in
Jefferson's life was over. The Declaration of In-
dependence antedated it by thirty-five years, and
Tracy himself had been influenced in no small
degree by American publicists, as appears from

1 Works, V (Washington edition), 535. Cf. VIII, 24.

2 Ibid. IX, 305, 500.

» Letter to Tracy, iUd. IX, 305.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 169

his eulogy of our federal system of government.
It is hence impossible to impute the paternity of
Jefferson's ideas to this work.^

Indeed, it is unnecessary to go outside of the
English theory of politics to find ample precedent
upon which Jefferson might draw. In the English
writers, particularly of the seventeenth century, are
found revolutionary and democratic principles of
the most decided character,^ anticipating not only
Jefferson, but in large measure Rousseau himself.
As I have indicated above, when Jefferson's rivals
wished to detract from his fame as author of the
Declaration, they could point to the substance of
this instrument in the words of Locke : the ideas
were the common property of the time — not bor-
rowed from Rousseau or Montesquieu. Jefferson's
theory followed a line of thought already marked
out during the English revolution by Milton, Syd-
ney, and Locke, and taken up by colonial thinkers
before Rousseau had begun to write.^

When called upon for advice as to the best
political literature, Jefferson recommended Locke
and Sydney of the earlier writers, and of the later :
Priestley's Essay on the First Principles of Govern-
ment ; "^iMx^i Political Disquisitions; Chipman's
Sketches of the Principles of Government ; The Fed-

1 The commentary appeared first in America, and eleven years
afterward in France (1822).

" See G. P. Gooch, English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth
Century. ' See ante, Chap. I.

I/O AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

eralist, which he once commended as "the best
commentary on the principles of government which
was ever written," and Tracy's Commentaries.
Jefferson was also an intimate friend of Thomas
Paine, and there are many common points in their
theories. In a letter to Paine he assured him that
the Americans are "firm and unanimous in their
principles of republicanism, and there is no better
proof of it than that they love what you write, and
read it with delight. The printers season every
newspaper with extracts from your last, just as
they did before from your first part of the Rights
of Man." "^

X On the whole, it appears that, so far as the revo-
lutionary character of his theory was concerned,
Jefferson was little in advance, logically, of his
predecessors. The difference between Jefferson
and Locke, for example, was not so much in fun-
damental principles as in the development of and
deductions from these principles. Jefferson and
Locke were both democratic and revolutionary in
theory, but Jefferson went farther than Locke in
his advocacy of democratization of the government.
Between the Fundamental Constitutions of Locke
and the Jeffersonian program there was a wide
difference. Locke's attitude toward the organi-
zation of the government was wholly aristocratic,
while that of Jefferson was essentially democratic.
They agreed in their destructive, but not in their

1 Works, VI, 87.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY I/l

constructive, program. Both were opposed to
absolutism; but Locke feared, while Jefferson fa-
vored, the erection of a " numerous democracy." ^

In conclusion, what should be said of Jefferson's
rank as a political theorist.' The important service
rendered by the Sage of Monticello was not the
scientific elucidation of theory. The doctrines he
advocated had all been discussed and developed
long before his time, and he did not improve much
on the classic analysis of Aristotle, the reasoning
of Locke, or the brilliant logic of Rousseau. He
cannot be classed as one of the great political
thinkers. He did not inquire deeply into the na-
ture of the state, its forms of organization, or any
of the numerous problems arising out of the com-
plex relations of political association. He did not
write systematically at all, and what he did write
was notable rather because of its rhetoric than
because of its scientific depth or clearness. Tested
by the canons of the schools, Jefferson falls far
short of the stature of a great political philosopher.

What, then, shall be said of this personality so
preeminent in the annals of American democracy ?
What was the source of his power, and what the
significance of his career .' One great cause of his
power was the unusual sagacity and astuteness
that made him a great party leader. With a

1 See, on the source of the ideas of colonial theorists, Lewis
Rosenthal, " Rousseau in Philadelphia," Magazint of American
History, XII, 46.

172 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

" machine " that was ill organized, if organized at
all, and with little patronage, Jefferson's political
genius guided the Republicans on to the destruc-
tion of their rivals. Another cause was his sin-
gular gift for vivid statement of popular ideas.
He crystallized the common democratic sentiment,
giving it form and power. He was great in his
ability to interpret and express popular feeling.
And finally, he had great confidence in the people.
He believed in their capacity for self-government,
had confidence in the soundness of their judgment,
and was hopeful of the future of democratic insti-
tutions. In spite of the many inconsistencies in
his conduct, Jefferson stands out as the great apos-
tle of the democratic faith in his day. He appeared
as the advocate of the " people" against the claims
of "monarchists" and "aristocrats." He not only
defended the people on theoretical grounds, but
he was identified with a fairly definite program of
democratic reform, a part of which he was success-
ful in carrying out, and much of which was ideal-
ized later under the Jacksonian democracy. jHe
stood for the extension of the suffrage, periodiical
revision of the Constitution, religious liberty, sub-
ordination of military to civil authority, the main-
tenance of local governments as a barrier against
excessive centralization, and for a certain demo-
cratic simplicity in place of the elaborate cere-
mony of kings and courts. This was the framework
of his political system, while the life and spirit of

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 173

it was faith in the self-governing capacity of the
people.

What is said of Jefferson may be taken as typi-
cal of the school with which his name is connected.
He organized the party, furnished its policies and
its principles, and for eight years offered a prac-
tical illustration of the type of thought for which
he stood. When the political theory of Jefferson
is stated, that of the Jeffersonian democracy has
been outlined.)

/
In conclusion on the theory of this epoch, it
may be said to have begun with a reaction
against democracy and to have closed with the tri-
umph of the popular doctrines. The great work
of the reactionary party was the adoption of the
Constitution and the establishment of the federal
government on a firm basis. Their chief concern
was with the maintenance of law and order, and
they were interested only secondarily in the guar-
anty of human rights. This was the secret of
their success and the cause of their failure as well.
In the accomplishment of their task they necessa-
rily antagonized some of the democratic doctrines
of their time ; and certain of the leaders, such as
Adams and Hamilton, developed and expressed
decidedly aristocratic ideas. Notwithstanding the
explanations made at a later date, it is evident that .
Adams and his school leaned away from the peo-
ple; or perhaps it would be more accurate and^

174

AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

just to say that they favored strong and efficient
government, whether popular or not. If they must
choose between strong government and popular
government, they would stand for an adequate and
effective political system. When once the central
government was fairly established, the opposition,
aided by the movement in France, rapidly gained
strength, and soon was able to obtain control of
the administration. Their return marked the re-
action from government to liberty again. Although
guilty of much misrepresentation of their oppo-
nents' position, and of many inconsistencies in their
conduct, the Jeffersonian Democrats had greater
confidence in the masses, and were ready to do
more for popular government than was the conser-
vative school.! They looked forward to a contin-
ued process of democratic development; the other
school looked backward toward the long-tried re-
gime of England, half expecting a return to an
order like that of earlier days, when the demo-
cratic impulse had spent its force.

Notwithstanding the democratic character of
the Jeffersonian theory, the program involved
in this was by no means carried out. Even un-

1 It should not be forgotten that in 1787 Jefferson himself enthu-
siastically endorsed Adams's Defence. " I have read your book
with infinite satisfaction and improvement," he said. " It will do
great good in America. Its learning and its good sense will, I
hope, make it an institute for our politicians, old as well as
young." — Letter to Adams, 1787. Works (Washington edition),
II, 128.

THE JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1 75

der the democratic regime, there still remained a
strictly limited electorate, property qualifications,
long terms of office, and little participation of the
people in the election of their officers. The gov-
ernment was still in the hands of the freeholders
and the gentry. The theory of the Jeffersonians
was in many respects an advance upon that of
the government party, but its practice was still in
many ways aristocratic. The development of de-
mocracy was begun by the Jeffersonian democracy,
but its full realization was left for another time
and another party.

CHAPTER V

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

The radical movement which was destined to
break down the power of the landed aristocracy,
level the old barriers of exclusiveness, and open
the way for government of a more popular char-
acter, took the form of Jacksonian Democracy.
Its leaders made few contributions to democratic
political theory, but they broadened the applica-
tion of principles already familiar. By expanding
the electorate, a revolution was made in the basis
of the democracy, and radical changes in the
superstructure were equally conspicuous. To the
more important features in this movement, atten-
tion will now be directed.^

Two great forces were back of the Jacksonian
democracy. These were, in the first place, the
frontier conditions and ideas in the West and
South ; and, in the second place, the growth of

^ On this period, see J. B. McMaster, Untied States, IV, V;
S. N. Thorpe, Constitutional History of the American People;
H. J. Ford, Rise and Growth of American Politics ; F. A. Cleve-
land, The Growth of Democracy in the United States ; James
Schouler, Constitutional Studies.

176

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 177

cities and an industrial class. By 1830 nine new
states had been added to the original thirteen,
and by 1850 there had been sixteen admitted,
of which only two, Maine and Vermont, were
not on the Western frontier. In these new states
the conditions, economic and social, were highly
favorable to the development of the democratic
spirit. Frontier life tended to produce self-reliance,
independence, and individuality. It developed a
sense of equality on the part of the members of
the community. There was no great wealth, no
highly polished society, no leisure class, and no
historic tradition ; the conditions were accordingly
unfavorable to aristocratic theory or practice. To
the hardy pioneers, the idea of a jure divino king,
an hereditary nobility, or a specially privileged
class was ridiculous in the extreme; while reli-
gious or property qualifications, permanent or long
tenure of office, and similar restrictions were alto-
gether unacceptable. They firmly believed in the
sovereignty of the people, and, furthermore, in
the necessity of giving to the mass of the popu-
lation, as far as possible, the direction of public
affairs. Anything in the shape of special privi-
lege or class exclusiveness became at once an ob-
ject of suspicion and distrust; but confidence in
the people was always met with hearty applause,
and was the surest way to popular approval.

A second cause was the increase of the city
population, and the development of other than

1/8 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

agricultural pursuits. By reason of this develop,
ment there came into existence a population and
a set of interests different from those of the free-
holders' aristocracy. They demanded the right to
share in the active exercise of political power,
exerted pressure in this direction, and helped to
bring about the same state of affairs in the East
that was being realized in the Western and South-
em states.^

This democratic tendency found expression in
national politics through the election to the Presi-
dency of Andrew Jackson. In his personality the
new leader embodied the characteristics of the new
democracy. His defeat of John Quincy Adams, the
skilled and accomplished statesman, marked the ad-
vent of another type of chief executive and the
end of a long line of the old school Presidents.
To many grave thinkers, the election of Jackson
seemed the triumph of " King Mob," and portended
the ascendency of the worst elements of the peo-
ple, the rule of an ignorant and incapable democ-
racy. They thought that republican institutions
were threatened with the very gravest danger, and
would not have been surprised to see them wholly
subverted.

The importance of the new departure was soon
felt in the national government. The President
regarded himself as the representative of the peo-

1 See on this point the debates in the Massachusetts Convention
of 1830, and the New York Convention of 1821.

THE JACICSONIAN DEMOCRACY 179

pie, and asserted the rights of the executive against
the legislature and the judiciary as they had nevei
been asserted before. In the days when state consti-
tutions had first been formed, overwhelming predomi-
nance had been given to the legislative department ;
and in the national government also. Congress had
occupied the most conspicuous place up to this time.
Congressmen had nominated candidates for the
Presidency ; had already directly chosen two Presi-
dents; their law-making power had seldom met with
executive check; they had occupied the foremost
place in the direction of the affairs of the nation.
In the days of Jackson, the rule of "King Caucus"
was overthrown in favor of the less aristocratic
nominating convention. The long dormant veto
power was brought out and used in a way that had
never been thought of in the old regime. The
constitutional strength of the executive was for
the first time revealed, and the legislature met its
first decisive check.

Fear of the executive was soon aroused, and the
most painful anticipations of presidential tyranny
were expressed. The Whig party was organ-
ized in opposition to what its leaders considered
the abuse of the executive prerogative. Clay,
Calhoun, and Webster, the ablest intellects of the
time, struggled hard in defence of Congress, de-
nouncing the action of the President in the most
unsparing terms. Webster said: "The contest
for ages has been to rescue liberty from the grasp

l80 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

of executive power. ... To this end, all that
could be gained from the imprudence, snatched
from the weakness, or wrung from the necessities
of crowned heads, has been carefully gathered up,
secured and hoarded, as the rich treasures, the
very jewels of liberty." ^ The executive, he urged,
has always been regarded " as a lion which must
be caged." The executive power is not the de-
fender of liberty; but "our very security depends
upon our watchfulness of it." The President,
he denounced as " a Briareus (who) sits in the
centre of our system, and with his hundred
hands touches everything, moves everything, con-
trols everything." Clay was equally vigorous in
his attacks on the executive. The power of the
President, he said, " is felt from one extremity
to the other of this vast republic. By means of
principles which he has introduced and innova-
tions which he has made in our institutions, alas !
but too much countenanced by Congress and a
confiding people, he exercises uncontrolled the
power of the State. In one hand he holds the
purse, and in the other brandishes the sword of
the country. Myriads of dependants and parti-
sans, scattered over the land, are ever ready to
sing hosannas to him, and to laud to the skies
whatever he does. He has swept over the gov-
ernment during the last eight years like a tropical
tornado. Every department exhibits traces of the
1 Congressional Debates, Vol. X, Pt. II, p. 1 68 1 (1834).

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY l8l

ravages of the storm." ^ To the leaders of the
Whigs, indeed, it seemed that, as in the seven-
teenth century in England, the people were threat-
ened by the power of the executive, and should
find their natural ally in the legislature. This was
clearly expressed by Calhoun when he said, that
he considered Congress "the great central point
where all power must receive its sanction and
direction ; " and that the large amount of discre-
tionary authority which must under every govern-
ment be lodged somewhere, should be placed in
the hands of the legislature. Still more radically
this theory was stated at times. For example,
it was said on the floor of the Senate : " The
executive power which represents the common
force of society is, in every just theory, and in the
nature of things, inferior to the legislative power,
which is the representative of the common intelli-
gence and the common will, and that, too, pre-
cisely in the degree to which brute force is inferior
to reason." ^ The essence of the Whig doctrine
was that the legislature is naturally the closest
representative of the people, and that the execu-
tive should be an object of constant suspicion and
distrust. ^

1 Ibid. XIII, Pt. I, p. 438 (1837). Cf. X, Ft. I, p. 1314, on the
Whigs as opponents of executive prerogative.

2 IHd. Vol. XIII, Pt. I, 469.

' A very rhetorical statement of the anti-prerogative men was
that made by Mr. Sprague in the Senate, January 29, 1834. " I may
be deemed an alarmist. There is cause for alarm. When one

1 82 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

The legislature, however, had reached the climax
of its power in the days of the Revolution, and
there was now a pronounced reaction against that
department. This was one of the most significant
points in Andrew Jackson's administration. He
announced himself as the representative of the
people in as true a sense as the Congress, and de-
clared his independence of, or better, his right to
an equal rank with, the other two departments.
The executive, since the time of the Revolution
shorn of power, again found strength to assert him-
self in the affairs of state. It may fairly be said
that one of the first fruits of the new democratic
regime was a decisive victory for the executive,
representing the people, over the congressional
aristocracy inherited from the Revolution. It was
the old story over again, of a strong executive sup-
ported by the masses of the people against a well-
intrenched aristocracy ; and the victory rested with
the executive. Jackson undoubtedly believed that
he was the representative of the people against
the legislative aristocracy ; the people apparently

man, encroaching upon Congress, the Senate, and the judiciary,
arrests and rolls back the course of legislation; interprets laws,
treaties, and constitutions; assumes the sole power of appointment,
— holding at the same time absolute control over the army, the
navy, the post-office, an affiliated press, and the whole swarm of
executive officers, — and now superadded to all this, tremendous
money power, the fiscal agency ingrafted upon banking capital, —
can liberty be safe? Safe — when a boa-constrictor is closing
around her his crawling and crushing folds?"

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 183

regarded him as their champion in the conflict, and
were willing to trust him with great powers in
order to insure the victory.

A similar expansion of the executive power is
noticeable in the individual states. In fact, the
movement began there, and not in the national
government. The selection of the governor was
taken away from the legislature and submitted to
the direct vote of the people ; ^ the term of office
was materially lengthened ; "^ the great weapon for
the defence of the executive prerogative, the veto,
was in general vested in the governor,' and also a
larger share of the appointing power. At the
same time, the former high property qualifications
were removed, and the position was made accessi-
ble to all citizens so far as wealth was concerned.
In short, there arose a new idea in regard to the
executive and his place in the scheme of govern-
ment. This was well expressed by one of the dele-
gates to the New York Convention of 1821. "An
erroneous idea," said he, " seems to have prevailed
in relation to the powers and origin of the gov-
ernor. Who is he .' and by whom is he appointed .'
Does he derive his authority from the king of Great
Britain .' Is he an usurper } If so, let us unite to

1 Penn., 1790; Del., 1792; Ga., 1824; N.C., 1835; Md., 1837;
N.J. 1844; Va., 1850.

2 Penn., 1790; Ga., 1789; Va., 1830; Del., 1831; N.C., 1835;
Md., 1837; N.J., 1844.

«Ga., 1789; Penn., 1790; N.H., 1792; Conn., 181S; N.J., 1844.

1 84 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

depose him. But, sir, he is the man of the people
— elected by their suffrages and identified with
their interests. He is a watchful sentinel to guard
us from evil and a zealous friend to admonish us
of error."

It is evident, then, that one pronounced feature
of the democratic movement in the first half of the
century was the elevation of the executive and the
degradation of the legislative power. The early
distrust of the executive, which once took the form
of a fear that monarchy might return, had disap-
peared, and also the early confidence in the legis-
lature. Popular suspicion seemed to be directed,
not so much against a tyrannical monarchy, as
against " encroaching aristocracy." The public
was willing to intrust large powers to one man,
but was jealous of the authority of a legislative
coterie, or a "banking aristocracy," or aristocracy
in any shape or form. As has often been the case,
the instrument by which the aristocracy was over-
thrown, in this instance also, was a powerful execu-
tive. In the national field this change centres
around the career of Andrew Jackson ; in the
states the same tendency was at work, readjust-
ing the balance between the legislative and the
executive power.

Another point in national administration was car-
ried for the radical democracy, when the principle
of rotation in office and the " spoils system " ob-
tained recognition. This was primarily a victory

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 185

for party organization, but the idea of rotation in
office was a democratic one. This result had
already been partly achieved by the provisions in
state constitutions for short terms of office, and in
many instances by limitations upon reeligibility.
But now the general principle was accepted that all
offices should be held for short terms only, in order
that all citizens might have better opportunity to
secure a position. The idea rested on the assump-
tion that one man is about as well fitted for any
office as any other man, and may, therefore, be
safely intrusted with official responsibility. It was
diametrically opposed to the doctrine that office
should be held on the ground of special fitness,
and that long tenure of office gives one, in a sense,
a vested right to the position.

By no one was the popular notion more clearly
stated than by Jackson himself in his first annual
message to Congress. Here are found the two
ideas on which the new system rested; namely,
that experience is not very important for a public
servant, and secondly, that a long tenure of office
is actually detrimental to good pubUc service.
"There are, perhaps, few men," said Jackson, "who
can for any great length of time enjoy office and
power without being more or less under the influ-
ence of feelings unfavorable to the discharge of
their public duties." And again he argued that " the
duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of
being made, so plain and simple that men of in-

1 86 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

telligence may readily qualify themselves for their
performance; and I cannot but believe that more
is lost by long continuance of men in office than is
generally to be gained by their experience." He
further urged that the proposed measure "would
destroy the idea of property in office now so gener-
ally connected with official station ; and although
individual distress may be sometimes produced,
it would, by promoting that rotation which consti-
tutes a leading principle in the republican creed,
give healthful action to the system." Such was
the doctrine of rotation in office as announced by
President Jackson.

This view seems to be that experience had be-
fore entering office is unnecessary, and experience
gained after entering office is apt to make the
officer less fit to serve the pubhc. John Taylor,
in his Inquiry, asserted that more talent is lost by
long continuance in office than by the system of
rotation. Talents are called out by the prospect
of employment, and " smothered by the monopoly
of experience." On the floor of the United States
Senate it was predicted that in time opportunities
will be enlarged, " till it shall become a matter of
course that each individual shall strive to qualify
himself to discharge the duties of any office to
which he may be called." ^ It was, in fact, gener-
ally believed that no great skill is necessary for
the work of governmental administration ; and, on
1 Congressional Globe (1835), 23d Congress, 1st Session, I, 273.

THE J A CKSONIAN DEMO CRA CY 1 8 7

the Other hand, that an officer long in the pub-
lic service would lose sympathy with the people,
and become a devotee of officialism and bureau-
cracy. Life estate or even long estate in office
was attacked by the democracy of this time in the
same way that monarchy and aristocratic privilege
had been at an earlier time. This attack was one
part of the great movement which swept away
what was left of privilege, and opened the way for
the democratization of political institutions. That
some of the ideas accompanying this advance
should be crude, radical, or extreme, was in the
nature of things to be expected.

One of the most important measures of this
period was the general extension of the suffrage
from the "property" basis to a "manhood" basis.
This change went down to the very roots of the
political society, and for that reason deserves the
most careful attention. At the time when the re-
public was founded there were very strict limita-
tions on the electorate. Political power was kept
tightly in the hands of the freeholders, who were
to all intents and purposes "the people." These
qualifications began to disappear, however, soon
after the establishment of the federal government. ^
Few of the new states entering the Union adopted
the property requirement, and the old states slowly

1 On this point see the authorities already cited, Poore, CAar-
ters and Constitutions; and the debates in the constitutional
conventions of the various states.

1 88 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

abandoned the restrictions found in their constitu-
tions. Stubborn resistance to the tendency was
often encountered, notably in the case of Virginia,
New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island; yet
the advance was sure, no backward step was taken,
and by the middle of the century property qualifi-
cations for suffrage had been practically abolished
in all the states. A few restrictions were still in
existence, but these were not oppressive in charac-
ter, and excluded no large section of the com-
munity. In the majority of the states, however,
even these restrictions were omitted, and the broad
principle of manhood suffrage (white) received
full recognition. The old property qualifications
were outgrown and a new democracy sprang
up, based, not on the freeholders, but on the
whole body of adult male citizens. The electo-
rate was enormously expanded, and there came
into existence a type of democracy which made
that of Revolutionary days seem like a limited
aristocracy.

Recognition was won for this new idea only after
a bitter and protracted struggle. The doctrine that
suffrage should depend upon property was tena-
cious of life, and clung desperately to its hold on
the state constitutions. The property requirement
was supported by some of the ablest men in the
nation, and it is from one point of view surpris-
ing that the opposite principle was able to make
headway against such talented advocates. John

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 189

Adams, Daniel Webster, and Joseph Story de-
fended the property qualification in Massachu-
setts. In New York Chancellor Kent bitterly
opposed the adoption of universal suffrage; in
Virginia there were arrayed against the exten-
sion of the franchise, Madison, Monroe, Marshall,
Randolph, and Upshur. The opposition to the
freehold principle could boast of no such formid-
able champions.

The earnestness displayed in the defence of prop-
erty, and the ability with which the cause was con-
ducted, are such as might have been expected from
a class long accustomed to the possession of the
right to govern. To this dominant class, the plan
of extending the suffrage to practically all male
adults appeared to be fraught with the very grav-
est danger. The project seemed to them to be with-
out foundation either in reason or in justice, and
they did not see how it could result in anything
but the subversion of democratic institutions. The
results of the adoption of the principle of uni-
versal suffrage as predicted by the famous jurist,
Kent, were the abuse of liberty, the oppression of
minorities, the disturbance of chartered privileges,
the degradation of justice, unequal taxation, crude
and unstable legislation. " I hope, sir," said the
venerable judge, "we shall not carry desolation
through all the departments of the fabric erected
by our fathers. I hope we shall not put forward
to the world a constitution such as will merit the

190 AMERICAN POUTICAL THEORIES

scorn of the wise and the tears of the patriot."'
On every hand, it was urged that the freeholders
are the safest and most conservative depository of
political power. They were considered as the
only class capable of actively entering into politi-
cal affairs. Frequent and always unfavorable con-
trasts were drawn between the solid class of landed
gentry, and the commercial and laboring classes
found in the cities, with the uniform conclusion
that political power might be most safely intrusted
to those who held the land. This idea was of
course connected with the theory, sanctioned by
Jefferson himself, that a democracy thrives best
where it has an agricultural population as its basis.
Profound distrust of the capacity of the urban popu-
lation for the exercise of political power helped ma-
terially to stiffen the resistance made by the ruling
class to sharing its authority with others.^ From

• Debates in the New York Convention of 1821, 219 ff. In the
Virginia Convention of 1829— 1830, there was an animated and ex-
tended debate in which almost every phase of political opinion was
represented.

^ Kent, op. cit., 222. In the New York Convention, one speaker
referred to " the ring-streaked and speckled population of our large
towns and cities, comprising people of every kindred and tongue."
p. 253. Referring to the commercial classes. Root had said a little
before this : " Will not these classes feel as strong an interest in sus-
taining them (the judges) as the farmer back in the woods ? . . .
Have they not more frequent occasion to resort to them for the
protection of their rights?" p. 223. In the Virginia Convention one
enthusiastic orator expressed the belief that " if there are any
chosen people of God, they are the cultivators of the soil." p. 366

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 191

the Strength displayed by the old aristocracy at this
time, one may judge of the importance and the
significance of the new democratic movement.^

In behalf of an increase in the electorate, the
argument was less brilliantly conducted, but was
none the less convincing and effective. Sometimes
the plea was made in the interest of the commercial
class, or the laboring men, or of those who had
done military duty for the state, but were never-
theless excluded from participation in the suffrage.
Sometimes it was asserted that the franchise is a
natural right, and that therefore men cannot be
justly deprived of it ; but this was not always con-
tended. The greatest difficulty seemed to be that
of uprooting the idea that only the holders of
property have an interest in government strong
enough to justify giving them a voice in its direc-
tion. The proposition that men who own no land
in the community should have a share in the politi-
cal power was contrary to long-estabUshed English
custom, and to the practice in America since the
early days of settlement here. The introduction
of any other idea was necessarily difficult.

The case of the liberals was most clearly stated
in the argument that "our community is an as-
sociation of persons — of human beings — not a
partnership founded on property." Thus the re-
sult was made to turn on the question whether

1 See Debates in Massachusetts Couvention of 1820; New York
Convention of 1 821; Virginia Convention of 1829- 1830.

192 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

property or human personality is the more funda
mental element in civil society, or what their rela-
tive importance is. One party denounced the rule
of mere numbers as illogical and absurd, and
showed that it is wholly impossible to carry out
the principle fully.^ The other party, with equal
logic, showed that if property were the only consid-
eration, voting power ought, then, to be proportioned
according to wealth. The suffrage extensionists, in
reply to the property argument, laid great stress
on the elements of virtue and intelUgence in soci-
ety, and declared these were as worthy of consid-
eration as the mere ownership of a tract of land.
As one disputant said, there is nothing in property
that " by enchantment or magic converts frail, err-
ing man into an infallible and impeccable being."
It was shown that the non-freeholders are not
eager for an opportunity to plunder the rich, but
that they are responsible and reliable citizens who
may safely be intrusted with the exercise of politi-
cal power. This assertion was pointed by the fact
that many citizens who owned no real estate were
so prosperous and wealthy that they could not
well be looked upon as untrustworthy individuals
who would use the ballot to the perversion of the
state.

Slowly the old idea that the holders of real

1 Randolph referred to the rule of " King Numbers. " The reply
was made that " there is no other monarch save King Cypher,
King Blood, King Sword, or King Purse." Virginia Debates, 389.

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 193

estate are the political people was discredited and
abandoned, and the way opened to practically all
citizens of mature years. The land-holding class
abdicated, and the mass of the people was in-
trusted with the power of political control. This
was by far the most important change made dur-
ing the Jacksonian epoch, for it radically altered
the foundation of the republic.

At the same time, the property qualifications
for office-holding became unpopular and were cast
aside. When the new states came in, these re-
quirements generally found no place, and the old
states, one by one, abolished the severe require-
ments of colonial and Revolutionary days.^ A
few states, notably Delaware and Massachusetts,
clung persistently to these early provisions or
remnants of them almost down to the end of the
nineteenth century, but they were exceptions.
Generally speaking, by the middle of the century
property qualifications for office in the United
States were a thing of the past. Office was no
longer the monopoly of the few, but was thrown
open to all so far as wealth was concerned.

With these restrictions on suffrage and office
went those of a religious character. A majority of
the original thirteen states disqualified Roman
Catholics, and all but New York and Rhode Island

1 Md., 1810; Penn., 1838; Mass. (except for governor), 1840;
N.J., 1844; Conn. 1845; N.Y., 1845; Ga., 1847; Va., 1850; N.H,
1852.

o

194 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

imposed a religious test of some kind. These re-
strictions endured for only a short time, however,
and very early began to drop out of the state con-
stitutions. The Protestant clause was first aban-
doned, and finally the religious tests were omitted
altogether; Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jew, Uni-
tarian, and those of no religious profession were
placed on the same footing in the political world.
The tendency of the time was wholly opposed to
conditioning political rights on religious considera-
tions, and although the case was ably argued by
those who defended such restrictions, they were
unable to make effectual resistance to the demand
that religious belief and political capacity should
not be connected by the law of the land.-'

With the abolition of these tests disappeared
the provisions for public taxation in support of
churches in the states which had inherited religious
establishments from the Revolution. The estab-
lishment of religion had been forbidden the national
government in the Constitution, and the same pro-
vision was adopted by the states a little later.^ By
1833 the provisions for taxation in support of eccle-
siastical organizations had been abolished, except

1 See the argument in the Massachusetts Convention of 1820-1821
passim; also the North Carolina Debates (1835), especially the
speech of Judge Gaston in favor of religious toleration, 264-305.
Consult in this connection Phillip Schaff, Church and State in the
United States, and Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty
in America.

2 Va., 1785; S.C, 1790; Md., 1810; Conn., 1818; Mass., 1833.

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1 95

in New Hampshire, where the Revolutionary
clause is still found in the constitution.

Thus was completed that separation of church
and state, which has since been a characteristic
feature of American institutions. The idea was
early stated by Jefferson, but was not at that time
able to win a place for itself. The line of reason-
ing, however, was substantially that which was
later followed. He urged that rights of conscience
were not surrendered in the original contract, but
were retained by the individual, and that govern-
ment has, therefore, no jurisdiction over that field.
Government, said he, can interfere only in respect
to such acts as are injurious to others; but "it
does me no injury for my neighbors to say there
are twenty gods or no god. It neither picks my
pocket, nor breaks ray leg." He denied that uni-
formity of behef was desirable, pointing out the ad-
vantages arising from variety. But even if desir-
able, such uniformity was not attainable by the use
of coercion. The only effect of the use of force,
he maintained, was " to make one half of the world
fools, and the other half hypocrites." ^

The same principle was strongly stated by Mad-
ison. He argued that state support of religion is
unjustifiable because, in the first place, the right to
religion is inalienable. It is a duty to the Creator,
and is a reserved right in the social contract. In-
terference in this matter violates the principle of
1 Notes on Virginia (1784), HI, 261-266.

igS AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

equality by allowing some men the free exercise of
religion, and forbidding it to others. It gives the
legislature unwarranted jurisdiction, and confers
power on civil magistrates to act as judges of re
ligious truth — a capacity in which they are not
fitted to serve. Such measures, he urges, are not
needed for the advancement of the Christian re-
ligion, nor do they tend to strengthen the civil
government. The effect of an attempt to enforce
such laws is simply "to enervate the laws in
general and to slacken the bands of society." i

The abolition of religious tests and church estab-
lishment during this period was a recognition of
these ideas. In general the line of reasoning fol-
lowed was about that indicated by Jefferson and
Madison. The underlying cause seems to have
been the multiplicity of sects, which was highly
favorable to mutual toleration, rather than antip-
athy to religion as such.

Another feature of the democratic movement
during the first half of the nineteenth century was
the increasing participation of the people in the
election of their officers. In the earlier period
this power had been largely in the hands of the
legislature, and hence the choice of officers was,
to that extent, indirect. With the increasing em-
phasis on the people, however, and the reaction
from the early confidence in the legislatures, there

^ " Remonstrance to the General Assembly of Virginia on the sup-
port of religious teachers" (1785). Works, I, 162-169.

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY I97

came a decided change. Elections were taken out
of the hands of the legislative bodies, and officers
were chosen directly by the popular vote. In the
national government, popular voting under the dis-
trict system took the place of election by the legis-
lature in the choice of representatives in the House,
and the choice of presidential electors was also
taken away from the legislature. In the states a
tendency in the same direction was clearly evi-
dent. The choice of governor was taken away
from the legislature and conferred upon the people,
thus rendering him less dependent upon the legis-
lative branch of government. Other officers, such
as the treasurer and the auditor, were given over
to popular election in place of choice through the
legislature. Many minor officers were also made
directly elective, such as clerks of court, sheriffs,
and justices of the peace. The theory upon which
this action rested was that the legislature is a
more or less aristocratic body, and that the people
should participate directly in the choice of their
officers.

In this same connection should be noticed the
popular opposition to certain elements in the judi-
cial system, which were considered as aristocratic.
The courts, state as well as national, were objects
of suspicion and often of open hostility.^ The

1 See McMaster, Vol. Ill, 153 ff., for account of "judge-break-
ing" in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Hampshire; Burgess,
Middle Period, 195 ff.

198 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Federal Supreme Court was feared because of its
alleged encroachment upon the rights of the indi-
vidual states, but the commonwealth courts also
met with opposition from the newly awakened
democratic sentiment. This desire to put a check
on the judiciary was expressed in two ways;
namely, by an abbreviation of the judicial term of
office, and by constitutional provision for the elec-
tion of the judges by the people. In the early days
of the Republic, the tenure of the judges had gen-
erally been during good behavior. Life tenure,
however, was obnoxious to the new democracy, and
was repudiated as occasion offered, particularly in
the South and West, and also in some of the
Eastern states.^ The tenure for life was replaced
by a shorter term of from five to fifteen years, six,
seven, and eight years being the most common
periods allotted. Popular election of the judges
was less easily carried through than the shortening
of the term. At first, provision was made for the
election of justices of the peace and minor officers,
but toward the middle of the century popular elec-
tion of the higher courts began to find general
favor. This movement was looked upon with
alarm by the conservative class, but the idea made
rapid progress as constitutions were constructed
and reconstructed, and soon won a general victory.
In the period from 1846 to 1853, no fewer than

1 Of the old states, Penn., 1838; N.J., 1844; N.Y., 1846J Va,
1850; Md., 1851.

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1 99

thirteen states recognized the elective principle
in the choice of judicial officers of the highest
grades.^ Thus, with the abandonment of life
tenure of office and the adoption of a popular sys-
tem of judicial election, the democracy triumphed
in the third great branch of government — the
judiciary.

Another evidence of the democratic tendencies
of this period is the method in which changes in
the fundamental law were made. Of the Revolu-
tionary constitutions, only two were submitted to
the people, the others being adopted by conven-
tion alone. By 1830 the practice of submitting
constitutions to a popular vote for ratification had
become frequent; and in the period from 1830 to
1850 only two constitutions went into operation
without having received popular sanction at the
polls.2

Summing up the democratic movement of this
period, we have the following results. The elec-
torate was largely increased by the abolition of
property qualifications. Religious and property
requirements for office-holding were abandoned,
terms of office were shortened, the principle of
"rotation in office" was accepted, provision was

1 Cal., la., Ky., La., Md., Mich., Mo., N.Y., Ohio, Penn., Tenn.,
Va., Wis.

2 Del., 1831; Ark., 1836. Cf. Cleveland, op. Hi., 113; Jameson,
Constitutional Conventions.

200 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

made for popular election of officers, the legislative
department of government became an object of
suspicion, and the executive was correspondingly
advanced in popular favor. These numerous and
important changes marked the rise of a new
democracy, widely different from that of Revolu-
tionary times, or the early days of the Republic.
The new type of government was as much an
advance on that of the Revolutionary period, as
that of those days was upon the contemporary
government in England. The only exception to
the democratic movement was the position in re-
gard to slavery. In the Southern states, accom-
panying the democratic changes in government,
there were laws of increasing severity in respect
to those held in bondage. With this exception,
the new democracy had taken the country by
storm.

In spite of these marked democratic changes,
there was little advance in the fundamental princi-
ples of political theory. The Jacksonian democ-
racy carried out in large measure the ideas which
the Jeffersonian democracy either had not thought
of carrying out, or was unable to carry out. The
theory was not new, but such a wide application
of these ideas was a decided innovation. In fact,
there was on some points a perceptible reaction
from the principles of 1776. This was notable in
the case of the contract theory, which was sub-
jected to important modifications. Story, for ex-

THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 20I

ample, held that the doctrine of the contract
" requires many limitations and qualifications when
applied to the actual condition of nations, even
of those which are most free in their organization.
Every state, however organized, embraces many
persons in it who have never assented to its form
of government, and many who are deemed in-
capable of such assent, and yet who are held bound
by its fundamental institutions and laws." ^ On
the other hand, Calhoun and his associates, who
upheld the cause of slavery, repudiated altogether
the " natural right " theory of politics and came out
boldly with another doctrine. With these two ten-
dencies coincided that of the German refugee,
Lieber. Thus the Revolutionary theory, although
still widely accepted and defended by many writers
and thinkers,^ was already seriously undermined.
Although the organization of the government and
the spirit of social institutions was more demo-
cratic than before, there were strong evidences of
a change in the character of the political theory.
This movement was in the direction of a new
basis for democracy — a new theory of republican
institutions, fundamentally different from that of
the founders of the Republic. The nature of this

'■ Commentaries, sec. 327.

* See Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free In-
stitutions (1848), by Frederick Grimke — a diffuse work covering
the entire field of politics; Nathaniel Chipman, Principles of Politics
(1833;, 1st edition, 1793.

202 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

new philosophy will be considered in a subsequent
chapter on modern tendencies.^

^ Attention may be called at this point to a change in the preva-
lent theory as to the form of the contract upon which society rests.
In Revolutionary times it v^as a common opinion that the parties to
the agreement were the king, or government, and the people. The
later thinkers distinctly repudiated any contract between governor
and governed, and held that the agreement was one between indi-
viduals. The governors, it was held, were not parties to a contract,
but the mere agents or servants of the people. Cf. Madison, Works,
IV> 63; John Taylor, /w^ajVy, 424; James Wilson, fVorHs, I, zji.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE SLAVERY
CONTROVERSY

One of the most interesting developments of
political theory in the United States is that which
arose out of the controversy over slavery in the
years between 1830 and i860. During the period
of the Revolution and the early days of the Re-
public the general sentiment was unfriendly to slav-
ery.^ The existence of the custom was lamented
by such men as Washington, Jefferson, Monroe,
and Adams. There was general regret that the
institution had ever been planted in America, and
it was hoped that it would in time be abandoned.
In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 the anti-
slavery principle was recognized, and later in the
abolition of the slave trade. Slavery was gradually
abolished in the Northern states, and the Coloniza-
tion Society represented the desire to put an end
to it in the South. No effort was made to defend
the institution or to present it as an ideal basis for

1 William Poole, Anti- Slavery Opinions before j8oo; S. B.
Weeks, " Anti-Slavery Sentiment in the South," in Publications of
the Southern History Association (1898).

203

204 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the political and economic structure of a society.
At best, slavery was regarded as a necessary
evil.

Certain influences were at work, however, that
tended to bring the question of slavery into greater
and greater prominence. On the economic side,
there was the invention of the cotton gin and other
contrivances which made possible the rapid ex-
pansion of the cotton industry, and thus offered
new fields for the employment of slave labor. On
the political side, the territorial expansion of the
United States precipitated a bitter struggle as to
the status of the new acquisitions, and gave rise
to problems of the gravest character. And,
finally, like oil on the flames, came the agitation
of the Abolitionists. The beginning of the period
of controversy may be placed at 1830. In that
year occurred the July Revolution in France;
in 1 83 1 the Southampton massacre in Virginia;
and in the same year the foundation of the Boston
Liberator. During the thirty years following this
time, while the conflict between slavery and anti-
slavery was at its height, the doctrines of both sides
were fully stated, and the philosophy of slavery
discussed in all its aspects.

In the course of this discussion many different
sides of the question were considered. From the
economic point of view inquiry was made as to
whether slavery was or was not a profitable insti-
tution, and how it compared with the system of

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 20$

free labor.^ From the constitutional point of view,
questions of profound importance were discussed,
involving the power of Congress in the territories,
the admission of new states, the concept of United
States citizenship. From the ethical side, inquiry
was made to determine whether the relations of
slave and master rested on a proper moral basis.
There was also discussion from the standpoint of
religion as to whether slavery was contrary to the
principles of Christianity, and particularly as to
whether slavery was sustained by the Scriptures.
And finally, there was an animated controversy as
to whether the status of slavery is consistent with
the principles of political science. This is the
inquiry which forms the subject of this chapter.
Upon what theory was the practice of slavery
defended, upon what principles was the attack
upon it conducted } What was the political theory
of the anti-slavery forces } What was the political
theory of the pro-slavery party .' How were they
related to each other .'

The bitterest attacks on slavery were made by
the Abolitionists, but they were not the only or
perhaps the typical opponents of the system. The
forms which the anti-slavery theory took were
many and various, ranging from the statesmanlike
views of such men as Lincoln to the radical utter-

1 On this point see H. R. Helper's work, The Impending Crisis
of the Souih (iS^g). With this compare Southern Institutes, by
G. S. Sawyer, a member of the Louisiana Bar (1859).

206 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

ances of the extreme Abolitionists of the Garri-
sonian type.^

In this discussion an analysis will be made of
three forms of the anti-slavery theory : first, the
theory of the radical Abolitionists; second, the
philosophic argument ; and third, the doctrine of
the statesmen. These theories are not very much
different in final analysis, but in form they show
divergences which should be noted. This method
of classification is, no doubt, open to certain objec-
tions, but is perhaps useful in distinguishing the
various shades of poUtical thought.

The impulse to the anti-slavery crusade was
given by the radical Abolitionists, and their doc-
trines and tendencies may therefore be first con-
sidered. This group of agitators differed from the
conservative class in that they demanded the im-

1 On this period, see James Schouler, History of the Unitei
States; Hermann von Hoist, The Constitutional History of the
United States; J. W. Burgess, The Middle Period ; Henry Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power ; J. F. Rhodes,
History of the United States ; J. C. Hurd, The Law of Freedom and
Bondage. For statements of the anti-slavery theory, see William
Ivj, Miscellaneous Writings on Slavery {\%t^'^; William Goodell,
Slavery and Anti- Slavery (1852); Richard lXCi.dxeS.\ Despotism in
America (1854); Wendell Phillips, Works; Daniel R. Goodwin,
Southern Slavery in its Present Aspects ( 1 864) ; Albert Barnes, The
Church and Slavery (1857), Scriptural Views of Slavery (1856);
T. S. Goodwin, The Natural History of Secession (1865); Debates
in Congress, especially Sumner on the crime against Kansas, 1856,
1st Session, 34th Congress, Appendix. An excellent summary of the
situation is given by J. E. Cairnes in The Slave Power (1862).

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 207

mediate and unconditional abolition of slavery with-
out concession or compromise. They differed
from the philosophic group in that they reasoned
in general less strictly and carefully, being given
to action rather than to reflection. The funda-
mental premise of the Abolitionists was about the
same as that expressed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence ; namely, that all men are created equal
and are endowed with a number of inalienable
rights, which are independent of all government,
and cannot justly be taken away by any govern-
ment. They regarded liberty as a birthright of
man, and not as a privilege to be enjoyed under cer-
tain conditions. Consequently, they looked upon
slavery as a piece of monstrous injustice to those
deprived of their natural liberty.

In the platform of the National Anti-Slavery
Society (1833) the following declaration was made :
"The right to enjoy liberty is inalienable. To
invade it, is to usurp the prerogative of Jehovah.
Every man has a right to his own body, to the
products of his own labor, to the protection of
the law, and to the common advantages of society."
With this general statement of principle perhaps
all the opponents of slavery could agree ; but with
the violent conclusion drawn, not all were in har-
mony. This conclusion was that " all those laws
which are now in force, admitting the right of
slavery, are, therefore, before God, utterly null and
void." It was characteristic of the Abolitionists,

208 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

however, to be intolerant of delay, and to demand
immediate emancipation. They did not believe
in postponing the day of liberation, because they
could not see the necessity for any long period of
preparation. They considered that hberty is an
innate faculty of man, and that he requires no
special training for its effective exercise. "Lib-
erty," said one, "being the birthright of every
man, the natural and normal condition of his
existence, all the preparation he needs for its en-
joyment is born with him. He gets his fitness for
liberty as he gets his hands and feet — not by edu-
cation, but by inheritance." It was expressly de-
nied that a good government is fit only for the
best of people, that is, "the most wise, virtuous,
and intelligent." If this were true, it was said,
then one might, with equal logic, maintain that
"bad children should have bad parents, or that
sick people should have worse treatment than
those in health."^

To those holding such views, the argument for
the postponement of emancipation because of the
unfitness of the negro was looked upon as fallacious
and dangerous. " Gradualism," as it was termed,
was repudiated at every point. " Has not the
experience of centuries shown," said Garrison, "that
gradualism in theory is perpetuity in practice?"
Acting on this principle, they attacked and over-

^William Hosmer, The Higher Law (1852); see especially
Chap. XIII, on the Capacity of Slaves for Civil Government.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 209

threw the Colonization Society, denounced slavery
as a " combination of death and hell," branded the
Constitution of the United States as a " covenant
with death and an agreement with hell," and
declared for a dissolution of the Union. Inability
to see any possible justification for the institution
of slavery led them to say of slaveholders : " They
ought not to be allowed seats in Congress. No
political, no religious copartnership should be had
with them, for they are the meanest of thieves and
the worst of robbers. We should as soon think
of entering into a compact with the convicts at
Botany Bay and New Zealand. . . . We do not
acknowledge them to be within the pale of Chris-
tianity, of republicanism, of humanity." ^

The ultra-radical wing of the Abolitionists did
not stop at denunciation of slavery and of the
United States government for failing to put an end
to it. They went on to denounce all systems of
government as such. This doctrine took the form
of the " non-resistance " or " no-government theory,"
of which Garrison and Noyes were the great
champions, and of which the New England Non-
Resistance Society was an organized expression.
This body declared in 1838 that its members could

1 Boston Liberator (1841). Garrison said on one occasion, that
his manner of expressing himself was unpleasant because of its
plainness and directness. He could, he said, " be as smooth and
politic as any one, but I do not so choose, and much prefer nature
to art." Life of Garrison, by W. P. and F. J. Garrison.
p

2IO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

not " acknowledge allegiance to any human govern-
ment," nor would they oppose any such government
by resort to physical force. In accordance with
this principle they disclaimed any particular love
for the United States. " We love the land of our
nativity, it was said, only as we love all other lands.
The interests, rights, liberties of American citizens
are no more dear to us than those of the whole
human race." They recommended that no physi-
cal force be employed either for or against their
fellow-men ; that all should refuse to hold office or
to vote, and none should invoke the aid of the
courts.^

The principle on which this action or inaction
was based was that of opposition to coercion as a
means of securing obedience. The use of violence
they looked upon as a wholly irrational and un-
christian way of maintaining order. Since all
governments are based on this principle, it follows
that they are, "in their essential elements and as at
present administered, all anti-Christ ; that they can
never by human wisdom be brought into conformity
with the will of God."^ If this is true, then all
Christians are obligated " to come out now and be
separated from the kingdoms of this world." All

' This idea had also a religious basis in the " holiness " or per-
fectionist movement. The non-resistance idea was also adopted by
various socialistic organizations. See J. H. Noyes, History of
American Socialism.

^ Garrison's Life, II, 202,

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 211

governments, whether despotic, monarchical, or
republican, are to be supplanted by the " King of
Kings and Lord of Lords, who is to rule in righteous-
ness." ^ The laws of this kingdom are written
upon the hearts of men, not upon parchment ; they
depend not on human, but on divine wisdom ; the
weapons of this kingdom are not carnal, but spiritual.
It was, therefore, urged upon all Christians to with-
draw their allegiance from any human government,
and regard themselves as subjects of the kingdom
of God only.

The following statement gives an adequate sum.
mary of the views of this party : " As every human
government is upheld by physical strength, and
its laws are virtually enforced at the point of the
bayonet, we cannot hold any office which imposes
upon its incumbents the obligation to compel men
to do right on pain of imprisonment or death. We
therefore voluntarily exclude ourselves from every
legislative and judicial body and repudiate all human
politics, worldly honors, and stations of authority.
... \iwe cannot occupy a seat in the legislature
or on the bench, neither can we elect others to act
as our substitutes in any such capacity. It follows
that we cannot sue any man at law to compel him
by force to restore anj^hing which he may have
wrongfully taken from us or others ; but if he has

1 See the letter of Noyes to Garrison (March, 1 837) , Life, II, 145-
148. In 1837 Noyes nominated Jesus Christ for President of the
United States.

212 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

seized our coat, we shall surrender up our cloak
rather than subject him to punishment." ^

The capture and return of fugitive slaves in
the midst of free communities occasioned fre-
quent expressions of the right of resistance to
government, and in some cases of even more radi-
cal sentiments. In his famous nth of March
speech, Seward declared that "there is a higher
law than the Constitution," and maintained that
slavery was contrary to the laws of God. ^ In the
famous Van Zandt case. Chase argued that the fu-
gitive slave law was unconstitutional, Because the
Constitution is a "free constitution."^ It was de-
signed, he said, " to estabUsh as written law cer-
tain great principles of natural right and justice,
which exist independently of all such sanction."
Slavery, he declared, was contrary to natural right,
and '■' no legislature can make right wrong, or wrong
right." Even if there are no express restrictions
in the Constitution, "there are certain vital prin-
ciples in our national government which will as-
certain and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse

1 Declaration of sentiments adopted at the Peace Convention
held in Boston, September 18-19, 1838.

^ Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st Session, Appendix.
Cf. Frederick Bancroft, The Life of Seward, I, 242 ff. Seward
refused to explain what he meant by " higher law," or what its
practical application would be.

'^ A.n argument for the defendant, submitted to the Supreme
Court o' the United States at the December term, 1846, in the case
of Whaiton Jones v, John Van Zandt, 93.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 213

of legislative power." He further declared that
no court was bound to regard an unjust law, but on
the contrary was obligated to refrain from enforc-
ing the provisions of any such act. ^

In a time when statesmen Uke Seward and Chase
could speak like this, it was to be expected that
more radical men would go much farther in this
direction.^ A striking example of this was the
treatise on Civil Disobedience by the famous
author, Thoreau (1849). Evidently exasperated
beyond all bounds by the attitude of the govern-
ment, state as well as national, Thoreau expressed
his opinion of government in general, in terms by
no means flattering. He declared that the best
government is no government at all, and that
when men are fully developed, they will have
none. The value of government, he did not
estimate very highly. It is at best an expedi-
ent, said he, but " most governments are usually,
and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient." ^
Even in America government accomplishes but
little, for what has been done here is due largely
to the character inherent in the American people,
and this would have accomplished even more, " if

1 Cf. The Higher Law in its Relation to Civil Government with
Particular Reference to the Fugitive Slave Law, by William Hosmer,
1852; C. K.Whipple, The Non- Resistance Principle, with Particu^
lar Application to the Help of Slaves by Abolitionists (i860).

2 Cf. Slavery in Massachusetts (1854). With Thoreau compare
Emerson's individualistic theories, contained in the essays on Self-
Reliance and Politics.

214 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the government had not sometimes got in its way."
Government is, indeed, very often a hindrance to
human activity. " Trade and commerce," said
Thoreau, " if they were not made of india-rubber,
would never manage to bounce over the obstacles
which legislators are continually placing in their
way." Whenever government comes into conflict
with conscience, the former must yield. One must
be, said he, in his expressive phrase, a man first and
a subject afterward. In view of the attitude of our
government toward slavery, he maintained that no
one could conscientiously associate himself with the
American political system, but must withdraw the
support given to it, whether in the shape of per-
sonal service or of a contribution of property as
taxes. If a few men would adopt this policy and
adhere to it for a time, he felt confident that both
war and slavery would soon be given up. Doubt-
less this might involve the imprisonment of the
person offending ; but in this case the prison is the
" only home in a slave state in which a free man
can abide with honor. " i It is true that one who
resists the government may find it difficult to live
in as great comfort as he might otherwise enjoy.

' Thoreau himself acted on this principle and spent one night in
jail as a consequence — a punishment he was disposed to ridicule,
however. " I saw," said he, " that the state was half witted, that it
was as timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did
not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining re-
spect for it and pitied it.''

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 21$

"You must hire or squat somewhere, and raise but
a small crop and eat that soon," but this may well
be done for the sake of a clear conscience. It was
ingeniously suggested, however, that one is not
obligated to forego any advantage offered him by
the state, since he is really at war with the common-
wealth, and on this basis is entitled to take from
the enemy whatever he can get.

No government, said Thoreau (and this is the
beginning and the end of his theory), can have any
" pure right over my person and property but what
I concede to it." We have progressed from abso-
lute to limited monarchy, thence to democracy ;
but it is possible to take one step more in organiz-
ing the rights of man. The ideal state must regard
the individual as " a higher and independent power,"
from which its own authority is derived, and must
treat him accordingly.

Such was the theory of the radical Abolitionists,,
and this is the direction in which it led. It has
already been stated that the fundamental premise
in the political philosophy of this school was the
original and inalienable liberty of all men. Starting
from this highly individualistic premise, it is easy
to see how the most radical conclusions were
reached, even the abolition of government, or
refusal to take any part in it, and in other cases re-
fusal to affiliate with any of the churches.^ To such

1 For an exposition of the tendencies of ultra-radical Abolitionism,
see the Life of William Lloyd Garrison, by W. P. and F. J. Garrison.

2l6 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

men as Garrison, the emancipation of the slaves
was only a small part of the program. They
believed in the broader idea of " universal emancipa-
tion," by which they understood "the emancipation
of our whole race from the dominion of man, from
the thraldom of self, from the government of brute
force, from the bondage of sin. This was emanci-
pation evolved into a mystical and transcendental
sort of " Perfectionism," marked by a coming-out
from the church and the state.' It would of course
be unfair to suggest that all Abolitionists indorsed
such doctrines as these, but to the radical wing they
were acceptable, and the tendency of Abolitionism
was necessarily radical.

Radical Abolitionism was in fact only a part of
a larger movement which swept over the North.
TranscendentaUsm, idealism, humanitarianism, were
dominant in the philosophy of the time during
which the anti-slavery crusade was at its height.
Religious and social reforms of every description,
genuine and sham, were eagerly taken up and were
propagated with the greatest enthusiasm. In the
religious world these tendencies found expression
in a decided liberal movement which sometimes
took the form of a demand for no religion at all.
New sects arose with strange doctrines; the
Mormons, for example, made many converts at this

1 The " come-outers " believed in coming out of the churches
on account of their failure to take a proper stand on the slavery
question.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 217

time, while the Millerites proclaimed and awaited
confidently the advent of the millennium. Social-
istic ideas flourished, and experiments such as those
of Brook Farm and Icaria were undertaken. A
vigorous assault was made upon Masonry and a
powerful political party formed on the basis of
this idea alone. The temperance movement was
actively carried on and won notable victories.
The agitation for women's rights was begun, and
able champions of the cause appeared. The
environment was favorable to the rapid and
rank growth of reforms and crusades, many of
them utterly impracticable, but all of them
pushed on with the greatest devotion and en-
thusiasm. Abolitionism was only one part of a
great current of liberal and humanitarian senti-
ment that was sweeping over the country. The
frequent blending of the anti-slavery movement
with these other tendencies made it still more
difficult for the South to understand or to value
properly the real significance of the anti-slavery
agitation.
«>^ A more philosophic presentation of the anti-
slavery theory was that made by a certain group
of thinkers of which William E. C banning^ and
Francis Wayland ^ were the ablest representatives.

1 Essays on. Slavery (1835).

» The Elements of Moral Science, by Francis Wayland, president
of Brown University (1835), one of the strongest works on the anti-
slavery side.

2l8 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

The method of these men presents a decided con-
trast to the simple style and language of Lincoln,
on the one hand, and to the fiery utterances of
the Garrisonian Abolitionists on the other. The
starting-point in this theory was the proposition
that every man is a rational and moral being. As
such, he must be recognized by all as a person,
and cannot be regarded as a thing merely. He is
an end and purpose in himself and cannot be
a mere instrument to accomplish the ends or
purposes of others. He is a person, and cannot,
philosophically, ethically, or politically, be justly
deprived of all the prerogatives of personality.
All men, it was asserted, are equal in the essential
and fundamental elements of their humanity. All
men are endowed with a rational nature as dis-
tinguished from the animals ; all men are gifted
with the faculty termed conscience ; all men have
the capacity for development. These attributes are
common to humanity, the universal characteristics
of rational beings; in these respects all men are
equal.

Endowed with these high characteristics, all
moral beings possess certain rights, which may be
summed up as the right to exercise one's powers
and to promote the happiness and virtue of one's
self and others, as one sees fit, and so far as one
does not interfere with the equal rights of others.
A more specific enumeration is found to include
the following. All men as rational and moral beings

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 219

have a right to exercise and develop their intellect ;
they have a right to inquire into their duty ; to be
respected by others in accordance with their moral
worth ; to receive a fair equivalent for their labor ;
to sustain domestic relations ; and other such funda-
mental rights arising from the fact that man is a
moral personality. These rights are the preroga-
tives of every individual. He cannot give them up
if he would ; they are inherent and inalienable, an
essential part of his nature, indispensable to the
proper performance of his function in the world.
These rights must not only be regarded by other
individuals, but they must be respected and main-
tained by the government. " Right," says Chan-
ning, " is older than human law. Law ought to be
its voice." Considerations of expediency should
not be allowed to weigh against these rights, for the
good of the individual is really of more importance
than the welfare of the state. It is a more sacred,
exalted, enduring interest than any accessions of
wealth or power to the body politic.^ It was con-
ceded, however, that there are extreme cases in
which these rights may be suspended for their ulti-
mate and permanent security, and in the interest of
the community at large.

The conclusion was, then, that slavery, which is

subversive of all these rights, must be regarded as

fundamentally unjust — a usurpation of the sacred

prerogatives of humanity. Slavery makes of man

1 Channing, op. cit., 47.

220 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

a thing, a piece of property, whereas he is essen.
tially and primarily a person. It constitutes a
system that cannot possibly be justified on any
rational basis.

Furthermore, it was pointed out that the influ-
ence of slavery was unfavorable to the growth of
democracy. The spirit of liberty, it was said, can-
not live and flourish in an atmosphere of human
slavery. Free institutions rest upon the basis of a
love of Uberty, but this is destroyed or impaired by
the practice of slavery. The contempt for human
rights as manifested in the treatment of the slave
leads to a universal contempt for all the rights of
men, and must bring on a general decline of the
spirit of liberty. Democracy,^ it was said, implies
that one has learned to obey as well as to com-
mand. In a slaveholding community the habit of
command is acquired, but that of obedience is little
cultivated, except by the slaves. Hence the ten-
dency is to make men arrogant and imperious,
and consequently ill-adapted for democracy. The
claim was made, therefore, that the influence of
slavery is ultimately fatal to the liberty-loving spirit
upon which free government rests. Democracy can-
not exist with slavery as its basis. If, as some say,
democracy is dependent upon a slave system, then
such a government is scarcely worthy of perpetu-
ation. "Those who tell us," said Channing, "that
slavery is a necessary condition of a republic, do
1 Channing, loo.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 221

not justify the former, but pronounce a sentence of
reprobation on the latter." ^

In brief, then, what we have called the philo-
sophical argument against slavery was, that every
rational moral being has the right to develop his
own powers, is an end or purpose in himself, and
cannot justly be held as property by any other man.
Slavery was therefore regarded as a status con-
trary to the rights of every or any human being.
It was conceded that the community is justified
in imposing a certain degree of restraint upon its
members, but emphatically denied that slavery is a
proper means for this, since it amounts to the per-
manent subversion of all rights. The tendency
with this school was altogether toward the consid-
eration of the rights of the individual in contrast to
those of the community. What they were endeav-
oring to do, was to show that in every political
system a large field of autonomy should be left to
the individual, and that only under exceptional
circumstances should he be reduced to a condition
where he would enjoy no rights at all.

One of the ablest and certainly the most repre-
sentative statement of the anti-slavery theory was
that made by the great leader of the conservative
emancipation party — Abraham Lincoln. His rea-
soning was not that of an agitator or of a philoso-
pher ; yet it was profound, it was stimulating, and it

1 IHd., 103. Cf. Richard Hildreth, Theory of Politics (i8s3>
also Despotism in America (1854).

222 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

was politically masterful. Since it represented the
opinion of a large group of men who were neither
radical Abolitionists nor acute philosophers, the the-
ory he advanced is worthy of careful examination.
As Lincoln viewed the situation, there should be
no repudiation of the teaching of the Declaration
that all men are created equal. He firmly believed
that that doctrine, properly understood and applied,
should still be regarded as a foundation principle
of free government. He would not admit that
the Declaration was intended to apply only to the
British colonists, or to the whites alone, or to any
class or caste of men ; but he did not interpret this
statement to mean that all men are equal in all
respects. The Fathers "did not mean to say
all were equal in color, size, intelligence, moral de-
velopment or social capacity." ^ What they did
mean was that " all men are equal in the possession
of certain inalienable rights among which are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." It was not
understood that all men are exactly equal in all re-
spects, nor was it intended to confer political equal-
ity upon all men aUke and immediately. This was
not the purpose of the founders of the republic.
They meant merely "to declare the right so that
enforcement of it might follow as soon as circum-
stances should permit." The Declaration was in-
tended to be, and in fact is, a fundamental principle
to serve as an ideal for free society, " constantly
^ Works, I, 232.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 223

looked to, constantly labored for, and even though
never perfectly attained, constantly approximated,
and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its
influence, and augmenting the happiness and value
of life to all people of all colors everywhere." ^
Not only is it to serve as an ideal toward which
men should struggle, but it is also to prevent a re-
turn to the past — an impressive warning " to all
those who in after times might seek to turn a free
people back into the hateful paths of despotism."

To the institution of slavery, therefore, Lincoln
was wholly opposed. He did not demand for the
negro equal social and political privilege with the
white, but on the contrary expressly disclaimed
any such desire. He did claim for the black man
" the right to put into his mouth the bread that his
own hands have earned," and asserted that in this
respect he is the equal of every other man. The
fact that others are more highly endowed cannot
be used to justify them in depriving their inferior
of the little that he does have. The alleged right
of the superior to enslave the inferior man, he
regarded as contrary to justice and the principles
of all free government. " No man," said Lincoln,
" is good enough to govern another man without
that other's consent." ^ "When the white man
governs himself, that is self-government ; but when
he governs himself and also governs another man,
that is more than self-government — that is despot-
1 Ibid. " li>i<i- 1. 195-

224 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

ism." The whole argument from the right of the
superior to enslave and oppress the inferior, he
denounced as identical in object and effect with the
old plea for "classification, caste, and legitimacy."
Whatever form this reasoning may assume, it is in
reality " the same old serpent " ; it is a principle
essentially hostile to free and popular government.

Such doctrines, he argued, are "the vanguard,
the miners and sappers, of returning despotism."
These ideas must be driven out not only for the
sake of the black man, but in the interest of the
white as well, for they are a menace to his own
equality and freedom. It must not be supposed
that freedom and slavery can permanently endure
side by side. One must overthrow the other, and
one principle be everywhere recognized. "This
is a world of compensation," said Lincoln, " and he
who would be no slave, must consent to have no
slave. They who deny freedom to others, deserve
it not for themselves, and under a just God can-
not long retain it." Thus Lincoln not only main-
tained that this nation could not permanently
endure half slave and half free, but also formulated
the universal law that freedom and slavery cannot
permanently exist side by side.

Lincoln believed that there are two great the-
ories of society. ^ According to the " mud-sill "

1 Annual address before the Wisconsin Agricultural Society at
Milwaukee (1859). Works, I, 580 ff. See also II, 105. Annual
Message to Congress (1861).

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 225

theory, capital always takes precedence of labor,
and must be honored and rewarded accordingly.
Capital employs either hired laborers or slaves,
both of which classes tend to remain in their de-
pendent position. Education and labor are re-
garded as incompatible, while the educated and the
laboring classes are separated by a sharp dividuig
line. " A Yankee who could invent a strong-
handed man without a head would," said Lincoln,
"receive the everlasting gratitude of the 'mud-sill'
advocates."

According to the other theory, labor is prior to
and independent of capital. The laborer is not
limited to the so-called laboring class ; for there is
a large group of those who "mingle their own
labor with capital." All men are or should be
educated, so that the sharp distinction between the
educated and the laboring classes tends to disap-
pear. This system, which Lincoln champions, opens
the way to all, inspires all with hope, and tends to
develop energy and to improve the condition of all.

It is evident, then, that Lincoln looked upon the
conflict between slavery and its adversaries as one
part of the great struggle between liberty and des-
potism, and believed that American slavery could
not long be tolerated without endangering the
foundations of American liberty. In his opinion
slavery and despotism were inextricably inter-
woven. He did not, however, demand the imme-
diate emancipation of the slaves, nor did he ask

Q

226 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

or expect that they be placed on terms of entire
equaHty with the whites. Admitting the inequality
of the races, he did not think it logical or expedient
to conclude that the inferior race should be wholly
deprived of political rights. Such a course he
considered as selfish and unjust, and sure to bring
retribution upon those who attempted it.

This is, in general outline, the anti-slavery theory.
In spite of the widely different forms in which the
idea was stated by agitators, philosophers, and
statesmen, there was a fundamental agreement
underneath all this diversity. The point of union
was the belief that all men are created equal, and
are endowed with certain natural rights which must
everywhere be respected. In every form of theory
the very term " slavery " was assumed to be synony-
mous with injustice, and scarcely any argument
was needed to show its enormity. In the Revolu-
tionary days the climax in the denunciation of
Great Britain had been the charge that the colo-
nists, taxed but not represented, were being reduced
to the level of slaves, and no one had thought of
saying that slavery might be a benefit to both ruler
and ruled. Slavery had been considered then, as
it was later regarded by the anti-slavery party, the
very name for tyranny and oppression of the most
execrable kind. To justify slavery would be to
subvert the foundations of free government — a
crime against civilization and humanity.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 22/

In respect to the practical program most suitable
to the conditions, there was a wide difference be-
tween such men as Lincoln and those of the Gar-
risonian type. One party demanded the immediate
and unconditional emancipation of the slaves as an
act of simple justice to those in bondage, trusting to
the ability of the newly made freemen to take and
use their liberty without danger to themselves or
to the nation. The other party, although de-
nouncing slavery as an evil, and demanding its
ultimate abolition, clearly perceived the great diffi-
culties involved in the transition from bondage to
freedom, for the negro and for the community in
general. They therefore counselled a policy of
moderation and conservatism.

The pro-slavery theory was almost wholly the
product of the three decades preceding the out-
break of the Civil War. Before this time no
organized or well-sustained effort was made to
defend slavery, but it was generally treated in an
apologetic way. As late as the 'controversy over
the admission of Missouri, it was said that the
entrance of slavery into new territory was not
expected to strengthen the institution, but to
weaken it by scattering the evil. In 1832, in the
Virginia legislature, the whole question of slavery
was discussed, and emancipation was openly and
strongly urged by many. The increasing bitter-
ness of the attacks on slavery, however, touched

228 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the pride of the South, and aroused its leaders to
find a justification for the institution. In the face
of the furious arraignment made by the Abolition-
ists, it seemed necessary to assume some other
attitude than that of indifference toward the ques-
tion. As Calhoun said, the discussion " has com-
pelled us of the South to look into the nature and
character of this great institution, and to correct
any false impressions that even we had entertained
in relation to it." ^ As a result of this reinvestiga-
tion of the question, the opinion of the Southern
leaders was radically changed. They no longer
apologized for slavery, they defended it ; they not
only defended it as a necessary evil, but upheld it
as a positive good.**"

The formulation of the pro-slavery theory may
be attributed in large measure to John C. Calhoun,
assisted by such able associates as Stephens and
Davis, together with a clever group of thinkers,
including Bledsoe,^ Simms,^ Sawyer,* Dew,^ and
others.^

1 Works, II, 180(1838).

* A. T. Bledsoe, Professor of Mathematics in the University of
Virginia, An Essay on Liberty and Slavery (1856).

* Dr. W. G. Simms of South Carolina, The Morals of Slavery
(1837). This was an answer to the writings of Miss Martineau and
other persons.

' George S. Sawyer, Institutes of Slavery (1859).
^ F. R. Dew (professor in William and Mary's QoVitgf:'), Review
of the Debates in the Virginia Legislature (1833).

* See The Pro-Slavery Argument, containing " Memoir on
Negro Slavery," by Chancellor Harper ; " Letters on Slavery "

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 229

In order to make an adequate defence of slavery,
it was found necessary to abandon certain ideas
that had been conspicuous during the Revolution-
ary period. The Declaration of Independence,
with its assertion that all men are created equal
and are endowed with certain inalienable rights,
was not in harmony with the practice of slavery,
and must be repudiated or explained away. This,
however, proved no barrier to the new move-
ment, for the defenders of slavery rejected the
principles of the natural-right school of political
theory, and constructed their political system on
another basis.

In the first place, the proposition that all men
are created equal was subjected to the most severe
criticism on the part of the pro-slavery school. It
was maintained that unless taken in some very
qualified sense, such an assertion was incapable of
proof. Calhoun declared that : " Taking the prop-
osition literally, there is not a word of truth in it.
It begins with, ' all men are born,' which is utterly

(Letter to Thomas Qarkson), by Governor J. H. Hammond of
South Carolina (1845); ^1^° Simms, op. cit. and Dew, op cit. ; Lec-
tures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery, by William A. Smith
(Randolph-Macon College, 1857); Studies on Slavery, by John
Fletcher (Louisiana, 1852); Slavery in the United States, by J. K.
Paulding (1836); Slavery ordained of God, by F. A. Ross (1859);
American Slavery, by Rev. Samuel Seabury (1861). Many interest-
ing contributions to this subject are contained in The Industrial
Resources of the South, by J. D. B. de Bow (1853), a collection of
articles published in De Bow's Magazine. See also The Southern
Literary Messenger.

230 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

untrue. Men are not born. Infants are born.
They grow to be men." ^ He found it difficult to
see how so unreasonable an idea could ever have
become current among reasonable men. Governor
Hammond alluded contemptuously to the " much-
lauded but nowhere accredited dogma of Mr.
Jefferson that all men are born equal." ^ Simms
said that this phrase was " a finely sounding one,
significant of that sentimental French philosophy
then so current." ^ When the Fathers spoke of
equality, what they really had reference to, was
the equality of the American states among other
states of the world, or at the most the equality
prevailing among white men.

Not only are men created unequal, such was
the line of reasoning, but this very inequality must
be regarded as one of the essential conditions of
human progress. Calhoun did not hesitate to
assert that the advance of human civilization
depends upon the inequality that exists among
men. There have always been and there must
always be, he argued, a front and a rear rank in
the onward march of humanity ; to reverse or con-
found this order, would check the advance of the
race. This fundamental fact that individuals or
races are unequal, is not an argument against, but
rather in favor of, social and political advancement.*
Others maintained that inequality is the necessary

1 Works, IV, 507-512. ' Ibid. 251. Cf. Fletcher, op. Hi. 399.
^ Pro-Slavery Argument, no, * Works, I, 57.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 23 1

principle upon which all government rests; that
inequality is the source of all harmony in the uni-
verse; even that the souls of men in the future
state must be unequal.i In short, the doctrine
that all men are created equal was wholly repudi-
ated as a basis for political theory. Emphatic
denial was entered on grounds of both fact and
philosophy. From either point of view, it was re-
garded as untenable and absurd.

Again, the doctrine of natural rights — that every
individual possesses certain rights which are not
derived from government, and of which he cannot
justly be deprived by government — was either aban-
doned entirely or interpreted in such a way as to
lose all application to the institution of slavery.
The repudiation of this theory of natural rights
was most emphatically made by the famous Dr.
Cooper of South Carolina.^ He attempted to
show that even on the hypothesis of an original state
of nature it could not be assumed that all men
are endowed with the same rights. Force, either
of body or of mind is, said he, the basis of all
rights. " The universal law of nature is force. By
this law the lower animals are subdued to man, and
the same law governs the relations between men."^
In fact, there is no law of nature of the character

1 Fletcher, op. cit. 407.

'^ Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy (1826). With
this compare his Essay on the Foundation of Civil Government,
(1787); reprinted 1826. « liid. 56.

232 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

conceived by such thinkers as Grotius, Pufendorf,
and Vattel. The so-called law of nature, and with
it the natural rights claimed under such a law, con-
sist merely of "systems fabricated by theoretical
writers on a contemplation of what might usefully
be acknowledged among men as binding on each
other." ^ What is right, in the proper sense of the
term, is only that which is granted and protected
by society. That which society refuses to acknowl-
edge is not a right and has no character of a right.
In other words, there is no body of natural rights
obtained independently of all government, but only
those rights which the society considers it expedi-
ent to grant.

Calhoun, also, scouted the idea of a state of
nature, natural rights, and a social contract. He
believed that the " state of nature " is purely hypo-
thetical and fictitious, and he placed no confidence
in the conclusions drawn from such an hypothesis.^
In his opinion, government is not to be regarded
as a mere matter of choice, but must be considered,
on the contrary, as a fundamental necessity, organ-
ized and maintained in obedience to a purely nat-
ural instinct of man. There is consequently no
need to presume a state of nature, and reason from
this to the formation of political institutions. The
whole structure erected on the foundation of the
natural-right theory seemed to him to be worth-

^ Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy, 54.
' See on this point Chap. VI.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 233

less speculation, unnecessary to consider when once
the weakness and imperfection of the corner-stone
is discovered. For his part, he was determined to
disregard the individualistic political theory of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to con-
struct his political science upon another founda-
tion. There was no hesitation or uncertainty in
his attitude : he did not attempt to reconcile diver-
gent views ; he simply rejected outright the fun-
damental tenets of the old school.

Not all of the defenders of slavery, however,
were willing to part with "the rights of man."
There were many and ingenious interpretations of
the law of nature, intended to bring it into accord
with the practice of slavery. Thus it was admitted
in one instance that there are natural rights with
which every human being is endowed; but a closer
examination of these rights shows that they con-
tain nothing to interfere with the status of slavery.
Among these natural rights it is found that one
has in early life " the right of such absolute control
by others as that his will may retain its self-acting
power unimpaired." It also appears that an adult
is entitled to have such a political organization as
will afford " that system of appliances which de-
velops and matures the self-acting power of his
will." Now, the negro in slavery is under an
institution which will allow the fullest development
of the " self-acting power of his will, " and thus
may be said to have the full possession of his

234 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

-latural rights.^ Another writer declared that there
are certain inherent and inahenable rights, but at
the same time denied that liberty and property are
among these. These rights are subject, he reasoned,
to the general good, and occasion may demand their
sacrifice on the part of some members of society.^

It is evident from these authorities that the doc-
trine of natural rights was either wholly repudiated,
or so interpreted as to obviate any objection to
slaveholding. This did not necessarily mean that
the principles of democracy were entirely given up,
but rather that the principles on which the Fathers
had thought democracy must be based, were falla-
cious and inadequate. It was believed that such
doctrines were not essential to the existence of
republican government, and that they might better
be made less prominent in the new political science.

Having rejected the idea that all men are
created equal, and possess from the hour of their
birth certain inalienable rights, it was asserted that
the status of the individual should be determined
by his ability or capacity. John C. Calhoun main-
tained that the theory of the equal right of all men
to the same degree of freedom is contradicted by
the most evident and unmistakable facts. Liberty,
he reasoned, is not inborn in men ; it is not a natu-
ral inheritance, given to every man, but a condition
dependent upon a high degree of human develop-

1 Wm. A. Smith, Philosophy and Practice of Slavery (1857),
" A. T. Bledsoe, An Essay on Liberty and Slavery (1856).

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 235

ment. Liberty is the " highest reward bestowed
on mental and moral development, combined with
favorable circumstances." ^ It is not a status into
which men are born, but one for which they must
struggle, and which can be reached only by those
who are most highly endowed. Liberty is not
given to man at the beginning of his career, but is
the distant goal which he reaches at the end. The
same idea was clearly stated by Bledsoe in his Es-
say on Liberty and Slavery, where he urged that
there is no natural and inherent right to political
power or privilege, except that arising from
superior fitness or capacity. He denounced the
" French idea" that liberty may be obtained through
formal equaUty, and held that, on the contrary,
liberty depends on equality of intelligence and
virtue. "The most illiterate peasant," said he, "may
at a glance grasp the idea of equality; the most
profound statesman may not, without much care
and thought, comprehend the nature of liberty." *
Particular emphasis must be placed on this doc-
trine, for it was just at this point that the pro-
slavery and the anti-slavery party sharply diverged.
It was a part of the Abolitionist argument that
freedom is inborn in all men, is an essential
part of their nature, something of which they can-
not justly be deprived. Calhoun and his followers
maintained, on the contrary, that liberty is not born
with man, not a natural and inherent right, but
1 Works, 511. " op. cit. 129.

236 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

a privilege, a reward of which all are not equally
worthy, for which individuals or races must dem-
onstrate their fitness. This fundamental difference
between the doctrine of the pro-slavery party and
that of the Revolutionary Fathers and the Aboli-
tionists, is deserving of careful attention, for it
is the clew to the philosophic controversy between
the opposing schools. It marks the scientific part-
ing of the ways.

Assuming, then, that liberty is not a gift impar-
tially bestowed by nature on all men, but only upon
the few, the pro-slavery party declared that the
negro race is unworthy of liberty and incapable
of self-government. The contrast between the
white man and the black man, in all those points
that are characteristic of civilization, was a staple
item of argument. It was asserted that the negro
" stands at the lowest point in the scale of human
beings."^ If human beings at all, they are
of the most degraded species.^ The negro is not
merely "a lamp-blacked white man debased by
slavery," but a being essentially and fundamen-
tally inferior in mind and body. Contemporary
authorities in the scientific world were invoked
to show that the racial characteristics of the negro
stamped him as an inferior order of man.^ It

1 "Nature and Destiny of the Negro," by J. C. Nott (1850), in
De Bow, Industrial Resources, II, 308.

2 Ibid. II, 203.
8 Ibid. II, 308.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 237

was even urged that the negro could not be a
descendant of Adam, but must be derived from
some other distinct and inferior species.^ More
common was the assertion that the negro is de-
scended from Ham, upon whose race both God
and nature have set a curse, as shown by the
concurring authority of the Scriptures and natural
science.^

Not only was it asserted that the negroes were
manifestly inferior, but the ground was also taken
that they were incapable of ever becoming, even
approximately, the equal of the white race. It was
said of the negro races that " no moral or physical
agencies can redeem them from their degrada-
tion ; " to attempt to relieve them from their
natural inferiority is idle in itself, and may be mis-
chievous in its results. The negro must, there-
fore, be regarded as an essentially inferior race,
and, moreover, as incapable of rising very far or
very soon from this natural and divinely appointed
status of degradation.^

It follows, then, that the black man cannot be
considered as a fit subject for the exercise of civil

1 Ibid. 203, and III, 315-329. Article on Negroes, by Dr. Cart-
wright. Cf. Negro-mania, by John Campbell (1851). There was
at this time considerable discussion as to the multiple origin of the
human race.

2 Sawyer, Institutes of Slavery, 116.

' " The negro cannot be schooled, nor argued, nor driven into ii
love of freedom. His intellect cannot be schooled, nor argued, not
driven into a love of freedom." De Bow, oJ>. cit. II, 204.

238 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

or political rights. Governor McDuffie said that
the negroes are "utterly unqualified, not only for
rational freedom, but for self-government of any
kind," and this fairly expressed the sentiment of
the slavery party. If the negro is unfit to govern
himself, there can be no injustice in governing him
without his consent. To do for him what he could
not do for himself, and what must be done by some
one, is not to commit an injustice, but to confer a
benefit. Hence, the slave is not to be regarded
as a hapless victim of oppression ; he is under no
despotic power ; there are laws which protect him,
in his place, as inflexible as those which his pro-
prietor is required to obey in his place. " Provi-
dence," said Hammond, " has placed him in our
hands for his good, and has paid us from his labor
for our guardianship." ^

In brief, the contention was that if there are
two races existing side by side, and the inferior
race is incapable of self-guidance and self-govern-
ment, this race must be taken in hand and gov-
erned by the superior. It had also to be shown
that the institution of slavery did no more than
what was necessary for the regulation of the lower
race ; in other words, that the relation between the
races was that of guardian and ward, and not that
of exploiter and victim.

1 Hammond, op. cii. 274. Cf. Bledsoe, of. cit. 115; Samuel Sea-
bury, op. cit. 91. Others held slavery to be the result of sin; cC
Fletcher, op. cit.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY '239

Such reasoning, however, was only a defence
of slavery, and the advocates of the cause were
unwilling to rest their case at this point. They
attempted to show, not only that slavery was not
an evil, but that it was a positive good; that it
was not only tolerable under certain unfortunate
conditions, but essential to the highest type of
society. Inspired by this motive, Calhoun declared
in Congress that "there has never yet existed a
wealthy and civilized society in which one portion
of the community did not, in point of fact, live on
the labor of the other." ^ He maintained that the
performance of menial duties is wholly inconsist-
ent with the life of a freeman. " No Southern
man," said he, " not even the poorest or the low-
est, will, under any circumstances, submit to per-
form (either of) them. He has too much pride for
that, and I rejoice that he has."^ Fortified by
this belief, Calhoun was ready to say that the
institution of slavery "forms the most soUd and
durable foundation on which to rear free institu-
tions " ; ^ and Governor McDufifie could declare
that " domestic slavery, instead of being a politi-
cal evil, is the corner-stone of our republican edi-
fice." With the same idea in mind, Alexander H.
Stephens, on the verge of the Civil War, proclaimed
that slavery, rejected by the Revolutionary Fathers,

1 Works, II, 631 (1837).

2 IHd. IV, 505.

» II, 632.

240 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

" is become the chief stone of the corner in our new
edifice." i

The pro-slavery party reasoned that in a society
where all are equally free, and share alike in political
privileges, some of the citizens must of necessity
be occupied with the performance of menial duties.
But one who engages in such labor has not the
leisure necessary for political observation and reflec-
tion, and hence is unqualified for the performance
of the duties that devolve upon him. Consequently,
the average of the political society is greatly lowered
by the presence of this body of citizens, who are
of necessity unworthy and unfit. Whenever any
considerable proportion of this element is present,
the otherwise pure republicanism is defiled and its
possibilities of development are seriously limited.
On the other hand, in a community where the
drudgery of society is performed by a particular
class devoted to that purpose, and excluded from
participation in poUtical rights, the remaining part
of the community may be formed into a democracy
of the very highest type. There will be fewer
members of the democracy, but they will be of a
superior grade ; they will enjoy the necessary leisure
for the cultivation of political affairs, and so will be
able to maintain a much more perfect and efficient
kind of a democracy than would otherwise be
possible. The members of such a democracy will

1 Speech at Savannah, Georgia (March 21, 1861), in Moore's
Rebellion Record, I, D, 44-48.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 241

be men of great capacity for self-government, and
among them the principles of free government can
be carried out to an extent impossible among a
mixed population containing a large element of
inferior stock. For example, where a slave class is
found, there is no necessity for the existence of an
order of nobility or an hereditary monarchy, since
the lower class is wholly under the control of the
higher, and in the higher class itself such distinc-
tions of rank are not necessary. In a mixed politi-
cal society some such device as this is required in
order to impress the masses with the dignity and
majesty of the government. But where all the
undesirable and unfit elements have been eliminated
from the political society, these artificial devices
are unnecessary and may be abolished. The ruling
class exists by virtue of natural capacity alone, and
within that class there may safely be established
the most liberal type of a democracy. Here may
be seen " the perfect spirit of equality so prevalent
among the whites of all the slaveholding states." ^
This argument as to the function of a slave class
in a democracy is, it will be observed, almost identi-
cal with that made by Aristotle in his Politics; and
it was to his political theory that the slavery apolo-
gists returned.^ In proof of the theoretical justice

^ Dew, The Pro-Slavery Argument, 461.

^ Calhoun recommended Aristotle as among the best writers on
government. Letter to A. D. Wallace (1840), in the Correspond-
ence, p. 469.

242 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

of slavery, his reasoning was repeated, and the
example of the Greek democracies was cited to
show the desirability of such a social and political
institution.

In fact, the whole question of the relative advan-
tages of slave and free society was discussed in all
its different phases. The conditions in the cities of
the North and in England were contrasted with the
state of affairs in the South, and conclusions drawn
to the decided advantage of the latter. The rule of
the capitalist and his indifference to the poverty
of the masses was compared with the benevolent
paternalism exercised over the negro by his master;
and the free laborer was said to be in a much more
miserable state than the slave. This kind of argu-
ment was reenforced by illustrations drawn from
material afforded by the state of the laboring classes
in England and by the frequent denunciations of
contemporary society by the socialists. It was
often asserted that, on the whole, the condition of
free labor was inferior to that of slave labor, and that
if anything needed reform, it was the condition of
the white slaves, " tantalized with the name of free-
dom, to which their condition gives the he." The
assertion was made that in every way — economi-
cally, socially, morally, and politically — a slave
society is superior to a society built on a foundation
of free labor. Apologies were no longer made for
slavery, but it was pointed to with feelings of pride,
and was really considered among intelligent leaders

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 243

of opinion as the " comer-stone of our republican
edifice," the very best foundation possible for a civil-
ized society. Within four years of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Alexander H. Stephens rejoiced in the
discovery of a new type of organization — slavery
— and declared the new government the first in
the world based upon " this great physical, philo-
sophical, and moral truth." Other societies had
been built on the slavery of the same or similar
races ; but now, for the first time, a foundation was
laid, perfectly in accord with the laws of nature,
since nature, in this instance, has fitted the enslaved
race for that particular condition. And he further
asked, " May we not, therefore, look with confidence
to the ultimate universal acknowledgment of the
truths upon which our system rests V'^

The climax or rather the anti-climax of this style
of reasoning is found in the writings of the radical,
George Fitz-Hugh.^ His work on Sociology for the
South, or the Failure of Free Society, 1854, is con-
sidered here, not because typical of the thought of
the pro-slavery school, but as an illustration of the
extremes to which their argument might be and in
this case actually was forced.

Fitz-Hugh favored the abandonment of any sort
of philosophy as applied to government. " Philoso-
phy," he said, " will blow up any government that is

1 op. cit.

' By the same author, Cannibals All, or Slaves without Masters
(1857). For a sketch of his life, see Appleton, Encyclopadia.

244 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

founded on it. . . . If we would have our people
normal and our institutions permanent, we should
repudiate our political abstractions and adopt
religious truths in their stead." ^ Notwithstanding
this denunciation of philosophy, he proceeded to
develop a system of his own. A fundamental part
of his creed was the doctrine that liberty is not, as
generally supposed, a good. Liberty, said he, is
an evil which government is intended to correct.
This is the object of political society, and all gov-
ernment is really slavery. " Sin," he said, " began
with the desire for liberty and the attempt to
attain it in the person of Satan and his fellow-
angels." 2 He declared that as civilization ad-
vances, liberty recedes, since "what is needed is
good government and a plenty of it — not liberty."
The idea that liberty is good for men, he ridiculed
as the " most false and foolish that ever entered
the human mind. The only free people in the
world are the Digger Indians of the valley of the
Great Salt Lake ' and the Australians of New
Holland. They know nothing of government,
of society, of castes, classes, or of subordination
of rank ; each man digs for worms and climbs for
birds' eggs on his own hook: they are perfectly
free, famished and degraded." ^

Slavery he considered as the best possible basis
for any society. Moreover, Fitz-Hugh discovered a
resemblance between the philosophic bases of slav-

1 Sociology, 114-115. ' Ibid. 170. » Ihid.

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 245

ery and socialism, which the advocates of neither
of these systems would be willing to admit. In
common with the socialists he attacked the principle
of free contract, considering its results as cruel as
the war of the sword, or theft, robbery, and murder.
A Southern plantation was an ideal type, he thought,
of a socialistic society. The feelings and interests
of the masters prevent undue pressure on the
laborers; they are protected from the evils of
competition and are assured employment and
support. His only objection to socialism was,
" that it will not honestly admit that it owes its
recent revival to the failure of universal liberty and
is seeking to bring about slavery again in some
form." 1 No effective combination of labor can be
made, said Fitz-Hugh, until men are willing to
surrender their liberty and subject themselves to a
despotic head or ruler — "this is slavery, and
toward this socialism is moving." This theory of
Fitz-Hugh was not, it may be said, the philosophy
of the great body of the pro-slavery school and
cannot be taken as representative of them. His
extremely radical ideas illustrate, nevertheless, one

1 Ibid. Fitz-Hugh favored providing for a system of entailment
of property. " We need not fear the mad-dog cry of aristoc-
racy. . . . We have the things, exclusive hereditary property and
aristocracy, in their utmost intensity; let us not be frightened at the
names." Fitz-Hugh was not alone in his radical theory. Governor
Hammond, in a letter to Calhoun (1850), expressed the belief that
" free government and all that sort of thing has been a fatal delu-
sion and humbug from the time of Moses." Correspondence, p. 1212.

246 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

phase of the intellectual movement and as such are
worthy of examination in the same spirit in which
the theory of the radical Abolitionists is studied.

Such, then, was the character of the theory by
which slavery was defended. The individualistic
philosophy of the eighteenth century and of the
Revolutionary period was rejected. The doctrine
that all men are created equal was denied, and the
possession of inherent and inalienable "natural
rights " was disputed or the force of the doctrine
weakened by interpretation. It was shown that
political rights and civil liberty cannot justly be
demanded by all, but belong only to those who
possess intellect, morality, and political capacity.
If this is true, then an inferior race or class unfitted
for political life may properly and justly be held
in a state of servitude by a class or race that is
politically capable ; and this servitude may properly
extend to the entire abolition of civil and political
rights, even of any legal status whatever. Such a
system is not undemocratic, but on the contrary
tends to foster the spirit of liberty and to develop
free institutions to the highest degree of perfection,
since the lower classes are eliminated from politics
and the political people are composed of those of
the highest grade and most capable of administer-
ing democratic government. The complete servi-
tude of a lower class to a highly democratic ruling
class is not only possible, as the ancient Hellenic

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 247

democracies conclusively show, but this is on the
whole the most advantageous kind of a governmen-
tal-social structure that can be devised, especially
when the slaves are taken from an inferior race,
naturally unfitted for participation in political life.
As the Abolitionist crusade was a part of a world-
wide humanitarian and philanthropic movement, so
the pro-slavery theory had certain features in com-
mon with an intellectual movement of the time.
The characteristics of the slavery apologists
were those of the natural scientists rather than
those of the philanthropists.^ The leaders in the
defence of the slave system regarded human
life as essentially a struggle in which the fittest
survive, and thought that in spite of certain
elements of cruelty in this process the system
was on the whole beneficent in its results. They
believed that they were among the fittest, holding
their position by the authority of the inexorable
fiat of nature, and they were not primarily inter-
ested in the elevation of the lower classes, or in the
amelioration of their condition. Abolitionism, they
regarded as sentimental, idealistic, and imprac-
ticable, classing it with socialism, spiritualism, free-
thought, anti-masonry, " teetotalism," and other
" isms " of the day. They justified themselves as
practical men, viewing with impartial eye the actual

' The method of argument employed by the slavery apologists
was not, however, the same as that of the natural scientists. The
pio-slavery reasoning was, to a great extent, a priori and deductive.

248 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

ind inevitable conditions of social life and prog-
ress, perceiving the difficulty of reversing the
operation of the laws of nature, and little disposed
to tamper with movements in that direction. They
regarded slavery as a social necessity decreed by
the laws of nature, and they looked upon any at-
tempts to alter this state as wholly idealistic and
impractical.

In conclusion, a few words may be said by way
of summarizing the discussion. It is clear that at
the bottom of the controversy between the radical
Abolitionists and the pro-slavery party, there was a
fundamental difference of opinion as to the nature
of human liberty. The abolitionists thought that
liberty is the birthright of all men ; the defenders
of slavery thought it the possession of those only
who are fit. The Abolitionists thought that as far
as rights are concerned, all men are created and
should continue to be equal ; and consequently they
were bitter in their denunciation of the denial of
these rights ; the opposite party thought that rights
do not belong to men simply as men, but because of
the superior qualities, physical, intellectual, moral
or political, which are characteristic of certain in-
dividuals or races. The Abolitionists argued, in
accordance with their belief, that the negro ought to
be put in possession of the original and natural
rights which are justly his, and of which he is wrong-
fully deprived. The slaveholders contended that

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 249

the negro, being an inferior order of man, should
be kept in a state of complete subjection for his own
and for the general good. Thus in both theory
and practice, there was an almost irreconcilable
difference between the two parties.

Between the conservative anti-slavery element
and the slave party there was a less marked
contrast. Although these opponents of slavery
declared that all men are born with certain rights,
they did not demand complete equality for the
races. It was therefore recognized that there must
be a certain restraint of certain classes under cer-
tain conditions, and no demand was made for equal
liberty or for immediate liberty for all members
of the community. Between this group and the
slavery party, the question was really one as to how
far individual conduct may be regulated and for
how long. The defenders of slavery insisted that
the negro is entitled to no rights at all, politically
speaking, and moreover that the nature of the
black man is such as to make this status permanent.
On the contrary, the anti-slavery party declared
that a certain body of rights should be granted to
every one — not necessarily full participation in the
exercise of political functions, but at least some-
thing in advance of complete and permanent sub-
jection to the will of a master. Upon this point
the two parties differed sharply. Had the pro-
slavery party been willing to grant the negro even
a modicum of civil rights, and to concede and

250 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

make provision for his capacity for future exercise
of further rights, the gulf between these positions
might have been spanned.

A further difference of opinion was that con-
cerning the influence of slavery upon society in
general, and democratic institutions in particular.
The apologists for slavery believed that such a
system was economically advantageous, socially
elevating, and that politically slavery made possi-
ble the very highest type of democratic govern-
ment ; in brief, that a slave society was superior at
almost every point by which civilization may be
estimated. The opponents of slavery regarded the
practice as wasteful from the economic point of
view, demoralizing socially, and with special em-
phasis urged that the existence of a system of slav-
ery is incompatible with the maintenance of demo-
cratic institutions, since the characteristic qualities
which make democracy possible are diametrically
opposite to those fostered under slavery. One side,
then, regarded democracy as properly applicable
to the whole society, the other as a relation within
a certain class not inclusive of the whole society.
This difference corresponds closely to that already
considered; namely, as to whether liberty is the
birthright of all, or the reward of the fittest.

From the standpoint of modern political science
the slaveholders were right in declaring that
liberty can be given only to those who have politi-
cal capacity enough to use it, and they were also

THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 25 1

right in maintaining that two greatly unequal races
cannot exist side by side on terms of perfect
equality. But the conclusion drawn from these
premises was by no means a legitimate one. It did
not follow that because the negro was not the
equal of the white man, and could not well exercise
the same political rights, that therefore he should
be deprived of all rights whatever. Because he
was not entitled to equal political rights, it did not
follow that he should not even have a personality
in the eyes of the law. This was the fatal non
sequitur that led to the violent abolition of slavery
in the throes of a terrible civil war. But, on the
other hand, the Abolitionists were guilty of an
equally rash generalization in assuming as they
did at the close of the war, that because the negro
is entitled to some rights, he should immediately
and without any preparation be placed in full
possession of the highest political rights. As the
slavery party blundered in giving the negro no
rights, the radical Abolitionists blundered in giving
him, at one stroke, all rights.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL THEORY IN RELATION TO THE NATURE
OF THE UNION

The question of national organization is the most
difficult problem that the United States has yet
been called upon to solve. Possessing all the char-
acteristics commonly attributed to nations, — com-
mon race, language, religion, geographical unity,
— the full expression of this nationaUty met with
stubborn resistance, and was realized only after the
bloodiest war of the century had been fought.
Even in colonial days there was evident the
strongest reluctance to form any union at all bind-
ing in nature. During the enthusiasm of the
Revolutionary movement a decidedly national atti-
tude was assumed, but in the Articles of Confeder-
ation this was abandoned. In the formation and
adoption of the Constitution there was a reaction in
which the national spirit was conspicuous. From
the very first days of the Republic, however, there
was marked divergence of opinion in regard to the
nature of the new Union. The Eleventh Amend-
ment, the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, the
Hartford Convention, Nullification, — all were evi-
dences of the general difference of opinion as to

252

NATURE OF THE UNION 2 Si

ihe character of the federal Union. 'With the rise
of slavery to the position of a national issue, the
defenders of this institution made states-rights a
part of their platform. Thus the unnational doc-
trine was associated with a particular section of
the country and with the life of a particular institu-
tion. It had a local habitation and a name. The
conflict accordingly became more and more des-
perate, until the final appeal was taken to the
arbitrament of arms.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and
analyze the political theory underlying the various
doctrines as to the nature of the Union developed
during this period. The compromise theory prev-,
alent at the time of the adoption of the Con-j
stitution, the states-rights theory developed by/
Calhoun, and the nationalist doctrine in the legal/
[form given it by Webster, and in the more scien-
tific shape later assumed, form the large groups
under which these doctrines may be classified and
discussed.

The question as to the nature of the American
Union was an important one, theoretically and
practically, in the days when the Constitution was
pending. The new government involved, it was
seen, a closer union than that under the old Con-
federation, and yet it was not desired to form a
centralized state, a " consolidated republic." The
Confederation was too closely allied to anarchy ; a
centralized state, it was feared, would be equiva-

254 AMERICAN POUTICAL THEORIES

lent to tyranny. This difficulty was discussed by
the Federalist and was explained with such con-
summate skill as to constitute a satisfactory
solution for the political problem then immedi-
ate and pressing. The United States was the first
type of the modern " Bundes-Staat," and the Fed-
eralist was breaking new ground ; nevertheless, the
theory then developed profoundly influenced the
thought of America, and also at a later date that of
(Continental countries. The new Union was vari-
ously termed a " Compound Republic," a " Con-
federate Republic," and a "Confederacy," an
assemblage of societies, or an association of two or
more states into one state. " The extent, modifi-
cation, and objects of the federal authority," it was
explained, " are mere matters of discretion. So long
as the separate organization of the members be not
abolished ; so long as it exists by a constitutional
necessity for local purposes, though it be in per-
fect subordination to the general authority of the
Union, it would still be in fact and in theory an
association of states or a confederacy." *
\ The nature of the new Union, it was held, is
neither wholly national nor wholly federal, but
contains both national and federal elements in
combination. Considering the foundation of the
government, it is federal, since the Constitution
must be ratified by the several states. In regard
to the organization of the legislative power, the

1 Federalist, No. 9.

NATURE OF THE UNION 255

new Union is partly national and partly federal,
one House resting on a national and the other on
a federal basis. The executive is also constituted
in a mixed federal and national way, since the
electoral vote is distributed partly in accordance
with the principle of state equality, and partly
according to population. Viewing the operation
of the government, it is seen to be national and
not federal, inasmuch as it acts directly on indi-
viduals and not through the states. In the extent
of its powers, however, the Union is federal, be-
cause its jurisdiction is limited to specific objects,
and all else is left to the states. Lastly, as re-
spects the amending power, it is found that the
government is partly federal and partly national,
since neither the principle of unanimity nor that
of proportionality obtains exclusively. It thus
appears that the government, as organized in the
Constitution, must be regarded neither as a pure
confederacy nor yet as a " consolidated republic " ;
but should really be placed in a class by itself. It
is a new type of government peculiar to American
conditions — a form at once national and federal,
happily combining the characteristics of both.

In harmony with this idea of the mixed charac-
ter of the Union, was the theory that sovereignty
is capable of division and actually is divided in the
United States. This doctrine was current at the
time when the Constitution was adopted, was gen-
erally accepted until the days of Calhoun, and still

256 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

remains the theory of the federal courts. In the
letter of the Constitutional Convention to Congress,
it was expressly declared that " all rights of inde-
pendent sovereignty " could not be secured to the
states under a system of federal government.^ In
the Federalist, also, the division of sovereign power
was frequently suggested. Thus it was said that
the old Confederation attempted to accomplish
impossibiUties, "to reconcile a partial sovereignty
in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the
states ; to subvert a mathematical axiom by taking
away a part, and letting the whole remain." ^ It
was shown that in Rome " the legislative power
in the last resort resided for ages in two different
bodies, which were distinct and independent;"^
that is, the Patricians and the Plebeians. It was
asserted that the new Constitution does not reduce
the states to the rank of provinces, but leaves them
in possession of "certain exclusive and very impor-
tant portions of sovereign power."* The states
will still hold " all the rights of sovereignty which
were not by that act exclusively delegated to the
United States."* In a consolidated system the
local authorities are wholly subject to the central
government ; but in the proposed Union the " local
authorities form distinct and independent portions
of the supremacy, no more subject to the general
authority than the general authority is to them

'^ Journal of Congress, XII, 165. " No. 4.

1 No. 32. * No. 9. ' No. 31. Cf. No. 82.

NATURE OF THE UNION 257

within its own sphere." ^ The states may not be
fully sovereign, but they have at least a residuary
sovereignty. There are, in fact, many sovereignties
existing side by side. The real sovereignty rests,
however, not with state or federal government, but
with the "people." "The ultimate authority," it
is said, "wherever the derivative may be found,
resides in the people alone." ^ But who the
" people " were, whether of the several states or
of all the states taken collectively, the Federalist
was careful not to answer. This was a question
left for coming generations.

It is a fair conclusion, then, that at the time when
the Constitution was adopted, the prevalent opin-
ion was that in some way or other sovereignty was
being divided between the states and the Union.^
It is a mistake to suppose that the states thought
they were renouncing all of their sovereignty, or
that they thought they were giving up none of
it. There were, of course, some who believed
in one or the other of these two ideas ; but in gen-

1 No. 39. = Nos. 33, 45, 82.

' See John Dickinson, " Letters of Fabius," p. 179; Noah Web-
ster, "An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal
Constitution," p. 46 (both the foregoing are in Ford's Pamphlets) ;
Elliot, Debates, II, 129, 143, 356. John Adams said (1790): "Our
new government is an attempt to divide a sovereignty — a fresh
essay at imperium in imperio. It cannot, therefore, be expected
to be very stable or very firm." Works, IX, 564. In this connec-
tion see a discussion on " Social Compact and Constitutional Con-
struction," by A. C. McLaughlin, in The American Historical Review
(April, 1900).

258 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

eral it was thought that a compromise was being
made between states and Union, and that a divi-
sion of sovereignty was involved in this. If the
question were ever raised as to where the ultimate
controlling power in the community is located, the
answer was, " with the people," without particular
inquiry as to just what was meant by this.^ In
the Revolutionary days "people" had stood for
the opposition to the king, and this old idea was
used to conceal the difficulty involved in a wholly
different situation.

This idea of the divisibility of sovereignty was
early enunciated by the United States courts, nota-
bly in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia (1792). The
declaration was made that " the United States are
sovereign as to all the powers of government actu-
ally surrendered. Each state in the Union is sov-
ereign as to all the powers reserved." ^ Succeeding
decisions gave expression to the same theory that
sovereignty is capable of division and actually has
been divided under the American system. The
opinions of the courts were permeated with the idea
of the division of sovereign powers between the
states and the Union.^

1 Cf. James Wilson's argument in the Pennsylvania Convention
on this point, Elliot, Debates, II, 504.

2 2 Dallas, 435.

^ Cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas, 232(1 796) : "The several states
retained all internal sovereignty and . . . Congress properly pos-
sessed the great rights of external sovereignty." Cherokee Nation
V. Georgia, 5 Peters, 26: "They have in Europe sovereign and

NATURE OF THE UNION 259

One of the staunchest champions of the theory
of divided sovereignty was James Madison. He
maintained that the American government was
neither federal nor national; it was sui generis,
federo-republican, unique in the nature of its con-
struction, a " nondescript to be tested and explained
by itself alone," ^ an illustration of the adaptability
of republican institutions to new and difficult con-
ditions. To his mind nothing was clearer than
the proposition that sovereignty may be divided.
If it cannot, he urged, then " the political system
of the United States is a chimera, mocking the vain
pretensions of human wisdom." ^ Or again, " It
is difficult to argue intelligibly concerning the com-
pound system of government in the United States
without admitting the divisibility of sovereignty." ^
In this case it is necessary " to abandon abstract
and technical modes of expounding and designat-
ing its character," and regard the Constitution as a
"system hitherto without a model."* He found
that the sovereignty was divided between the
states on the one hand and the Union on the
other, so that the whole society, as he said, consists
in a number of partial sovereign ties. ^ Moreover, he
charged that the main pillar of nullification was

demi-sovereign states, and states of doubtful sovereignty. But
this state, if it be a state, must be a grade above them all." See
McCuUoch V. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316; Worcester v. Georgia,
6 Peters, 591-592.

1 Works, IV, 420-421. ^ liiil- IV, 61.

» IHd. IV, 394. * Ibid. IV, 420-421. ^ Ibid. IV, 393.

26o AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the assumption that sovereignty is a unit at once
indivisible and inalienable.^

Up to the time when the theory of Calhoun be-
came influential, the characteristic American doc-
trine was that in the United States, whatever
might elsewhere obtain, the sovereignty had been
divided into several portions without the destruc-
tion of its life principle. Replying to Calhoun's
argument for unqualified state sovereignty, Sena-

1 Frederick Grimke, Nature and Tendency of Free InsHtutiom
(1848), argued that " when we assert that the sovereignty is inalien-
able or indivisible, we, in effect, impose limitations upon the sov-
ereignty, which is a contradiction," p. 527. He held that in the
United States sovereignty is divided between the " states united "
and the " states severally," pp. 519-520. Nathaniel Chipman, Prin-
ciples of Government (1833), concluded that there is an external
sovereignty vested in the United States, but no provision made in
the Constitution for an internal sovereignty, 142 ff. Sovereignty
is also divisible : " the opinion formerly entertained that the sov-
ereignty of a state was a sort of indivisible essence, a power abso-
lute, uncontrolled and uncontrollable, has been corrected in modern
times. Experience has shown it capable of division." p. 273. Cf.
E. D. Mansfield, The Political Grammar of the United States
(1834), 520-521 ; John Taylor, New Views of the Constitution
(1822), Sec. 13. Nathan Dane, General Abridgment and Digest
of American Law (1823-1829), Vol. IX, Appendix, holds that
sovereignty may be indivisible by " a people standing alone as in
Russia or France," but in " a family political connection," like the
United States, we " give and distribute almost ad infinitum dele-
gated powers, or what is vaguely called sovereignty," Sec. 8. It
also appears that " though the nation is sovereign, the power of the
general government is limited, and so, strictly and accurately speak-
ing, is no sovereign," Sec. 18. On the omission of the term " sov-
ereignty " in the Constitution, see Sec. 35.

NATURE OF THE UNION 36 1

tor Rives of Virginia, himself a states-rights man
of the old school, said (1833) : " Sir, this is a novelty
unknown to the founders of the Constitution, and
has sprung up in a hotbed of local politics. At the
period of the adoption of the Constitution it was
distinctly made known and understood that to the
extent to which sovereignty was vested in the
Union, that of the states was relinquished and
diminished." If the idea of a double sovereignty
seemed to be without adequate historical prece-
dent, so was the whole American system without
parallel. As democracy seemed impossible until
put in practice in America, so with the division of
sovereignty. The fact that such a condition was
not elsewhere to be found did not constitute an
argument against its acceptance, but was rather a
testimony to the " peculiar adaptability of republican
institutions."

As has already been indicated, the progress of
this idea was facilitated by the prevalence of the
theory of popular as opposed to governmental sov-
ereignty, and by the general belief that the New
World had really little to do with the Old World
conception of government in general or of sov-
ereignty in particular. The wide acceptance of
this idea throughout the United States made it
for a long time possible to quiet the contention
between the states and the Union by referring
them to that authority above both; namely, the
"people." When the contest between nationalism

262 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

and particularism entered the acute stage, how-
ever, this doctrine became less easy to maintain.
The difficulty long concealed behind the compli-
cated governmental machinery and the ambiguous
term "people" became evident, the compromise
doctrine was rejected by both North and South,
and the battle fought out between the sovereignty
of the states and that of the Union.

It should not escape notice, however, that Joseph
Story early distinguished two uses of the term
"sovereignty" in such a way as to obviate the diffi-
culties inherent in the idea of double supremacy.
He observed that "by sovereignty in its largest
sense is meant supreme, absolute, uncontrollable
power, the jus summi imperii, the absolute right to
govern."^ But the term, he showed, is also used
in another and more limited sense, signifying
" such political powers as in the actual organiza-
tion of the particular state or nation are to be
exclusively exercised by certain public function-
aries without the control of any superior authority."
In this sense, he continues, the sovereignty " may
be of a very limited nature. It may extend to a
few or many objects. It may be unlimited as to
some, it may be restrained as to others." In this
use of the term, sovereignty is not the ultimate
political power, but that which, " under the given
form of organization," is exercised " without the
control of superior authority." From this point of

' Commentaries, Sees. 207, 208.

NATURE OF THE UNION 263

view it is easy to regard sovereignty as theoreti-
cally divisible and as actually divided between the
states and the Union, understanding that the " ab-
solute right to govern " still remains in its original
unity and integrity. Sovereignty in the limited
sense is divided ; in the broader sense it remains
one.

In this connection attention should be called to
an application of the social-contract theory to the
nature of the Union. This doctrine of contract
was capable of different application, but in the
hands of Madison and others was employed to
combat the theories of the extreme states-rights
party. It was conceded that the Union was formed
by an agreement to which states, and not individ-
uals, were the parties, but the binding force of the
contract was emphasized in the very strongest
way. The fact that the Union rests on a contract,
it was said, should not be made an excuse for
abandoning it at will. On the contrary, the very
fact that it is a contract entitles it to the highest
respect. "It is," said Madison, "the nature and
essence of a compact that it is equally obligatory
on the parties to it, and of course that no one of
them can be liberated therefrom without the con-
sent of the others, or such a violation or abuse of
it by the others as will amount to a dissolution of
the compact." ^ The states, then, may in an ex-
treme case exercise their revolutionary right, but
1 Works, IV, 63.

264 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

they cannot legally dissolve the Union at pleasure.
They are bound as states by virtue of the contract.^
Of this nature was the theory of the Union pro-
claimed by Jackson in his message of 1833 on the
nullification question. His position was, that, with-
out inquiring closely into the exact form of the
national contract, "it is sufficient that it must be
admitted to be a compact and to possess the obli-
gations incident to a compact." The parties to the
agreement cannot dissolve the association without
"acknowledging the correlative right in the re-
mainder to decide whether that dissolution can be
permitted consistently with the general happiness."
Owing to the wide prevalence of the social-con-
tract theory in America, this appeal to the binding
force of a contract was an exceedingly effective
argument to use. It was an easy step from the
doctrine that governments derive their powers
from the consent of the governed, to the idea that
if the states had consented or contracted to form a
government, they were bound by that agreement.
The more strongly it was believed that the only
legitimate basis of government was consent, the
greater was the emphasis placed on the obligation
of a contract or agreement, whether between states
or individuals. And just as it was thought that
the social contract must not be interpreted by any
one citizen, but by the majority, so it was reasoned
that the agreement between the states should be

1 Compare Lincoln's Inaugural Address.

NATURE OF THE UNION 265

interpreted by the majority, and not by any one of
them at pleasure. The one-sided repudiation of a
contract voluntarily entered into was, according to
this theory, wholly unreasonable, and contrary to the
analogy both of private law and of the social contract
on which the society rests. By this line of reason-
ing the conclusion was reached that the Union,
although created by the voluntary act of the states
as states, was not an association from which a
state could depart at pleasure without consulting
its fellow-states.

None of these compromise ideas, however, offered
a satisfactory solution of the problem. In the
course of a generation after the Constitution was
adopted, they were supplanted by well-defined
doctrines of state sovereignty on the one hand,
and national supremacy on the other. The conflict
between nationalism and particularism, intensified
by the agitation over the slavery question, passed
out of the realm of compromise. Rigid dogmas
were framed upon either side, their validity stub-
bornly asserted, and the conclusion found in the
field of armed conflict.

Definite form was first given to the particularistic
theory. The feeling of state sovereignty, strong
from the first, had been aroused to vigorous protest
by the summons issued against the state of Georgia
from which resulted the eleventh Amendment; by
the Alien and Sedition Laws; again by the war
with England ; by the tariff of 1832 ; finally by the

266 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

fear that the Union and slavery were incompatible.
The outgrowth of this sentiment was the doctrine
of Nullification and Secession. To the political
philosophy underlying these ideas attention must
now be given.

In its earliest form the states-rights idea was
based on the current theory of the social contract.
Analogies were drawn between the social contract
and the federal contract.^ The formation of the
Union by the states was compared to that of a
state by the individuals ; reference was made to
the natural rights of states, and it was suggested
that the states, like individuals, might abandon the
association of which they were members, if abused
or oppressed. This analogy between social and
federal contract was implied in the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions.

The doctrine was exploited by the Virginia jurist,
H. St. George Tucker, in his Commentaries on
Blackstone (1803). The states, said Tucker, are
united in a confederacy, but still remain inde-
pendent and sovereign. Each is still a sovereign
state, still capable, should the occasion require,
of resuming the exercise of its functions to the
full extent. Whenever the common government
becomes subversive of the rights of any state, it
may secede as the states seceded from the old
Confederation. This is a natural right of which

1 This argument had been used by James Wilson, although not
in defence of states-rights. Works, I, 539.

NATURE OF THE UNION 267

"no force or compact can deprive the people of
any state, whenever they see the necessity and
possess the power to do it."i The state has the
same right to withdraw from or overthrow the
federal government as the individual has, under
the Declaration of Independence, to overthrow any
political system which has become oppressive. But
this, it will be observed, gave the states only a
revolutionary right of resistance or secession, and it
also involved the recognition of the social contract.^
Both of these ideas were repudiated by the later
defenders of the cause of the states.

The finally accepted statement of the states-rights
doctrine was made by the great political philoso-
pher of the South, John C. Calhoun. The work in
which his ideas are most systematically expressed
is, A Disquisition on Government, accompanied by
A Discourse on the Constitution and Government
of the United States, one of the ablest treatises on
political theory that appeared in the first half of
the last century.^ This, taken in connection with
the numerous public utterances of Calhoun, affords
a basis for the study of his political philosophy.

1 Commentaries, I, 187.

2 Tucker speaks of the contract as partly social and partly fed-
eral; also of a division of sovereignty between states and the
government; but nevertheless maintains that a state may at will
withdraw from the Confederation.

8 Published posthumously. See Calhoun's Works, edited by
Richard K. Cralle ; Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, edited by
J. Franklin Jameson, in Vol. II, Annual Report of the American

268 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

An analysis will first be made of his theory of
nulKfication, and then of the doctrine of secession
with which he is associated. The inquiry is directed
in the first place, then, to the general attitude of
Calhoun toward the fundamental question of the
origin of the political society.

Calhoun condemned in no uncertain terms the
time-honored hypothesis of a pre-civil " state of
nature " and the origin of government by means
of a contract.! This had been the theory of the
revolutionists in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and continued to be the prevailing Ameri-
can doctrine even in the nineteenth. In fact, this
hypothesis of an original " state of nature " and
the contractual character of government had been
one of the leading principles of " the Fathers " ;
the theory of contract had even been extended from
individuals to the relations between the states ; it
was recognized in many of the state constitutions ;
adopted by men of all parties, aristocrats as well
as democrats ; and was generally accepted as the
correct theory of the origin of political institutions.
In the politics of Calhoun, however, there was no
place for the assumptions of the Naturrecht phi-

Historical Association for 1899. Of especial importance are Cal-
houn's speeches on The South Carolina Exposition (1828), Vol. Ill;
The Force Bill (1833), Vol. II; Reply to Webster (1833), Vol. II;
Reception of Abolition Petitions (1837), Vol. IV; Veto Powet
(1842), Vol. IV. See the Life of Calhoun, by H. von Hoist.

1 Cf. ' A Study of Nullification in South Carolina," by D. F
Houston, in Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. Ill (1896).

NATURE OF THE UNION 269

losophy, and he had no sympathy with this interpre-
tation of the nature of government. The "state of
nature " he regarded as a mere fiction, an unwarrant-
able hypothesis. "Instead of being the natural
state of man, it is, of all conceivable states, the
most opposed to his nature, most repugnant to his
feelings, and most incompatible with his wants.
His natural state is the social and political."

Government is not artificial and unnatural, but
perfectly natural in the sense that it is neces-
sary to the development and perfection of human
powers. Government is not a matter of choice,
depending for its origin and continuance on the
caprice of the individual ; on the contrary, it is
a primary necessity of man, and, " like breathing,
it is not permitted to depend on our volition." ^
There are, reasons Calhoun, two fundamental ele-
ments in the constitution of man : one the selfish,
the other the social instinct or tendency. Of these
two, however, the stronger is the selfish tendency,
and as a consequence, there arises conflict between
individuals which must be in some way controlled.
The instrument by means of which this control
is effected is government — a necessity arising out
of the essential nature of man.^ Society is neces-
sary to man ; government is necessary to society.
But government itself contains the germ of evil,

1 Ibid. 8.

' Ibid. 1-4. Calhoun avoids using the term "selfish," substitub
ing " direct " or " individual."

2/0 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

and must in its turn be controlled or balanced.
To this end is erected a constitution intended to
hold in check the destructive tendencies found in
government. This constitution bears the same
relation to government that government bears to
society ; as government restrains the selfish ten-
dencies of the individual, so the constitution checks
the selfish tendencies of the government. There
is this difference to be noted, however, that gov-
ernment is of divine origin, whereas the constitu-
tion is a human device and construction. There
must be a government; there may be a consti-
tution.^

The organization of the constitution Calhoun re-
gards as one of the greatest of political problems.
How can the government be given the powers nec-
essary and yet be restrained from oppressing the
members of the society 1 Calhoun's answer to this
perennial problem is that there must be created
an organism " by which resistance may be syste-
matically and peaceably made on the part of the
ruled to oppression and abuse of power on the part
of the rulers." ^ This result may be effected by
establishing the responsibility of the rulers to the
ruled through the exercise of the right of suf-
frage — the primary principle in the establishment
of constitutional government. Yet this alone is
inadequate to afford the necessary protection ; " it

^ma.%. ^IHd. 12.

NATURE OF THE UNION 27 1

only changes the seat of authority, without coun-
teracting, in the least, the tendency of the govern
ment to oppression and abuse of its powers." ^
We are still confronted by the imminent danger
that the majority of the electors will prove to
be tyrannical and oppress the weaker minority
as intolerably as the most irresponsible govern-
ment.

Calhoun enters, therefore, on a vigorous polemic
against the despotism of the majority. He asserts
that the tendency of the majority is to assume all
the rights belonging to the people. Although
only a fraction, they assume to be and act as
the whole people ; while on the other hand, the
minority is treated as if it were nothing at all.
Again, Calhoun points out the probability that
great political parties will arise, that their organi-
zation will become increasingly centralized, and
that continually stricter party discipline will pre-
vail. Offices will come to be regarded as the
legitimate reward of the victorious party, while
recognition of other than partisans will be ex-
cluded. Party strife will become fiercer and fiercer
as it becomes more factional, and will finally re-
sult in an appeal to force and the establishment
of absolute government.^

Nor is there any way by which this inherent

1 Ibid. 14.

2 Ibid. 42. Calhoun had before him the spoils system inaugurated
by Jackson. See Vol. II, 435.

272 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

tendency may be effectively restrained. It may be
urged that a sufficient check is found in the power
of public opinion to keep party spirit within reason-
able limits. But to this Calhoun is not ready to as-
sent. He concedes the great strength of public
sentiment, particularly that of modern times in its
highly developed form, but does not consider it
even yet as an effective barrier against the ten-
dencies of the majority. Public opinion itself may
be just as despotic as the majority party, just as
radical and unreasonable, and consequently just as
uncertain a defender of the rights of the minority.
Nor are constitutional restrictions or the separa-
tion of powers of sufficient force against the ma-
jority. All restrictions must be interpreted, all
requirements carried out, by the prevailing party.
The minority is helpless and must submit to any
adjustment of constitutional balances that may
commend itself to the majority.^

The "tyranny of the majority " is, then, one of the
fundamental propositions in the theory of Calhoun.
Majority rule is always liable to abuse at the hands
of a party, an interest, or a section, which inter-
prets constitutional law, determines public opinion,
arrogates to itself the right and privilege prop-
erly belonging only to the whole people. With
dramatic power Calhoun pictures the inevitable
advance of majority encroachment and aggres-

' Disquisition, 22 ff. See Madison's defence of majority rule^

n, 330.

NATURE OF THE UNION 273

sion.i Application of this principle is made in ref-
erence to the question of taxation. Under the opera-
tion of the numerical majority, says Calhoun, a party
or section obtaining power may easily abuse and op-
press another section found in the minority. Taxes
may be levied by the majority section, which bur-
den chiefly the minority section ; not only this, but
these taxes are actually returned by the minor-
ity to the majority, virtually bounties paid by the
weaker to the stronger party. The case in point
was that of the protective tariff, which he con-
sidered was levied for the benefit of the North at
the expense of the South. It seemed to him,
therefore, an excellent illustration of the " major-
ity tyranny " upon which so much emphasis had
been laid.

In place of the dangerous, " numerical ra.2J\Qx'\\.y"
Calhoun presents his doctrine of the "concurrent
majority." " All constitutional governments," says
Calhoun, " take the sense of the community by its
parts, each through its appropriate organ." ^ On
the other hand, those governments in which power
is centred in an individual or a body of individuals,
even including the majority, may be regarded as
absolute governments. The principle upon which

1 It is interesting to note that Calhoun objected to party caucuses
and conventions " because they are irresponsible bodies, not known
to the Constitution.'' The election of the President, he held, should
be left to the electoral college as the framers of the Constitution
intended. Works, Vol. IV, 394.

' Disquisition, 36.
T

274 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

they rest is, in last analysis, force, in contrast to
the principle of constitutional governments, which
is that of compromise. Under the " concurrent "
or "constitutional" majority system this principle
of compromise will be made effective by giving
"each interest or portion of the community a
negative on the others." ^ Without a "concurrent
majority " there can be no negative ; without a
negative there can be no constitution. Calhoun
declares that "it is this negative power — the
power of preventing or arresting the action of the
government — be it called by what term it may —
veto, interposition, nullification, check, or balance
of power — which, in fact, forms the Constitution." ^
The positive power makes the government, but
the negative power makes the constitution. The
essence of the "concurrent majority" is, then, the
veto power granted to the various separate interests.
Governmental action is conditioned, not upon the
consent of a majority of individuals, but upon that
of various interests.

The advantages of such a system are presented
with great enthusiasm. With a " concurrent major-
ity " there will be a greater degree of attachment
to the state than is otherwise possible.^ Attention
will be attracted not so much to party as to country.
The government will not discriminate against any
one interest or group, and hence there will be no vio-
lent resentments and animosities provoked as undel
* Disquisition, 35. ^ Ji^^^ s jud, ^<j.

NATURE OF THE UNION 27$

the rule of the absolute majority. Consequently
there will result a higher development of " common
devotion." Politically and morally there must fol-
low, according to Calhoun, loftier standards of con-
duct under this regime of compromise than under
that of force. Moreover, under this system there
may be obtained a higher degree of liberty.^ Gov-
ernment will be effectually restrained from arbitrary
and oppressive conduct by the veto power of the
various interests, and thus poUtical freedom will be
guaranteed. In any other government, indeed,
liberty can be little more than a name ; the " con-
stitutional majority" alone makes it a reality. By
the same logic, civilization and progress are fostered
by the system of compromise, for under it are
secured liberty and harmony — two great factors
in civilized development.*^ On the whole, Calhoun
would conclude that the " organism " known as the
"concurrent" or "constitutional" majority is
eminently adapted to realize the great ends of
government included under the protection and
perfection of society.

Two objections may be raised against the pro-
posed system, Calhoun concedes ; namely, its com-
plexity and its ineffectiveness. To the first of
these he replies that the simplest of all governments
are absolute and that all free governments are of
necessity complex in their structure. Hence this
style of argument applies to the whole philosophy
■^md-tfl. *lhid.f,\.

276 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

and practice of free governments, which he does
not consider it necessary to defend. Nor is the
objection to the effectiveness of the proposed
system regarded as serious. Calhoun maintains
that in times of real stress the compromise principle
is not unfavorable to the passage of necessary
measures, and that any policy agreed upon is far
more enthusiastically supported than if compelled
by force. Obedience will be rendered, not from a
selfish or sectional motive, but from a higher sense
of obUgation to country. An analogy to the com-
promise principle is discovered in the unanimity
required of a jury before decisive action can be
taken. As circumstances lead the jurors to a
unanimous decision, so the far more imperious ne-
cessities of government will lead to a compromise
and agreement in the affairs of state. Historical
illustrations of the compromise are afforded by the
experience of Poland with the liberum veto, by the
Confederacy of the Six Nations, the Patricians and
Plebeians in Rome, the Lords and Commons in
England, and by the United States, if the original
intention of the Fathers were carried out.

It is now evident that Calhoun's argument all
leads up to the defence of a particular theory of
public law in the United States. " Concurrent " or
" constitutional ^majority is simply the prolegomena
to nullification. [Jhe individual states of the Union
are to enjoy a veto on the proceedings of the general
government, thus establishing the principle of action

NATURE OF THE UNION 277

through the concurrent instead of the numerical
majority^ A state may reject any measure of the
general government regarded as inconsistent with
the terms of the Constitution ; may, in other words,
nullify the proposed action of the federal govern-
ment. If three-fourths of the states support the
action of the government, the nullifying state must
either yield or withdraw from the Union.-' Thus
a constitutional means of defence is possessed by
each state ; there is no possibility of tyrannical con-
duct on the part of the " numerical majority " ;
and the action of the " concurrent majority " is
assured. Nullification, in Calhoun's eyes, was not
only a theory of the relation of the states to the
Union, but it was a theory of constitutional
government in general; founded not merely in
the particular system of the United States, but
equally essential in the frame-work of any free
constitution.

In South Carolina for example, he points out,
representation in the legislature is distributed on
the basis of property, population, and territory.
Representation in the senate is based on election
districts, and thus gives to the southern part of the
state the predominance in that body; the house
is based on property and population, thus giving
the northern part of the state the majority there.
As the governor, the judges, and all important
officers are elected by the legislature, there is
i See Discourse, 297 S.

278 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

established an equilibrium between the sections.
"Party organization," says Calhoun, "party disci-
pline, party proscription, and their offspring, the
spoils principle, have been unknown to the state." ^
The same principle and similar methods might
well be introduced, he thinks, into other states
and there be followed by like beneficent results.

As already stated, nullification as conceived by
Calhoun was not simply a theory of the American
Union, but a fundamental doctrine of free govern-
ment. Whether the political theory of nullification
was chronologically or only logically antecedent to
the constitutional theory of nullification, is a matter
which need not here be discussed; the important
fact is that in the developed thought of Calhoun,
the "concurrent majority" was declared to be a
vital element in constitutional government.^

The next object of inquiry is Calhoun's state-
ment of the doctrine of secession. The germ of
this theory is found in Calhoun's conception of the
nature of sovereignty. In the early years of the
Republic it had been generally believed that in

1 See Discourse, 405.

* Calhoun favored a plural executive for the United States.
This, he urged, was the practice in Sparta, Rome, and even England,
where the cabinet is the real executive. In the United States there
should be one of the members constituting the executive from each
of the two great sections of the country. Discourse on Constitu-
tion and Government, 392-395. Calhoun's opposition to Jackson's
use of the executive power would also lead him to favor a plural
executive.

NATURE OF IHE UNION 279

the United States there existed a divided sov-
ereignty. The states were sovereign in certain
ixiatters, the national government sovereign in cer-
tain others, and each was supreme in its proper
sphere. If any ultimate sovereign was thought of,
it was the people as contrasted with the government.

Calhoun, however, was wholly intolerant of any
theory of divided sovereignty. To him this was
logically impossible and contradictory. He rea-
soned that in its very nature sovereignty must be
indivisible. "To divide is to destroy it;" sov-
ereignty must be one, or it is not at all. There
can be no state partly sovereign and partly non-
sovereign ; there can be no association composed
of half-sovereign states on the one hand, and a
half-sovereign government on the other. The
vital principle of the state, its life and spirit, can-
not be sundered ; it must remain one and indi-
visible. Thus in Calhoun's doctrine, all compromise
was rejected, and the doctrine of the indivisibility
of sovereignty presented in its clearest and most
striking light.

Applying this argument to the nature of the
Union, Calhoun asserted that the states were origi-
nally sovereign, and that they had never yielded
up their sovereignty. They could not surrender a
part and retain another part, but they must either
have given up all, or have retained all ; the states
must be fully sovereign or fully subject. This was
the alternative which Calhoun urged with relent-

28o AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

less logic. Given the original sovereignty of the
states, and the indivisibility of sovereignty, either
the states must be sovereign communities and the
United States a mere agent, or the United States
must be sovereign and the states wholly subordi-
nate. In Calhoun's theory there was no oppor-
tunity given for a division of the field between the
states and the Union ; such a compromise was ex-
cluded.^ It is true, he concedes, that the central
government enjoys the right to exercise sovereign
powers, but it does not have the true sovereignty
from which these powers are only emanations. The
central government acts as a sovereign, but it is not
a sovereign. It wears the robes of authority only
by sufferance of the legitimate owner, the states.

To the central government there are delegated
by the states certain attributes of sovereignty, such
as the war power, the taxing power, the power to
coin money ; but these powers do not constitute
sovereignty. In Calhoun's theory these attributes
of sovereignty may be divided, and the supreme
authority itself remain unimpaired.^ Thus the
states do not surrender the sovereignty; they
merely forego the exercise of certain of its attri-
butes, and these are liable to recall at any moment

' Cf. Works^ Vol. II, 232, 233, in reply to Qayton and Rives.

' Discourse, 146. "There is no difficulty in understanding how
powers appertaining to sovereignty may be divided, and the exer-
cise of one portion delegated to one set of agents and anothef
portion to another."

NATURE OF THE UNION 28 1

by the state from which derived. In fact, neither
federal nor state government is supreme, for there
is a determining power back of both. One must
distinguish, he maintains, between the constitution-
making power and the law-making power; the
former alone is sovereign, and to its act is due
the formation and organization of the government.^
The constituent power in any state concedes both
to the state government and to the national gov-
ernment certain powers or attributes of sovereignty ;
but as it may recall the power granted to the
state government, so with equal right it may recall
the authority delegated to the central government
Throughout this process the sovereign power re-
mains intact. The practical conclusion which he
draws is, naturally, that the states may at any time
rightfully assert their sovereign prerogative and
withdraw from the Union.

It is further important to notice how, on Cal-
houn's basis, he differentiated the United States
from a league or confederacy. What line of de-
markation could he draw between the political
organization under the Articles of Confederation
and that effected under the Constitution ? Calhoun
declared that the main difference between these
two types of association consisted in the fact that
the Confederacy lacked one essential feature of the
" Republic," namely, a fixed and stable government.
The so-called "government" of a confederacy is
1 Discourse, 191.

282 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

"nearly allied to an assembly of diplomats," meet-
ing to determine certain policies, and then leaving
their execution largely to the several parties to the
agreement. " Our system is the first that ever
substituted a government in lieu of such bodies.
This, in fact, constitutes its peculiar characteristic.
It is new, peculiar, and unprecedented." ^ Among
the changes involved in the passage from Con-
federacy to " Republic " was, in the first place, a
change in the source from which power was
derived. The Confederacy obtained its authority
from the state governments ; the " Republic " from
the sovereign communities themselves. The Con-
federacy was a mere league between governments ;
the " Republic " is a " more perfect union " between
sovereign communities. Another point of differ-
ence is that in the " Republic " there is needed a
much more careful specification and enumeration
of powers than was required in the Confederacy,
where the states themselves were immediately con-
cerned in the administration.^ Furthermore, under
the Confederacy the state governments were supe-
rior to the central government, which was merely
their agent ; but in the " Republic " the federal and
the state governments are equals and coordinates.^
Both are inferior in rank to the constitutional con-
vention of the state which gives them life. Lastly,
there was a change in the method of executing the
commands of the central government. The Con-

1 Discourse, 163. ^ Ibid. 164. ^ Ibid. 167.

NATURE OF THE UNION 285

federacy acted through the states ; the " Republic "
is authorized to act directly upon individuals.^

The difference, then, between the " Republic,"
or a federal system, and a "nation" must be
sought, not in the character of the powers exer-
cised, but in the basis upon which they rest. It
matters not how large the power of the federal
government ; if that power may be recalled by the
states, the federal government is subordinate and
they are sovereign. The federal government may
have possession ; the states have ownership : and
they may at any time evict their tenant, or any one
of the states may claim its share of the estate.^

Of the influence of Calhoun there is no question.
He was easily the first in rank among the theorists
of his school, and his ideas dominated the South.
His political theories became the dogma of the
particularistic party ; they were pressed with the
most rigid and unyielding logic, and led straight
to the trial of arms in the Civil War. After the
close of this struggle, the theory of states-rights
was again stated by such authorities as Jefferson
Davis,^ Alexander H. Stephens,* and Bernard J.

^Ibid. 168.

" Calhoun's theory found expression in the constitution of the
Confederate States.

' The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government (1881).

* A Constitutional View of the Late War between the States
(1868), p. 70. Cf. A Brief Inquiry into the True Nature and
Cksjmctei:. of aw. Federal Government, by A. P. Upshur (1840), a
review of Story's Commentaries.

284 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Sage,^ but little was added to what had already
been said by Calhoun. His doctrines still stand as
the most perfect formulation of the particularistic
idea which played so large a part in the first two
generations of the life of the Republic.

The nationalist theory of the Union, like the
particularistic doctrine, did not develop imme-
diately on the establishment of the Constitution.
The first great champion of the cause was Daniel
Webster, who contributed more to the strengthen-
ing of Union sentiment than any other one man.
Webster's theory, however, was constitutional in
nature, rather than philosophic. He attempted to
show from the language of the Constitution itself,
without much discussion of philosophic or historic
considerations, that the Union was formed by a
contract between individuals which resulted in the
jcstablishment of a supreme law and government,
'and that the states as such were not concerned
"in this agreement. "The people of the United
States" he understood to mean the people of the
whole Union, and not of the several states. The
Union is not merely a compact between states to
form a new Confederacy, but an agreement be-
tween individuals to form a national government.
" It is established," said he, " by the people of the
United States. It does not say by the people of
the several states. It is as all the people of the

■• The Republic of Republics, or American Federal Liberty, by
P. C. Centz (Bernard J. Sage), 1865. See especiaUy Chap. VI.

NATURE OF THE UNION 285

United States that they established the Constitu-
tion." Thus the Constitution of the United States
was formed just as any state constitution ; namely,
by means of an agreement between individuals.

But a state constitution, although created origi-
nally by an agreement between individuals, was not
regarded as a contract, but as a law. It was
created by an agreement, but when that agree-
ment was once made, there came into being a law
proper. To use an analogy from private law, the
agreement has become an "executed contract."
" When the people agree to erect a government,"
said Webster, " and actually erect it, the thing is
done, and the agreement is at an end. The com-
pact is executed, and the end designed by it is at-
tained." ^ The same argument was made by Story,
who urged that a constitution falls under the defi-
nition of law as laid down by the eminent authority,
Blackstone. " It is," said he, " a rule of action pre-
scribed by the supreme power in the state, regulat-
ing the rights and duties of the whole community.
It is a rule, as distinguished from a temporary or
sudden order — permanent, uniform, and universal.
It is also called a rule to distinguish it from a com-
pact or agreement, for a contract is a promise pro-
ceeding from us, law is a command directed to us." ^

1 Works, III, 468 (1833). Reply to Calhoun.

' Commentaries, Sec. 339. Cf. the Federalist, No. 33. Nathan
Dane, General Abridgement and Digest of American Law (1823-
1829), Appendix, Sec. 14 &

286 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

On this basis it was denied that the Constitution
of the United States could be regarded as a con-
tract, and the assertion made that it must be con-
sidered as a law in the strict and proper sense of
the term. It is, in fact, the supreme law of the
land, and carries with it the very highest degree of
obligation. The Union is not a mere treaty relation
which may be denounced at will, but an agreement
as obligatory and indissoluble as the social contract
,on which the whole fabric of society rests. Hence
a state has no more right to question the authority
and supremacy of the Constitution than a citizen
of Massachusetts has to question the constitution
of that state ; not even as much right, for the Con-
stitution of the United States is the supreme law
of the whole society. The individual may exert
the original right of revolution, but he has no legal
right to resist the constituted authorities of the
nation.

Webster's doctrine was, then, that the Union is
not a treaty relation between sovereign states, as
Calhoun argued, or a contract between states by
which the sovereignty of the contracting parties is
diminished, as Madison contended ; but it is a law,
resting on a social contract between individuals,
and in which the states as such had no part. The
Constitution is a government ordained and estab-
lished by the people of the United States. In the
expressive language of Webster, the Union is, " the
association of the people under a constitution of

NATURE OF THE UNION 287

government, uniting their highest interests, cement-
ing their present enjoyments, and blending in an
indivisible mass all their hopes for the future."

Although reasoning with great skill and elo-
quence from the strict letter of the Constitution, it
is evident that Webster's real power did not come
from his constitutional arguments as such. The
very question over which he and Calhoun fought
was whether the Union should be regarded and in-
terpreted from the standpoint of constitutional law
or of international law. If the states were never
sovereign or had yielded up their sovereignty, then
Webster's contention, that secession is an unconsti-
tutional act, was valid. But to Calhoun, who looked
upon the Union as, in ultimate analysis at least, a
treaty between sovereign states, secession could not
be regarded as unconstitutional, but at the worst as
a breach of international law. The discussion, as
they carried it on, amounted to an argument over
the legality of an act, with one of the parties deny-
ing the existence of the law under which such
validity was contested. Webster wished to make a
purely legal argument on the question of legal
sovereignty. Calhoun declined to make it purely
a legal question, but at the same time disregarded
the matter of fact.

When we consider the social and economic
forces on which political forms are based, Webster
had the stronger position, and for this reason.
Calhoun was continually looking backward to a

288 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

state of things that once perhaps may have existed,
and he failed to observe that every year was carry-
ing him farther away from his premise. The fatal
flaw in his argument was that, even granting his
cherished hypothesis that the states were originally
sovereign, it did not follow that they would continue
to possess that fulness of power forever.^ On the
other hand, Webster's hypothesis was looking to
the future tense, and every year of nationalizing
conditions was therefore strengthening his conten-
tion. The great weight of his argument was due
to the fact that even if his interpretation of " We,
the people" was denied, it did not follow that his
conclusions were not sound. His power as a con-
troversialist really came, not from the strength of
his constitutional arguments as such, but from the
fact that he followed a great current of public sen-
timent, springing from the impulse of nationality.
He had with him the reasoned and unreasoned
forces of an ethnic and geographic unity strug-
gling toward self-expression.

^ Calhoun recognized this at times. In reply to a suggestion
that the best policy for the South would be separation, he said
(1838) : "That is a natural and common conclusion, but those who
make it up do not think of the difficulty involved in the word; how
many bleeding pores must be taken up in passing the knife of sepa-
ration through a body politic (in order to make two of one) which
has been so long bound together by so many ties, political, social,
and commercial. . . . We must remember it is the most difficult
process in the world to make two people of one; and that there is
no example of it, if we except the Jews." Correspondence, 391.

NATURE OF THE UNION 289

The political theory of the nationalist school
was not fully stated until the events of the Civil
War had shown the strength of the Union senti-
ment. In this great struggle the latent force of
the national spirit was at last decisively mani-
fested, and the nature of the American Union set-
tled beyond question. At the close of the four
years of war there could be no uncertainty whether
the United States should be ranked as a confed-
eration or as a nation. There was, perhaps, room
for question as to the exact powers possessed respec-
tively by central and by local governments, but the
great problem of nationality was settled beyond
dispute.

This nationalist tendency was marked not only
in the United States, but also in European countries,
where similar unifying influences were at work.
The struggles of the Hungarians, the Poles, the
Greeks, the profound movements preceding the
establishment of German and Italian national
unity — all gave evidence of the vitality of the
national principle in world politics. The right of
each nationality to organization as a separate state
was strongly emphasized ; the doctrine of nation-
ality was, indeed, the most conspicuous political
dogma of the time. It is a significant fact that,
within one decade, three great peoples — the
United States, Germany, and Italy — established
by "blood and iron" the fact of their national
unity.

u

290 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

The nationalist theory in its later form differed
materially from that advanced by Webster and his
school. The doctrine was, in the first place, less
strictly legal and constitutional in form ; it con-
tained a larger element of the philosophy that calls
attention to the organic elements in the state, and
correspondingly less of the contract theory of the
eighteenth century ; and finally it emphasized more
strongly the unity and indivisibility of the sover-
eignty, and consequently the wholly subordinate
position of the states.

In the first place, the form of the national argu-
ment was radically changed. Webster and his
school had relied almost entirely upon legal and
constitutional proofs that the United States is a
nation: "We, the people of the United States";
" the supreme law of the land " ; the provisions
concerning the "general welfare" and all "neces-
sary and proper" powers — these were the foun-
dations upon which the cause rested. The plain
language of the Constitution, it was said, is amply
sufficient to show the national character of that
instrument. The Constitution was made the cen-
tral figure in the discussion, strict adherence to its
requirements was demanded, and argument was
not carried beyond its boundaries. In the course
of the war, however, the point of view changed.
The stern necessities of that great conflict led to
a certain disregard for strictly legal forms, and
provoked the expression of a determination to

NATURE OF THE UNION 29 1

maintain the Union at whatever cost, while the
whole war brought into view the unexpected
strength of the Union sentiment. Although not
abandoning the claim that the Constitution is a
distinctly national instrument, the new school was
not satisfied to rest with the literal and legal proof.
They asserted that whatever the correct interpre-
tation of the Constitution may be, the United
States is and must be recognized as a nation. The
argument was carried back of governmental forms,
back of the written Constitution, so long a popu-
lar idol, to the primary source of power, the creator
of these forms, the American nation as it exists
behind the Constitution. This idea was expressed
by Lincoln, when he made the assertion that " meas-
ures otherwise unconstitutional might become law-
ful by becoming indispensable to the preservation
of the Constitution, through the preservation of
the Nation." ^ Evidence of the same spirit is given
by the statement of Fisher that, " if the Union and
the government cannot be saved out of this terrible
shock of war constitutionally, a Union and a govern-
ment must be saved unconstitutionally. ' ' ^ The fact
that there is an unwritten constitution of the nation,
in contrast to the written Constitution of the gov-
ernment, was frequently pointed out Jameson, for
example, distinguished constitutions as "organic
growths" from constitutions as "instruments of
evidence." The former are the product of various

I Worki, II, 508. =• The Trial of the Constitution, 199 (1862),

292 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

social and political forces; the latter, "the result
of an attempt to express in technical language
some particular constitution, existing as an organic
growth."^ Brownson distinguished between the
Constitution of the state or nation on the one hand,
and the Constitution of the government on the
other. The Constitution of the nation, the "con-
genital" or "providential" Constitution, as it is
variously termed, consists in " the genius, the char-
acter, the habits, customs and wants of the people " ;
and upon this the governmental Constitution must
rest if it is to operate successfully.^ Mulf ord dis-
tinguished between the historical and the enacted
constitution, one the result of the nation's historical
development, the other the formula prescribed for
public order at any given time.^ Still more strik-
ing was the argument of Hurd, who took the
ground that the effort to determine from the Con-
stitution itself, whether the states or the United
States is sovereign, is wholly futile, and must be
so in the nature of the case.* Sovereignty, said he,
does not proceed from or depend upon constitution

1 J, A. Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 63 (1866).

* O. A. Brownson, The American Republic, Chap. VII (1866).

» Elisha Mulford, The Nation, Chap. IX. (1870). A writer de-
cidedly under the influence of the German Transcendentalists.

'John C. Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage (1858);
The Theory of our National Existence (1881); The Union State
(1890). "Sovereignty cannot be an attribute of law, because, by
the nature of things, law must proceed from sovereignty. By the
preexistence of a sovereignty, law becomes possible." The Theory
of our National Existence, 97.

NATURE OF THE UNION 293

or law, but itself makes constitutions and laws.
It is the creator, not the creature. Sovereignty is a
matter of fact rather than of law, and hence it is to
the facts we must look for an answer to the question.

With this group of thinkers, dominated by the
spirit of nationality, and influenced by the philosophy
of such writers as De Maistre ^ and Lieber, the ten-
dency was to go back to the power that makes and
unmakes constitutions. They were no longer satis-
fied to construe the language of a written document,
but claimed the right to make an examination of the
political, social, and economic forces which are the
life and spirit of a state. They were no longer
interpreters of law, but observers of the forces that
make and unmake law.

Among those entertaining such views there was
little question as to whether the sovereignty be-
longed to the individual states or to the Union.
Judged by all the canons of distinction, the states
could not be regarded as nations; this attribute
must be reserved for the United States as a whole.
The sovereignty was unhesitatingly attributed to
the people of the nation. " Back of all the states,"
said Jameson, "and of all forms of government
for either the states or the Union, we are to con-
ceive of the nation, a political body, one and
indivisible." 2 Brownson thought that by the

1 A conspicuous representative of the reaction against the French
Revolution. See his Essai sur U principe ginerateur des constitu-
tions politiques, 1807.

2 Op. cit. Sec. 51. See Sees. 30-31 on definition of a nation.

294 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

unwritten constitution the sovereignty rests with
"the people as a whole or the collective body" in
the modified organic sense, although by the written
constitution there is in fact no sovereignty, the
governmental powers being divided between the
local and the general governments. Mulford de-
nounced the confederate principle in the language
of German transcendentalism, and declared that
the supreme power in the United States rested
only in the nation at large, and not in any common-
wealth. On every hand the supremacy of the
Union was asserted in the strongest terms, and
the dignity of the states disparaged. This was a
legitimate conclusion from the great demonstration
of strength exhibited in the maintenance of national
authority and the preservation of the Union.

Although the defenders of the Union agreed
in vesting the sovereignty in the nation as con-
trasted with the individual states, there was not
entire harmony of opinion as to what part the
states occupied in the Union. On the one hand, it
was held that the sovereignty of the United States
is constituted regardless of and independent of the
states. Thus Jameson maintained that the nation
is " a political body, one and indivisible, made up
of the citizens of the United States, without dis-
tinction of age, sex, color, or condition of life."^

1 Cf. Joel Tiffany, A Treatise on Government and Constitutional
Law (1867) ; J. N. Pomeroy, Constitutional Law (1868). For a dis-
cussion of the various theories as to the status of the commonwealths

NATURE OF THE UNION 295

This is the ultimate source of political power, out
of which all governmental authority flows. Gen-
erally and regularly the sovereignty is exercised,
it is true, through the groups called states; but
back of these states there is a power by which
they may be limited and restrained ; namely, the
sovereignty of the nation.^

On the other hand, the necessity of recognizing
the states as integral parts of the Union was not
less strongly urged. Brownson, although defend-
ing the sovereignty of the nation, declared that the
political or sovereign people of the United States
existed as states united and only in this way.^ The
sovereign nation was, therefore, the people as organ-
ized in states. To the same end Hurd contended
for the recognition of the "states united." "The
people," he declared, " or the nation holding sov-
ereignty as distinct from the states, or the politi-
cally organized people of the states, was not even
a myth " (until the Civil War). The states alone
were not sovereign, the people were not sovereign,
but this attribute belonged exclusively to the states
in Union. This view seems to have also the sanc-
tion of the Supreme Court in its declaration : " The

which passed ordinances of secession, see W. A. Dunning, Essays
an the Civil War and Reconstruction.

1 Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 57; also Political Scienci
Quarterly, V, 193. In the first edition of the Constitutional Con-
ventions, Jameson spolie of a " quasi-sovereignty " in the states.
Cf. Mulford, Pomeroy, and others.

' American Republic, 219.

296 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

states disunited might exist. Without the states in
union, there could be no such political body as the
United States." 1

In this discussion, however, there is no claim
that the individual states are sovereign. The issue
is one as to how the national sovereignty is organ-
ized, whether it rests with the people of the whole
nation, or with an association or group of states.
The whole controversy really arises from a failure
to distinguish clearly between the legal and the
political side of sovereignty — a lesson which the
events of the Civil War might have made clear.^

The new view of the Union differed in another
respect from that of Webster, namely, in regard to
the genesis of the United States. Webster thought
of the Union as formed, in accordance with the
political philosophy of the Revolutionary era, by
means of a social contract between individuals. In
the new national school, the tendency was to disre-
gard the doctrine of the social contract, and to
emphasize strongly the instinctive forces whose
action and interaction produces a state. This dis-

1 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wallace, 76 (1868). The court still
continued to speak of a divided sovereignty. See United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 550 (1875); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S., 384
(1879). With this some of the commentators agree. See Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations (3d edition, 1874), i; Black, Con-
stitutional Law, 21.

* On the question as to just where the sovereignty in a state is
located, see Woodrow Wilson, An Old Master, 95; Willoughby,
The Nature of the State, 293-294, 307.

NATURE OF THE UNION 297

tinction was developed by Lieber, who held that the
great difference between "people" and "nation" lies
in the fact that the latter possesses organic unity.
" People " signifies merely " the aggregate of the
inhabitants of a territory without any additional idea,
at least favorable idea." " Nation," on the other
hand, impUes a homogeneous population, inhabiting
a coherent territory ; a population having a common
language, literature, institutions, and " an organic
unity with one another, as well as being conscious
of a common destiny." ^ In general, the new
school thought of the Union as organic rather
than contractual in nature. Though not in all
cases clearly expressed, it was evident, neverthe-
less, that the contract philosophy was in general
disrepute, and that the overwhelming tendency
was to look upon the nation as an organic product,
the result of an evolutionary process.'^ It would,
of course, be a gross exaggeration to say that all
those who maintained the supremacy of the Union
repudiated the social-contract theory, but it is nec-
essary to recognize the fact that the nation was
something different in the popular mind and in
the philosophic mind from the " people " of earlier
days. Nation carried with it the idea of an ethnic
and geographic unity, constituted without the con-

1 Miscellaneous Writings, II, 128.

2 See Jameson, Sees. 66-67; ^'^o Brownson, Hurd, Mulford,
Woolsey to the same effect. John Draper, in Thoughts on the Future
Civil Policy of America (1865), represents the extreme develop-
ment of the organic theory.

298 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

sent of any one in particular ; " people " was under-
stood to be a body formed by a contract between
certain individuals. The very fact that the Union
was " pinned together with bayonets " was enough
to show that the doctrine of voluntary contract
had faded into the background. The general
idea was that the United States, by virtue of the
community of race, interests, and geographical
location, ought to be and is a nation ; and ought to
be held together by force, if no other means would
avail. This was the feeling that underlay the
great national movement of 1861-1865, and it
could not fail to be reflected in the philosophy of
that time and in the succeeding interpretations of
that event.

It is also to be observed that in the new school
the doctrine of sovereignty was subjected to impor-
tant modifications. In the contest over national
supremacy, the idea of a divided sovereignty was
laid aside, and the unity and indivisibility of the
supreme power strongly affirmed.^ As at an earlier
time Calhoun rejected the compromise doctrine, so
now the nationalistic school abandoned the idea,
declaring that the sovereignty is one and indivisi-
ble, and at the same time that it belonged to the
nation. The idea of sovereignty was first strongly
stated and clearly expounded by Lieber, in his
Political Ethics and later received general sup-
port. In the narrower and legal sense, the rights
1 Webster spoke of the states as partly sovereign. Works, III, 321.

NATURE OF THE UNION 299

of the States were admitted, but in respect to
the ultimate political sovereignty dispute practi-
cally came to an end. The events of the Civil
War firmly established the fact that the one and
indivisible sovereignty belongs to the nation, or
the Union as a whole.^ Calhoun's idea of the
nature of sovereignty was accepted, but it was
applied in a manner wholly different from what
he had expected or intended.

The nationalistic theory assumes its most com-
plete and scientific form at the hands of J. W.
Burgess. The concepts of nation, sovereignty,
and the theory of the " federal state," are in his
works clearly and definitely stated, for almost the
first time. " Nation " is defined as " a population
of an ethnic unity, inhabiting a geographic unity,"
and the application of this is made to various
nationalities. The national state is presented as
the highest product of recent political develop-
ment, and is shown to be " for the present and dis-
cernible future, the organ of interpretation in last
instance of the order of life for its subjects." *

1 See Jameson, Brownson, Hurd, Woolsey, Burgess, in general
agreement on this point. Brownson insisted that by the written
Constitution, there is really no sovereignty in the United States, op.
cit. Chap. XI. Philemon Bliss, Of Sovereignty (1885), declared
that sovereignty has no application to a federal state; in fact is
inapplicable to any constitutional state. See Lectures VII-XII.

^ Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (1891);
" The American Commonwealth " in the Political Science Quarierl)\
Vol. I; review of Labaad's StcuUsrecht, Ibid. Vol III, 123.

300 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

The doctrine of sovereignty is also strongly stated.
It is conceived as the " original, absolute, unlimited,
universal power over the individual subject, and all
associations of subjects;"^ an essential quality of the
state, indeed the most indispensable mark of state-
hood. " Really the state cannot be conceived," says
Burgess, "without sovereignty, i.e. without unlimited
power over its subjects ; that is its very essence."
There is no other power, no association or organ-
ization which can be conceived as limiting the state
in its control over its subjects, for the authority
which could exercise such power would itself be
sovereign. It is true that the state may abuse its
unlimited power, and wrong the individual under
its control, but the national state is after all " the
human organ least likely to do wrong." Moreover,
this unlimited power on the part of the state
necessitates no apology to civil liberty for its exist-
ence, since this very power is the real guaranty
of and security for individual liberty ; and hence
the more completely and really sovereign the state
is, the more secure is the liberty of the individual.^

From the principle that sovereignty is a unit, it
follows that the so-called " federal state " is an im-
possibility. What seems such, is either a number
of sovereign states, having an equal number of
local governments and a common central govern-
ment, or one sovereign state having a central

1 Political Science, I, 52. Cf. review of Laband.

2 Ibid. I, 57.

NATURE OF THE UNION 30 1

government and several local governments.^ There
may be a federal system of government in which
the sovereign state allots certain powers to the
central government, and others to the local govern-
ments. But in this case the sovereignty is in no
way divided, and there is no federal state. Sov-
ereignty, it is urged, "is entire or not at all," and
what remains to the former states under such
a system of government is only "the residuary
powers of government," which are by no means
equivalent to sovereignty or any portion thereof.
The sovereignty remains with the central state, un-
divided and indivisible.

Applying these principles to the United States,
it is seen that the characteristics of a nation have
been clearly evident here from the beginning,
although not always accorded full recognition.
The political system of the United States is a dual
government, with the ultimate sovereignty resting
in the nation.^ The nation has organized the cen-
tral government, indicated a sphere of individual
liberty, and given to the commonwealth residuary
powers of government. The so-called " states "
are not sovereign or semi-sovereign, but merely
organs of government for the nation. " It is no
longer proper," says Burgess, "to call them states at

'^ Ibid. I, 79 ff.; n, 10 ff.

* Cf. W. W. Willoughby, The Nature of the State, especially the
interesting discussion in Chap. X on the nature of the composite
state.

302 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

all. It is in fact only a title of honor, without any
corresponding substance." The commonwealths
are, strictly speaking, neither sovereign nor states,
and to call them either is inaccurate and mis-
leading. Attention is called to the diminishing
importance of the " states " in our political system,
in contrast with the rapidly increasing power and
influence of the modern city, and serious doubt is
raised as to the ability of the "state" to hold its
place as a unit of government in our political sys-
tem, if the influences operating during the last
half century continue uninterrupted.^

The development of American political theory
in relation to the nature of the Union may now be
summarized as follows. At the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution, and for a considerable
period thereafter, it was believed that the Union
was of a peculiar and anomalous character, and
that the sovereignty, so far as vested in govern-
ment, was divided between the states and the
United States. The real sovereign was thought
to be the "people," but whether this meant the

1 On the real place of the states see Political ScientA Quarterly,
Vol. I, " The American Commonwealth." On the relation between
civil liberty and nationality, see Political Science, I, 224. Woodrow
Wilson maintains that the members of the Union are still genuine
states, although their " sphere is Umited by the presiding and sov-
ereign powers of a State superordinated to them . . they have
dominion; it has sovereignty." An Old Master and other PoHHcd
Essays (1893), 94.

NATURE OF THE UNION 303

people of the United States as a whole or the
people of the several states was left undetermined.
As the contest between nationalism and states-
rights became more acute, this middle position was
abandoned by both parties. Calhoun contended
that the sovereign people were the people of the
several states, and that the sovereignty was, more-
over, essentially indivisible. The states were hence
sovereign communities, and the general govern-
ment had only the powers delegated to it by them.
On the other hand, the nationalist position was
defended by Webster, who declared that the Con-
stitution was adopted by the people of the United
States as a whole, by means of an agreement as
binding as the social contract. After the war had
settled the vexed question of secession, the new
school of nationalists developed and strengthened
the earlier doctrine. The argument from the let-
ter of the law was less emphasized and the consid-
eration of social and political facts made more
conspicuous. The nation was declared supreme,
but this differed from the earlier " people '' in that
the contract idea was largely eliminated, and the
organic and evolutionary character of the nation
given greater attention. Calhoun's doctrine of the
indivisibility of sovereignty was accepted, but sover-
eignty was claimed for the Union to the exclu-
sion of the states, which were relegated to the
position of organs of the nation. Differences of
opinion appeared as to the exact location of the

304 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

sovereignty, whether with the nation as an aggre.
gation of individuals or as an aggregation of states;
but the sovereignty of the Union was undisputed.

Looking back over the development of the
United States, a great growth in national spirit
and sentiment is at once observed. In 1787, the
general attitude toward the central government
was that of suspicion and distrust, if not of open
hostility. Liberty was regarded as local in char-
acter, and the states as the great champions of
the individual. The greater the power of the cen-
tral government, the greater the danger to the
freedom of the citizen. " Consolidated " govern-
ment was considered as equivalent to tyranny and
oppression. A century of national development has
reversed this attitude. The states are now looked
upon with more suspicion than is the national gov-
ernment, and it is frequently considered a matter
of congratulation when a given subject falls under
federal administration. It is no longer generally
feared that human liberty is menaced by the fed-
eral government, and protected only by the states.
Denunciation of the United States as a " consoli-
dated fabric " of " aristocratical tyranny " is sel-
dom heard, but certain states are sometimes
denominated as " rotten boroughs." The state has
in fact in many cases become a less important unit,
economically, politically, and socially than the city,
and, on the whole, the tendency of this time is over-
whelmingly national, both in fact and in theory.

CHAPTER VIII

RECENT TENDENCIES

In the last half of the nineteenth century there
appeared in the United States a group of political
theorists differing from the earlier thinkers in re-
spect to method and upon many important doc-
trines of political science. The new method was
more systematic and scientific than that which
preceded it, while the results reached showed a pro-
nounced reaction from the individualistic philoso-
phy of the early years of the century.^

Much of the credit for the establishment of this
new school belongs to Francis Lieber, a German
scientist who came to this country in 1827, and,
as an educator and author, left a deep impress on
the political thought of America. His Manual of
Political Ethics (1838-1839) and Civil Liberty and
Self-Government (1853) were the first systematic
treatises on poUtical science that appeared in the
United States, and their influence was widespread.^

1 The discussion of the two preceding chapters has partly antici-
pated the doctrines here considered.

^ See also the Miscellaneous Writings of Lieber, edited by D. C.
Gilman, also Legal and Political Hermeneutics (1837). For an
account of Lieber's life, see The Life and Letters of Francis Lieber,
by T. S. Perry; also Francis Lieber, by L. R. Harley.
X 305

306 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Following Lieber, came a line of American politi-
cal scientists, many of whom were trained in
German schools, and all of whom had acquired
a scientific method of discussing poUtical phe-
nomena. Among the most conspicuous figures in
the new school are Theodore Woolsey, whose
Political Science appeared in 1877, ^^^d John W.
Burgess, who wrote, in 1890, Political Science and
Comparative Constitutional Law, and a number of
others who have contributed materially to the de-
velopment of the subject.-'

The method of these authorities has already
been indicated, and need not be discussed at
length. The significant fact about it is the change
from the rather haphazard style of discussing polit-
ical theory in earlier days to a more scientific way
of approaching the questions of politics. A far
more thorough knowledge of history and a broader
comparative view of poHtical institutions are con-
spicuous in the new system.

1 Among these should be mentioned those writers who were con-
spicuous at the close of the Civil War, such as Brownson, Jameson,
Mulford, Hurd, and others. Somewhat later come A. L. Lowell,
Essays on Government (1892) ; Woodrow Wilson, The State (1889),
and An Old Master and Other Political Essays (1893); ^' J-
Goodnow, especially in Politics and Administration (1900); W. W.
Willoughby, The Nature of the State (1896), and Social Justice
(1900); see also the works later cited. In fhe Political Science
Quarterly, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, the American Historical Review, the Yale Review,
and the American Journal of Sociology are found numerous con'
tributions to the literature of poUtical science.

RECENT TENDENCIES 30?

The doctrines of these men differ in many im-
portant respects from those earlier entertained.
The individualistic ideas of the "natural right"
school of political theory, indorsed in the Revo-
lution, are discredited and repudiated. The notion
that political society and government are based
upon a contract between independent individuals
and that such a contract is the sole source of polit-
ical obligation, is regarded as no longer tenable.
Calhoun and his school had already abandoned
this doctrine, while such men as Story had seen the
need of extensive qualification of it. Objections
to the social contract were strongly urged by Lie-
ber,i and were later more fully and clearly stated by
others. In Lieber's opinion, the " state of nature "
has no basis in fact. Man is essentially a social
creature, and hence no artificial means for bring-
ing him into society need be devised. Lieber con-
demned the contract theory as generally held, on
the ground that it was both artificial and inade-
quate. Such an explanation of the origin of the
state can be regarded as true only in the sense
that every political society is composed of indi-
viduals who recognize the existence of mutual
rights and duties. Only in the sense that there
is a general recognition of these reciprocal claims
can we say that the state is founded on contract ;
and this, of course, is far from what the doctrine
is ordinarily taken to mean. As a matter of fact,
1 Political Ethics, I, 388 ff. Cad edition, 1890).

308 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the state may originate, and has originated, Lieber
said, in a variety of ways, as, for example, through
force, fraud, consent, religion.

Still more strongly is the opposition to the
social-contract theory stated by Burgess. The
hypothesis of an original contract to form the
state is, as he reasons, wholly contrary to our
knowledge of the historical development of politi-
cal institutions. The social-contract theory as-
sumes that "the idea of the state with all its
attributes is consciously present in the minds of the
individuals proposing to constitute the state, and
that the disposition to obey law is universally estab-
lished." ^ These conditions, history shows, are not
present at the beginning of the political develop-
ment of a people, but are the result of long growth
and experience. This theory therefore cannot
account for the origin of the state. Its only pos-
sible application is in changing the form of the
state, or in cases when a state is planted upon
new territory by a population already politically
educated.

In the refusal to accept the contract theory as
the basis for government, practically all the politi-
cal scientists of note agree. The old explanation
no longer seems sufficient, and is with practical

1 Political Science, I, 62. With Burgess compare Woolsey,
Brownson, Jameson, Wilson, Mulford, Willoughby, to the same
effect. See the comprehensive discussion in Willoughby, Tht
Nature of the State, Chaps. II-VI.

RECENT TENDENCIES 309

unanimity discarded.^ The doctrines of natural
law and natural rights have met a similar fate.
In Lieber's political philosophy, it is true, the con-
cept of natural law was still defended. The law
of nature he defined as " the body of rights which
we deduce from the essential nature of man. " ^ The
great axiom of natural law is, " I exist as a human
being ; therefore, I have a right to exist as a human
being." Under this natural law, there are certain
natural rights, or as Lieber preferred to call them,
" primordial rights," ^ which are inherent in the in-
dividual and inalienable by him. But even Lieber,
with his leaning toward the old theory, did not

1 F. M. Taylor, in The Right of the State to be (1891), defends
a concept of natural law.

* Political Ethics, I, 68.

* Ibid. I, 177. Cf. Woolsey, Political Science, Vol. I, Chap. I.
In his Civil Liberty and Self-Government Lieber distinguished be-
tween what he called "Anglican" liberty and " Galilean" liberty.
The Anglican idea of liberty is that of a sphere of immunity from
interference, protected by guaranties " at certain points where the
experience of the race has shown the individual to be most in
danger of attack." The Galilean idea is that all must share equally
in voting power, and that the authority of a government based on
universal suffrage may be indefinite in extent. One idea is that
men are free when they are protected in a certain sphere against
all encroachment, private or public; the other idea is that freedom
consists in equal suffrage, no matter what the character of the gov-
ernment so based may be. This he thought was the great differ-
ence between the English and the French idea of liberty. It is
interesting to observe that Benj. Constant, a famous French publi-
cist of the early part of the century, made the same comparison be-
tween the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns, among
whom he included, of course, the French.

3IO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

interpret the doctrine of natural rights as the seven-
teenth and eighteenth century revolutionists under-
stood it, and this he was very careful to point out.

By the later thinkers the idea that men possess
inherent and inalienable rights of a political or
quasi-political character which are independent of
the state, has been generally given up. It is held
that these natural rights can have no other than an
ethical value, and have no proper place in politics.
" There never was, and there never can be," says
Burgess, "any liberty upon this earth and among
human beings, outside of state organization." ^
In speaking of natural rights, therefore, it is essen-
tial to remember that these alleged rights have no
political force whatever, unless recognized and en-
forced by the state. It is asserted by Willoughby
that " natural rights " could not have even a moral
value in the supposed " state of nature " ; they
would really be equivalent to force and hence
have no ethical significance.^

In this connection it is interesting to notice the
restatement of the theory of " natural rights " as
made by Giddings.* Disclaiming any connection
with the earlier forms of this theory, he under-

1 Political Science, I, 88.

^ See The Nature of the State, 109 ; see also Social Justice,
Chap. VIII. Cf. C. G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of
the United States, Chap. VI ; Lyman Abbott, The Rights of Man.

'Franklin Yi.GKMm^^, Principles of Sociology, ^l?>-/^i<) (ist edi-
tion, 1896). Cf. Spencer, Principles of Sociology ; E. A. Ross, Social
Control, 421.

RECENT TENDENCIES 31I

Stands by natural rights those which are natural
in the scientific sense of the term. In this field
" natural " means, " that which is, on the whole,
in harmony with the conditions of existence." On
this basis, Giddings defines natural rights as, " so-
cially necessary norms of right, enforced by natural
selection in the sphere of social relations." Natural
rights, as thus defined, are the foundation of both
political and moral rights, and ultimately determine
the character of both. This definition, it will be ob-
served, is as destructive of natural rights in the ethi-
cal sense as of natural rights in the political sense.

The present tendency, then, in American political
theory is to disregard the once dominant ideas of
natural rights and the social contract, although
it must be admitted that the political scientists are
more agreed upon this point than is the general
public. The origin of the state is regarded, not as
the result of a deliberate agreement among men,
but as the result of historical development, instinc-''
five rather than conscious ; and rights are consid-
ered to have their source not in nature, but in law.
This new point of view involves no disregard of
or contempt for human liberty, but only a belief
that the earlier explanation and philosophy of the
state was not only false but dangerous and mis-
leading.

The modern school has, indeed, formulated a
new idea of liberty, widely different from that
taught in the early years of the Republic. The

312 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

" Fathers " believed that in the original state of
nature all men enjoy perfect liberty, that they
surrender a part of this liberty in order that a
government may be organized, and that therefore
the stronger the government, the less the liberty
remaining to the individual. Liberty is, in short,
the natural and inherent right of all men; gov-
ernment the necessary Umitation of this liberty.
Calhoun and his school, as it has been shown, repu-
diated this idea, and maintained that liberty is not
the natural right of all men, but only the reward
of the races or individuals properly qualified for
its possession. Upon this basis, slavery was de-
fended against the charge that it was inconsistent
with human freedom, and in this sense and so
applied, the theory was not accepted outside the
South. The mistaken appUcation of the idea had
the effect of delaying recognition of the truth in
what had been said until the controversy over
slavery was at an end.

The Revolutionary idea of the nature of liberty
was never realized in actual practice, and recent
political events and political philosophy have com-
bined to show that another theory of liberty has
been generally accepted. The new doctrine is best
stated by Burgess. By liberty he understands
" a domain in which the individual is referred to
his own will, and upon which government shall
neither encroach itself nor permit encroachments
from any other quarter." Such a sphere of action

RECENT TENDENCIES 313

is necessary for the welfare and progress both of
state and of individual. It is of vital importance
to notice, however, that liberty is not a natural
right which belongs to every human being without
regard to the state or society under which he lives.
On the contrary, it is logically true and may be
historically demonstrated that "the state is the
source of individual liberty." ^ It is the state
that makes liberty possible, determines what its
limits shall be, guarantees and protects it. In
Burgess's view, then, men do not begin with com-
plete liberty and organize government by sacrific-
ing certain parts of this liberty, but on the contrary
they obtain liberty only through the organization
of political institutions. The state does not take
away from civil liberty, but is the creator of liberty
— the power that makes it possible.

Liberty, moreover, is not a right equally enjoyed
by all. It is dependent upon the degree of civili-
zation reached by the given people, and increases
as this advances. The idea that liberty is a natu-
ral right is abandoned, and the inseparable connec-
tion between political liberty and political capacity
is strongly emphasized. After an examination of
the principle of nationality, and the characteristic
qualities of various nations or races, the conclusion
is drawn that the Teutonic nations are particularly
endowed with political capacity. Their mission in
the world is the political civilization of mankind

1 Political Science, I, 175.

314 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

From this as a premise are deduced further con-
clusions of the utmost importance.^ The first of
these is that in a state composed of several nation-
alities, the Teutonic element should never surren-
der the balance of power to the others. Another
is that the Teutonic race can never regard the ex-
ercise of political power as a right of man, but it
must always be their policy to condition the exer-
cise of political rights on the possession of political
capacity. A final conclusion is that the Teutonic
races must civilize the poHtically uncivilized. They
must have a colonial policy. Barbaric races, if
incapable, may be swept away ; and such action
" violates no rights of these populations which are
not petty and trifling in comparison with its tran-
scendent right and duty to establish political and
legal order everywhere." On the same principle,
interference with the affairs of states not wholly
barbaric, but nevertheless incapable of effecting
political organization for themselves, is fully jus-
tified. Jurisdiction may be assumed over such a
state, and political civilization worked out for those
who are unable to accomplish this unaided. This
propaganda of political civilization, it is asserted,
is not only the right and privilege, but the mission
and duty, the very highest obligation incumbent
on the Teutonic races, including the United States.
Such action is not unwarrantable or unjustifiable
interference with the affairs of those who should

^ Political Science, I, 44 et seq.

RECENT TENDENCIES 315

rightly be left unmolested, but is the performance
of the part marked out for the Teutonic nations
in the world's development.^

Closely related to the theory of liberty is the
doctrine as to the purpose or function of the state.
In the days of the Revolution, it was thought that
the end of the political society is to protect the life,
liberty, and property of its citizens, and beyond this
nothing more. The duty of the state was summed
up in the protection of individual rights, in harmony
with the individualistic character of the philosophy
of that day. In the theory of Lieber, this idea was
broadened out, and, as he phrased it, the duty
of the state is to do for man : first, what he
cannot do alone ; second, what he ought not to do
alone ; and third, what he will not do alone.^ In
more recent times there has been in America a de-
cided tendency to react against the early " protec-
tion theory " of government, and to consider
that the aim of the state is not limited to the main-
tenance of law and order in the community and

1 It is a striking fact that within less than a decade the United
States embarked on a colonial policy, invoking in justification the
very principles which have just been analyzed. In the extended
discussions of the colonial policy of the United States during the
past four years, there has been no clearer formulation of the domi-
nant theory than this. Burgess himself believes that the United
States is not yet ready for the propaganda of political civilization,
but should devote itself to its own problems of government and
liberty. See infra, p. 318.

' Political Ethics, I, Chap. V.

3l6 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

defence against foreign foes. In the new view, the
state acts not only for the individual as such, but
in the interests of the community as a whole. It is
not limited to the negative function of preventing
certain kinds of action, but may positively advance
the general welfare by means and measures ex-
pressly directed to that end. This opinion is shared
by such authorities as Woolsey, Burgess, Wilson,
Willoughby and others. To these thinkers it ap-
pears that the duty of the state is not and cannot
be limited to the protection of individual interests,
but must be regarded as extending to acts for the
advancement of the general welfare in all cases
where it can safely act, and that the only limitations
on governmental action are those dictated by ex-
perience or the needs of the time.

Woolsey took the position that the state cannot
be limited to restraining individuals from injuring
each other, but may justly act positively for the
general welfare. "The sphere of the state," he
said, " may reach as far as the nature and needs of
man and of men reach ; " and this each people
decides for itself in accordance with its own pecul-
iar conditions. In general the action of the state
falls under four groups : i, the redress of wrongs ;
2, the prevention of wrongs ; 3, a degree of care
for the outward welfare of the community, as in
respect to industry, roads, and health ; 4, the culti-
vation of the spiritual nature, " by educating the
religious nature, the moral sense, the taste, the in-

RECENT TENDENCIES 317

tellect." ^ The general limitation on the power of
the state is that there shall be no act in restraint
of the individual, except where there is imperative
reason for such restriction. He also enumerates
a series of individual rights which no just govern-
ment ought to take away.

Woodrow Wilson asserts that the objects of gov-
ernment are the objects of organized society. The
great end for which society exists is " mutual aid
to self-development," and this purpose, therefore, is
the proper function of government. With particu-
lar reference to modern industrial conditions, a
distinction is drawn between what is termed " in-
terference " on the part of the state, and what is
called " regulation," by which is meant an " equali-
zation of conditions in all branches of endeavor."
The limit of state activity is that of "necessary
cooperation " — the point at which such enforced
cooperation becomes a convenience rather than an
imperative necessity. This line is difficult to
draw, but may nevertheless be drawn. In gen-
eral, we may lay down the rule that " the state
should do nothing which is equally possible under
equitable conditions to optional associations." ^

A still broader view is that taken by Burgess in
his discussion of the ends of the state. These may
be considered, he says, under three heads: the

1 Political Science, Book II, Chap. IV, " Sphere and Ends of the
State."

» The State, Sec. 1273 ff.

3l8 AMERICAN POUTICAL THEORIES

primary, the secondary, and the ultimate. The
ultimate end of the state is defined as the " per-
fection of humanity, the civilization of the world ;
the perfect development of the human reason and
its attainment to universal command over indi-
vidualism; the apotheosis of man." ^ This end can
be realized, however, only when a world-state is or-
ganized, and for this, mankind is not yet ready.
Men must first be organized into national states,
based on the principle of nationality. The proxi-
mate ends of the state are the establishment of
government and liberty. The state must first of
all establish peace and order ; and in the next place
mark out a sphere of liberty for the individual
and later for associations. These are then the
great ends of the state ; the establishment of gov-
ernment and of liberty, so that the national genius
may find proper expression ; and, finally, the per-
fection of humanity. These objects must be
followed, moreover, in an historical order which
cannot be successfully reversed. Government
must precede liberty, government and liberty must
precede the final purpose for which the state exists.
In the present stage of development, only the
realization of government and liberty through the
national state are proper objects of state activity.
Beyond this broad outline Burgess makes no other
attempt to mark out the limits of the operation either
of state or of government.

1 Political Science, Vol. I, Boot II, Chap. IV.

RECENT TENDENCIES 319

An interesting study in this direction has been
made by Willoughby.^ The functions of the state
are classified into three groups, of which the first
contains those powers which concern the life of the
state and the preservation of internal order, the
second those which are concerned with human
liberty, and the third those which have to do with
the general welfare. A second method of classify-
ing the aims of the state is to divide them into the
essential and the non-essential functions. The
essential functions concern the protection of the
state against foreign interference, the preservation
of the national life, and the maintenance of internal
order. The non-essential functions include the
"economic, industrial, and moral interests of the
people." They are assumed by the state not
because they are necessary but because they are
advisable. The non-essential functions are sub-
divided into the socialistic and the non-socialistic.
The first class, the socialistic, includes only activ-
ities which could be exercised by the people if left
to private initiative, as the ownership and operation
of railroads, or telegraph and telephone systems.
The non-sociaUstic functions are " those which, if
not assumed by the state, would not be exercised
at all ; " as, for example, such work as that per-
formed by educational and labor bureaus. It is
denied that any limit can be set to governmental

1 The Nature of the State, Chap. XII. See also Social Justice,
Chap. IX.

320 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

activity, and the contention is made that "each
function must rest on its own utilitarian basis.''
This specific determination belongs to the domain
of government rather than of political theory,.
Willoughby predicts, however, that with the de-
velopment of civilization and the increasing com-
plexity of industrial interests, the activity of the
state must continue to expand.

Among the authorities on political economy, the
early idea of laissez faire, at least in its extreme
form, has been subjected to severe criticism, and
in general has been abandoned. The new position
is a mean between socialism and extreme individ-
ualism. Francis A. Walker characterized the situa-
tion when he spoke of " those of us who discerned
the coming of a storm and removed ourselves and
our effects from the lower ground of an uncom-
promising individuaUsm to positions somewhat
more elevated and seemingly secure." ^ He de-
clared, and this statement is typical of the general
attitude of the economists, that he believed "a
large practical gain to the order of society and the
happiness of its constituent members would in
the long result accrue from the interposition of
the state." ^ Every proposal, however, for the ex-

^ Discussions in Economics and Statistics (1899), I, 344.

^ Hid. II, 271. In the American Economic Association (1885)
there was an interesting discussion on this point. Among other
statements, that of Edmund J. James was significant : " We do not
regard [the state] as a merely negative factor, the influence of which
is most happy when it is smallest, but we recognize that some of

RECENT TENDENCIES 32 1

tension of the powers and duties of the state should
be subjected to careful scrutiny, and the burden of
proof should be thrown upon those who advocate
the innovation. Furthermore, no changes should
be made in the direction of state regulation for tran-
sient causes or doubtful objects. The principle of
action would seem to be to consider each case on
its own merits, without reference to the question of
individualism or socialism. In cases where the
economic principle of competition appears to be
threatened, the interference of the state seems to
be most cheerfully welcomed.^

From a consideration of these various opinions,
it is evident that the modern idea as to what is the
purpose of the state has radically changed since

the most necessary functions of a civUized society can be performed
only by the state, and some others most efficiently by the state; that
the state, in a word, is a permanent category of economic life, and not
merely a temporary crutch which may be cast away when society
becomes more perfect." Publications of the American Economic
Association, Vol. I, 26.

An interesting attempt to lay down definite principles respecting
the function of government has been made by H. C Adams, in TAe
Relation of the State to Industrial Activity (1887). His funda-
mental proposition is that neither the English idea of the indi-
vidual as supreme, nor the German idea of the state as supreme, is
the correct one. Both state activity and individual activity are in
reality functions of society — the " living and growing organism —
the ultimate thing disclosed by analysis of human relations." The
point of view in the discussions of the sphere and duty of govern-
ment should be therefore that of the society, rather than that of the
individual or the state.

1 See in this connection Richard T. Ely, Socialism and Social
Reform (1894).
y

322 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the days of the " Fathers." They thought of the
function of the state in a purely individualistic
way ; this idea modern thinkers have abandoned,
and while they have not reached the paternalistic
or socialistic extreme, have taken the broader social
point of view. The " protection " theory of the state
is on the decline ; that of the general welfare is in
the ascendant. The exigencies of modern indus-
trial and urban life have forced the state to in-
tervene at so many points where an immediate
individual interest is difficult to show, that the old
doctrine has been given up for the theory that the
state acts for the general welfare. It is not admit-
ted that there are no limits to the action of the
state, but on the other hand it is fully conceded
that there are no " natural rights " which bar the
way. The question is now one of expediency
rather than of principle. In general it is believed
that the state should not do for the individual what
he can do as well for himself, but each specific
question must be decided on its own merits, and
each action of the state justified, if at all, by the
relative advantages of the proposed line of conduct.

, \ At yet another point the drift away from the
Revolutionary theory is evident; namely, in rela-
tion to the division of governmental powers. The
generally accepted theory since the eighteenth cen-
tury has been that all governmental powers may
be divided into the legislative, the executive, and

RECENT TENDENCIES 323

the judicial ; that in every free government these
powers should be carefuUy separated and a dis-
tinct set of officers should administer each class of
them. This has long been regarded as a " funda-
mental" of political theory and of constitutional
law as well.^ ViewLog the situation from the
standpoint of administrative law, however, a new
line of division has been recently drawn by Good-
now.2 In Politics and Administration Goodnow
criticises the theory of the tripartite division of
governmental powers as an " unworkable and un-
applicable rule of law," and proposes to substitute
another classification in its place. The primary
functions of the state may be divided, he maintains,
into politics, "the expression of the will of the
state," and administration, " the execution of that
will." "Politics" includes constitution-making,
legislation, selection of governmental officers, and
the control of the fimction of executing the wiU of
the state. This fimction of politics is discharged by
constitutional conventions, legislatures, the judici-
ary, and the political parties. "Administration,"
on the other hand, may be divided into two classes :
the administration of justice, commonly called the
judicial authority, and the administration of govem-

1 See Winiam Bondy, " The Separation of Governmental
Powers," in Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public
Law, Vol. V.

^ Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (1900)
Comparative Administrative Law (1893).

324 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

ment, which includes what is ordinarily termed the
executive authority, together with other functions
of a quasi-judicial or semi-scientific or statistical
character.!

The method of control over the administration
is discussed, and the highly decentralized system
adopted in Revolutionary times is subjected to
severe criticism. The conclusion drawn is that
the present administrative system of the various
states should be much more centralized and consol-
idated than at present; and in the second place
that the political party should receive legal recog-
nition as a governmental organ. The fear of cen-
tralization which our fathers entertained is, he holds,
under modern conditions no longer reasonable.
It is a " battle-cry suitable only to an age that has
already passed away," ^ — " a bogie which has been
conjured up by designing persons conscious that
a proper organization of our administrative system
will work to their disadvantage." ' The party, fur-
thermore, must no longer be regarded as a purely
voluntary association but as a political body sub-
ject to public regulation and control, constituting,

1 Politics and Administration, Chaps. II, IV.

3 Ibid. 261.

* Ibid. 130. Cf. Ernst Freund, "The Law of Administration in
America," in the Political Science Quarterly, Vol. IX. See also
" Public Administration in Massachusetts," by Robert H. Whitten,
in Columbia University Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 4; "The Central-
ization of Administration in New York State," by John A. Fairlie,
Ibid. Vol. IX, No. 3.

RECENT TENDENCIES 325

in fact, a part of the government. In this way
the party may be made responsible, and the
danger, that under a more centralized system
party bosses would wield still greater power, may
be averted.^

Another interesting phase of American political
theory is the effort made by numerous thinkers to
distinguish between "state" and "government."
From the earliest days of the Republic, the differ-
ence between " people " and " government " has
been emphasized, and the assertion made that sov-
ereignty rests with the "people" as distinguished
from the "government." This idea was more sys-
tematically stated by Lieber, who made a distinc-
tion between state and government. The state in
his opinion is the jural or political society which
the whole community constitutes. The govern-
ment is the instrument through which the political
society acts, when it does not act directly .'^

In the theory of Burgess, this distinction has
been made a cardinal principle of political science
and of public law. The state is " a particular por-
tion of mankind viewed as an organized unit." The
government is a particular form of organization
through which the state acts. In early times, he
points out, there was no clear distinction made be-
tween the state and the government; they were,

1 On the function of political parties, see H. J. Ford, The Risi
and Growth of American Politics, Chaps. XXIII-XXV.
« Political Ethics, I, 238; Brownson, op. tit. 174-175.

326 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

in fact, blended in the person of the king ; but in
modern times the distinction has become clearly
evident, and the government need not now be con-
fused with the political society. In the United
States, in particular, this has been recognized and
embodied in our system of public law. Here we
have a separate and distinct organization for state
and government in their several capacities.

Burgess makes several important applications
of this doctrine to political problems. In the
classification of political systems, for example, the
recognition of this distinction between state and
government is of great advantage. The difficulty
involved in democratic Caesarism is on this basis
easily explained, for such a system is really a
combination of democratic state with monarchic
government. In the same way we may have a
democratic state with an aristocratic government,
or an aristocratic state with a monarchic govern-
ment. Since the state and the government are dis-
tinct, any combination of monarchic, aristocratic,
and democratic elements is possible.

Application of this idea is also made by Burgess
to the vexed question of sovereignty. The strong-
est objection to the recognition of the absoluteness
of sovereignty arises, it is pointed out, from the
general failure of publicists to distinguish dearly
between "state" and "government." One fears
to place unlimited power in the hands of the ordi-
nary government, and failing to distinguish between

RECENT TENDENCIES 327

this and the state, declares against supreme power
in general. In strict analysis, however, the " gov-
ernment is not the sovereign organization of the
state. Back of the government lies the constitution
and back of the constitution the original sovereign
state which ordains the constitution both of govern-
ment and liberty." Recognizing the fact that the
sovereignty belongs not with the ordinary govern-
ment or administration, but with the state in su-
preme organization, the admission of the character
of the ultimate power presents fewer and less for-
midable difficulties. This double organization is a
feature in which American public law has advanced
beyond that of the states of Europe, since here is
to be found an organization of the government in
its local and central branches, and then, above
these governments, the organization of the state
in its supreme and all-controlling capacity. Thus,
in our political system, government and state are
distinctly organized, and have distinct methods of
action.^

The reflection of American political theorists
on the problems of modern democracy has not up to
the present time taken on scientific form. In fact,

' A similar distinction is made by Woodrow Wilson, although in
his theory the line is drawn between " society " and " government,"
while the terms " state " and " government " are used interchange-
ably. Society, in his phrase, is termed an " organism," and gov-
ernment is characterized as an "organ." The State, Sees. 11 60,
1269-1273. Cf. Willoughby, The Nature of the State, 8. Wi)

328 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

the two great studies of American democracy have
been made respectively by a Frenchman and an
Englishman : Democracy in America by De Tocque-
ville and The American Commonwealth by James
Bryce. There has been no profound and compre-
hensive study of the facts and the philosophy of
modern democracy by an American thinker. In
recent years, however, considerable attention has
been given to the nature and meaning of demo-
cratic institutions, and there have been numerous
discussions centering around the problems of
democracy. The weakness of popular government
in our large cities has been considered by a num-
ber of thinkers ; among the most conspicuous is
Godkin, in his Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy
and Problems of Modern Democracy} The relation
of democratic government to modern industrial com-
binations has been considered by Moses in his sug-
gestive sketch on Democracy and Social Growth?
The compatibility between democracy and colonial
government has been discussed, among others, by
Giddings in Democracy and Empire. Eliot has
pointed out certain contributions made by Ameri-

loughby distinguishes between state and government on the ground
that, strictly speaking, state is "an abstract term," whereas govern-
ment is " emphatically concrete " — a distinction corresponding, he
says, to that between a person and his bodily frame. For his criti-
cism of Burgess's theory, see op. cit. 206, note.

IE. L. Godkin, Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy (1898),
Problems of Modern Democracy (1896').

^ Bernard J. Moses, Democracy and Social Growth (1898).

RECENT TENDENCIES 329

can democracy to civilization,^ and Lowell has
shown the relation between democracy and the
constitution.* Numerous other interesting and use-
ful contributions have been made, but in none or
all of them is there found that complete study
of modern or American democracy which it is
desirable to have.

Within the last few decades, no little attention
has been given in America to the study of social
forces in the general sense of the term. These in-
vestigations have been directed primarily to the
observation and classification of social facts, but
incidentally contributions have been made to the
solution of certain problems of political theory.
Attention has already been called to the restatement
of the doctrine of natural rights at the hands of
Biddings.' In his Dynamic Sociology {i^Bi), Lester
F. Ward * lays great emphasis on a more scientific
direction of social forces. The science of society,
he urges, should lead up to the art of society,
which in his terminology is known as " collective
telesis." There ought to be a transformation of

1 Charles William Eliot, Amtrican Contriiuiions to Civilitatien
(1897).

' A. L. Lowell, Essays on Government (1892). See also Gama-
liel Bradford, The Lesson of Popular Government {i8gg); Jane
Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (1902) ; J. H. Hyslop, De-
mocracy, A Study of Government (1899); David Starr Jordan,
Imperial Democracy (1899). ' See anU, p. 310.

* See also " Collective Telesis," in the American Journal ej
Sociology, VoL II.

330 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

government from its present unscientific and un-
progressive methods to " a central academy of
science which shall stand in the same relation to
the control of men, in which a polytechnic insti-
tute stands to the control of nature." Government
would be then, in truth, " the legislative application
of sociological principles," and this is what he
understands by " sociocracy " — " the scientific
control of social forces by the collective mind of
society for its advantage."

Following the same general method, John R.
Commons has worked out a somewhat elaborate
account of the sociological view of sovereignty
which he states, of course, in social rather than
political terms. ^ The most suggestive of these
contributions, however, is that made by Ross in his
Social Control, igoi.^ Believing that a study of
social control should not be limited to an examina-
tion of laws alone, Ross has instituted a compre-
hensive study of all social forces that go to make
up the control of the group over the individual.
To this end the work is divided into a study of the
grounds of control, the means of control, and the
system, of control. Under the grounds of control
are discussed the r61e of sympathy, sociability, the
sense of justice, and of individual reaction as bases
of social order. Under the means of control, there

1 American Journal of Sociology, Vol. V.

^ E. A. Ross, Social Control, A Survey of the Foundations oj
Order.

RECENT TENDENCIES 33 1

is given a description and analysis of the various
forces, by means of which the society obtains social
obedience and effects social control. These instru-
mentalities are partly legal, as law, belief, ceremony,
education, illusion ; and partly ethical, as public
opinion, suggestion, art, and social valuation. The
complicated machinery for producing obedience on
the part of the individual to the will of the group
is subjected to careful examination, with results
that are at times startling. Ross maintains, how-
ever, that the full understanding of these subtle
methods need not lead to any such disastrous
consequences as those drawn by the Anarchists.
Simply because the "X-ray shows control in all
social tissues and the spectroscope reveals the
element of collective ascendancy in almost every
culture product," it does not follow that all these
tissues and products must be destroyed. A full
comprehension of the facts of social control, while
not wholly quieting to the individual thus controlled,
need not lead to rebellion against this restraint.

Under the system of control are examined such
topics as class control, the vicissitudes of social
control, the limits and criteria of control. The
assertion is made that in the future the control of
society will be secured largely through the instru-
mentality of education — the best method of in-
surance against the spirit of disobedience in the
individual. In the same connection an effort is
made to lay down certain canons or principles of

332 AMERICAN POUTICAL THEORIES

social interference. Of these the most significant
are : " Social interference should not be so pater-
nal as to check the self-extinction of the morally
ill-constituted ; " and, " Social interference should
not so limit the struggle for existence as to nullify
the selective process." ^

In conclusion, it appears that recent political
theory in the United States shows a decided ten-
dency away from many doctrines that were held by
the men of 1776. The same forces that have led
to the general abandonment of the individualistic
philosophy of the eighteenth century by political
scientists elsewhere have been at work here and
with the same result. The Revolutionary doctrines
of an original state of nature, natural rights, the
social contract, the idea that the function of the
government is limited to the protection of person
and property, — none of these finds wide acceptance
among the leaders in the development of political
science. The great service rendered by these doc-
trines, under other and earlier conditions, is fully
recognized, and the presence of a certain element
of truth in them is freely admitted, but they are no
longer generally received as the best explanation
for political phenomena. Nevertheless, it must be
said that thus far the rejection of these doctrines,
is a scientific tendency rather than a popular
movement. Probably these ideas continue to be

» Chap. XXX.

RECENT TENDENCIES 333

articles of the popular creed, although just how
far they are seriously adhered to it is difficult to
ascertain. As far as the theory of the function of
government is concerned, it would seem that the
public has gone beyond the political scientists, and
is ready for assumption of extensive powers by the
political authorities. The public, or at least a large
portion of it, is ready for the extension of the func-
tions of government in almost any direction where
the general welfare may be advanced, regardless of
whether individuals as such are benefited thereby
or not. But in regard to the conception of natural
right and the social-contract theory, the precise
condition of public opinion is, at the present time,
not easy to estimate.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In conclusion of this study, a few words may be
said upon the general characteristics of American
political theory. It is evident from the preceding
chapters that thus far there has been no remark-
able development " of political philosophy in the
United States. Until recently, there has been no
attempt at all at systematic discussion of the prob-
lems of politics, and, although the new school has
accomplished much, it has not yet developed a
body of typical American political theory. It
would be putting it strongly to say that there is no
American political theory, but it is certainly true
that very few contributions to systematic politics
have been made by the great republic of the New
World. Many of the characteristic features even
of our own political system have received compara-
tively little attention ; as, for example, democracy
as an all-pervading influence in society and state,
the rule of the majority, written constitutions, the
relation between church and state. -These' Ideas
seem to be so generally accepted that argument
or discussion is regarded as superfluous. They
are articles of political faith, received with implicit
confidence and trust.

334

CONCLUSION 335

In general, American political theory has been
struck off in connection with controversies over
specific subjects. The rights of man, the consent
of the governed, the right of revolution, were dis-
cussed in relation to the Revolution of 1776. The
question of aristocracy, artificial and natural, was
associated with the struggle between the Federal-
ists and their opponents ; the effort to restrict the
spread of slavery led to the discussion of the proper
relation between unequal races under conditions
which render coexistence on the same soil neces-
sary. The great problem of the character of the
Union gave rise to the examination of the nature
of federal government, the essential marks of sov-
ereignty, and the elements of nationality. In re-
cent days, the territorial expansion of the United
States again raises the problem of the consent of
the governed, and the right relation between races
of widely different capacity. But in all these in-
stances the constitutional or legal aspects of the
problem have been most freely and most fully dis-
cussed, while the principles of political science have
been the object of far less attention. The nature
of the Union, for example, was much more thor-
oughly and ably treated from the constitutional
point of view than from that of political science ;
or, to take another case, the constitutional phases
of slavery extension were much more carefully
studied than the question of human rights or of
race relations.

336 AMERICAN POLITICAL THB.ORIES

The causes of this scarcity of political theory
are various. It may be urged that the lack of
theory is due to the tendency of the American or
the Englishman toward action rather than reflec-
tion — to be practical rather than philosophical.
In this connection it is well to remember, how-
ever, that it was an English thinker, John Locke,
who worked out the fundamental principles of the
English, American, and French revolutions of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Another
Englishman, Edmund Burke, was the author of
the most effective work written against those prin-
ciples, and yet another Englishman, Thomas
Hobbes, framed one of the strongest theoretical
arguments in favor of absolutism. A more plau-
sible explanation than inability to think abstractly
is found in the argument that the tendencies of
modem democracy are not yet fully enough devel-
oped to make possible the formulation of political
theory respecting these new conditions. From this
point of view, the development of a typical Ameri-
can theory is yet to come.

It may further be questioned how far American
political theory is dependent upon foreign sources
for its inspiration, and to which of these sources
we are especially indebted. Some reference has
been made to this in the discussion of the various
schools, but a summary of these influences may
not be inappropriate at this point. The great
reservoir from which the Fathers drew was the

CONCLUSION 337

English political theory of the preceding century
— the ideas of Sydney, Locke, and the English
Whig revolutionists. This was the origin of the
fundamental doctrines to which the Patriots ad-
hered. This body of ideas has had in the past,
and still has, a great hold on the political thought
of the American. Also of great influence on the
course of American political speculation have been
the individualistic theories of Mill and Spencer,
which have been widely read and widely ac-
cepted. Among jurists, the theory of John Austin
and the school of positive law has been the subject
of frequent discussion, and has been very influ-
ential.

Of French thinkers by far the strongest in-
fluence exerted on American theory was that of
Montesquieu, through the famous doctrine of the
tripartite division of governmental powers. This
proposition was readily taken up from the first,
and remains to this day scarcely contested. The
French Revolution gave a great impulse to the
democratic movement in America, as did the revo-
lutions of 1830 and 1848, yet few of the doctrines
of that day took deep root in American soil.
Destutt de Tracy was recommended by Jefferson,
but never was highly influential. One of the
reactionaries against the French Revolution, De
Maistre, has been sometimes referred to in the con-
troversy over the nature of the Union, because of
his statement of the theory that constitutions can-

338 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

not be made offhand, but are the result of growth
through long periods. The influence of Comte
upon social and political science must be included
in the summary of French influence upon Ameri-
can thought. Upon the whole, it is evident
that American theory has pursued its course with-
out much regard to the political ideas current
among the French. Doubtless the Revolution of
1789 and the succeeding revolutions helped to
strengthen the democratic impulse and tendency,
for the influence of these movements was world-
wide. But the immediate and direct effect of
these events on American political thought, it is
not easy to discover. The influence came in the
form of a general stimulus rather than of particular
doctrines or principles.

In recent years the influence of the German
political scientists has been most pronounced.
This influence began with the work of Francis
Lieber as an instructor in American schools and
an investigator in the field of political science.
In the movement toward the study of politics dur-
ing the last few decades, the leaders, almost with-
out exception, have been men trained in German
schools, familiar with German methods, and pro-
foundly influenced by German ideas. The work of
such publicists as Gneist, Stein, Ihering, Bluntschli,
JelHnek, and Holtzendorff is clearly evident in
the method and thought of present day politi-
cal scientists. So far as particular doctrines are

CONCLUSION 339

concerned, the influence of the German school is
most obvious in relation to the contract theory of
the origin of the state and the idea of the function
of the state. The theory that the state originates
in an agreement between men was assailed by the
German thinkers and the historical, organic, evo-
lutionary idea substituted for it. The purpose of
the state they have expanded from the "police
theory" to that of general care for the interests
of the community. Changes of American theory
in this direction cannot, however, be attributed
exclusively to the influence of the German school,
for the same tendencies have been conspicuous in
English and French theory, and in the case of the
contract had already been developed by Calhoun
and Story. It is interesting to observe at this point
that as between the idea of " natural rights " — the
German Naturrecht — and the Austinian theory,
the general tendency in the United States has
been to accept the doctrine that there is a body of
natural rights semi-ethical, semi-political in nature.
The idea that there are inalienable rights of man,
quasi-political in character, has taken firm hold of
the popular mind, and has not been dislodged by
any of the numerous attacks upon this theory
since the French Revolution.

The chief foreign influences at work upon the
American theory have been the EngUsh, the French,
and the German. Of these it may be said that the
French influence consists largely in the democratic

340 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

impulse given during the days of the Revolution,
the German contribution is chiefly in the direction
of scientific method, and that the fundamental politi-
cal ideas of the Americans have been deeply influ-
enced only by the English thinkers, especially
those of the seventeenth century. The present
generation looks back to the Fathers and the
Fathers looked back to the men of the preceding
century.

From a consideration of outside influence upon
American ideas, we turn to an examination of the
effect of American theory on other peoples. The
genera] influence of American institutions and
ideas has been great, but examples of specific doc-
trines or particular men who have left their im-
press on the political ideas of other countries are
not easy to find. Such instances, although
infrequent, are not, however, wholly wanting.
Thomas Paine in reply to Burke, Calhoun on the
rights of minorities, Lieber on the idea of self-gov-
ernment, are cases in point. Of special impor-
tance also was the American theory of a federal
union as expounded in the Federalist and by
Webster and Calhoun. Particularly in connection
with the German problem of national unity, these
ideas were widely discussed. The Federalist
theory of a double sovereignty was predominant
in the school of which Waitz was the chief expo-
nent, and Calhoun's doctrine of the indivisibility
of sovereignty is accepted by Max Seydel and

CONCLUSION 341

those of his particularistic faith. American insti-
tutions and ideas as described in the brilliant study
of De Tocqueville (1835) were made familiar to
Europeans, and in this way left their impress
upon those peoples at a critical period in the
history of constitutional government. In more
recent times a like service has been rendered by
James Bryce in his classic work on the American
Commonwealth.

It goes without saying, that the mightiest influ-
ence exerted by the United States in the domain
of political science, has been due to the example
of a democracy successfully working on a large
scale. It would be a gross exaggeration to say
without qualification that the constitutional re-
forms of the nineteenth century were caused by
the developments in America; but, on the other
hand, it is clearly evident that the American
Republic has been a powerful factor in the
growth of constitutional democracy and of consti-
tutional government in general. In Mexico and
the South American republics, this influence is
seen in institutions framed obviously after the
American type. In European countries, the in-
fluence is far less powerful, but even there it has
been remarkable. Not always, or even often, tak-
ing the shape of systematic theory, the democratic
spirit and practice of the United States have, never-
theless, made themselves felt in the development
of free institutions. What has been said of demo-

342 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

cratic government might also be said of federal
government, for in this field the practical influence
of the American system has been widespread.
The systems of Germany, Canada, Australia,
Mexico, and Brazil are sufficient evidence of this.
In conclusion, it may be profitable to notice what
has been the broad tendency of American politics,
including the theoretical and the practical. Dur-
ing the early period of our history the movement
was steadily democratic. Using the suffrage as a
standard, although this is not the only test that
might be applied, it is evident that the Fathers
were more democratic than the Puritans ; the Jeff er-
sonian democracy was more liberal than that of
1776; the Jacksonian democracy went far beyond
the Jeffersonian school; the Abolitionists extended
the boundary lines farther yet; and the advo-
cates of women's suffrage have even surpassed
this liberal provision. The political people were,
roughly speaking, in the first stage the church-
members, in the next the freeholders, in the third
place the white male citizens, in the fourth period
all adult males, and now tend to include the
whole adult population. ^ Property qualifications
have disappeared, religious restrictions have fallen
into disuse, popular election of officers has dis-
placed the system of legislative choice, constitu-
tions are now usually adopted by popular vote, and

1 The recent tendency to require educational or property test!
is an exception to this uniform advance.

CONCLUSION 343

the referendum has been introduced upon many
state and local issues.

Certain events in very recent times have been
interpreted, however, as indicative of a decline in
democratic faith. It is asserted that the rapid con-
centration of wealth is destroying the economic
basis on which democracy rests, and that the sub-
stance of power has passed or is passing from the
masses. The forms of power, it is said, cannot
long remain in conflict with the actual forces and
facts, and as the organization of industry has
become undemocratic, the organization of govern-
ment must soon follow in the same direction. It
is further urged that the United States has ac-
quired a vast domain lying outside of our geo-
graphical group, containing a population which
can never be admitted to equal fellowship in the
Union, but, if held at all, must be retained on terms
of political inequality. The conclusion drawn is
that the ideals of earher days have been forgotten,
and that the present tendency is away from demo-
cratic institutions.

Without attempting to discuss the future, for
that lies outside the scope of an historical study,
it may be said that down to the present time, at
least, the tendency of American political theory
and practice must be regarded as essentially demo-
cratic. There is little in either the industrial or
the colonial situation to indicate a departure
from the line of democratic progress. It is true

344 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

that the concentration of wealth is increasing at
a very rapid rate, and that the legal title to much
property is passing into the hands of a few. But
it must be remembered that under present condi-
tions, the increase of private possessions does not
necessarily signify that power is passing from the
hands of the people. On the contrary, in many
industries the greater the growth of individual or
corporate control, the nearer is that control to
becoming popular control. If, for example, a rail-
road combination should acquire all the railroad
systems of the United States, it is highly probable
that railroad operation would very soon become a
government function or, at least, the situation would
give rise to a very large measure of regulation by
the people. What seems like the climax of indi-
vidual or corporate control is likely to pass over
into governmental control or regulation. The idea
that property is an absolute and unassailable right
of the individual and that government exists chiefly
for the purpose of protecting this right, is no longer
accepted as in the earlier days. On the contrary,
the relation of property to the community is now
emphasized, and the right of the state to defend
its citizens against unfair competition is widely
recognized. It is evident, then, that the concen-
tration of wealth does not signify under present
conditions the destruction of democratic govern-
ment, but, on the contrary, is likely if continued
to call out a greater extension of democratic activ-

CONCLUSION 345

ity. In any event, the permanent crystallization
of enormous wealth in the hands of any class is
not likely to occur, since the transmission of
property from one generation to another is in the
hands of the people, and may readily be controlled
by the machinery of government if such a ten-
dency becomes threatening. Inheritance is gen-
erally regarded as a social function, and the
inheritance tax is a remedy which is capable of
indefinite extension. This instrument may do for
democracy what the law of entail did for the old
aristocracies. We conclude, therefore, that from
the industrial point of view there is little ground
for believing that the present drift is away from
democracy.

It is further urged, however, that the acquisition
of territory unfit for admission into the Union, and
without the consent of the population annexed, is an
indication of a defection from the principles of the
Fathers and the settled policy of the United States.
Reasoning from precedent, however, it appears
that the phrase "consent of the governed" was
never applied in the literal, or anything approx-
imating the literal, sense of the term. The
Puritans disregarded the Indians altogether, and
consulted the preferences of the church members,
who were the political people. The Fathers disre-
garded the negroes and consulted the freeholders,
to the exclusion of a large proportion of the male
adults. Likewise the Jeffersonian and the Jack-

346 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

sonian democracy ignored the blacks as a political
element, refusing them not only political but even
the most rudimentary civil rights. The emancipa-
tion of the slaves was brought about in the course
of a war that was fought in direct disregard of the
principle of the consent of the governed. The
eleven seceding states were simply held in the
Union by force of arms, without their consent, and
despite their most emphatic protest. From the
point of view of the South, they were a separate
people, and the war against them was one of con-
quest and subjugation.

Waiving the matter of precedent and considering
the question as one of principle, it is evident that
much depends on one's political theory. If we be-
lieve that government has no jurisdiction over men
unless they have consented to it, and that every
man is entitled to equal civil and political rights,
regardless of his fitness for them, then it follows
that to deprive any man of the suffrage for any
cause, or any people of self-government for any
cause, is a departure from democratic principles.
On this basis it would be concluded that within
the last four years democracy in the United States
had received a decided setback. If, on the other
hand, it is believed that liberty and rights are
necessarily conditioned upon political capacity,
and that the consent of the governed is a principle
which, in the present state of affairs, cannot be
perfectly realized, then the situation is altered.

CONCLUSION 347

From this point of view, the possession of full
political rights by every man is an ideal which
should, as far as possible, be realized. This was
the contemporary interpretation of the Fathers
who framed the Revolutionary state constitutions ;
this was the idea of Thomas Jefferson, of Calhoun,
and of Lincoln, and it is the view taken by the
overwhelming majority of modern political scien-
tists. This position, it is submitted, is the only
tenable one for modern democracy. Doubtless
this doctrine may be perverted to despotic uses,
but it is not so near despotism as is the opposite
doctrine to anarchy ; for the full application of the
doctrine of the consent of the governed and of the
absolute equality of all, in political as well as civil
rights at the present day, would be equivalent to
the dissolution of every political society now exist-
ing. Even with civilized peoples the democracy
of the present day must of necessity be imperfect ;
there must be in every community some exceptions
to the general law of political equality.

It appears, then, that whatever may be said of
the opportuneness of the new movement in time
or place, the charge that it is a departure from
democratic ideas has no basis in the principles of
political science. Democracy does not demand
that barbarians be admitted to equal political rights
with peoples long trained in the art of self-govern-
ment, nor, on the other hand, does it require that
democratic states leave the work of political civil"

348 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

ization to countries where constitutional liberty is
unknown, or to states possessing a less degree of
constitutional liberty than their own. It cannot
be an article of democratic faith that democratic
states must stand by and allow the despotic states
of the world to extend a despotic system over the
weaker nations of the earth.

Our conclusion is, then, that the charge that
democracy is on the decline in the United States
is not proven. There are certain tendencies,
which, if taken alone, might seem to point in such
a direction ; but when we consider as a whole the
numerous tendencies of which democracy is made
up, it is found that there are other and counter-
balancing influences, equally important and sig-
nificant. Hence, it cannot be said that the broad
tendency of American political life is away from
democracy.

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Jay, William. Miscellaneous Writings on Slavery. Bos-
ton, 1853.
Jefferson, Thomas. Works in 10 vols., edited by P. L.

Ford. New York, 1892-99. Also an edition in 9 vols.

by H. A. Washington. New York, 1861.
Summary View of the Rights of the Colonists. 1774.
Notes on Virginia. 1782.
Jordan, David Starr. Imperial Democracy. New York,

1899.
LlEBER, Francis. Political Ethics. Boston, 1838-39.
Legal and Political Hermeneutics. Boston, 1839.
Civil Liberty and Self-Government. Philadelphia, 1853.
Miscellaneous Writings, edited by D. C. Gilman. 2 vols.

Philadelphia, 1881.
Lincoln, Abraham. Works of, edited by Nicolay and Hay.

2 vols. New York, 1894.
Lowell, A. L. Essays on Government. Boston, 1892.
Madison, James. Works in 4 vols. Philadelphia, 1865.
Mansfield, E. D. The Political Grammar of the United

States. New York, 1834.
Mather, Cotton. Magnalia. London, 1703.

354 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Mather, Richard. Church Government and Church Cove-
nant Discussed. London, 1643.
Model of Church and Civil Power.

Moses, Bernard. Democracy and Social Growth in Amer-
ica. New York, 1898.

MuLFORD, Elisha. The Nation. New York, 1870.

Otis, James. A Vindication of the Conduct of the House
of Representatives. 1762.
The Rights of British Colonists Asserted and Proved.
1764.

Paine, Thomas. Works of, edited by Moncure D. Conway.
New York, 1894. Four volumes. Of especial impor-
tance are —
Common Sense. 1776.
The Forester's Letters. 1776.
The American Crisis. 1776-83.
The Rights of Man. 1792.

Parker, Joel. The Three Powers of Government. New
York, 1869.

Paulding,J. K. Slavery in the United States. New York, 1836.

Phillips, Wendell. Speeches, Letters, and Lectures.
2 vols. Boston, 1863-91.

PoMEROY, J. N. An Introduction to the Constitutional Law
of the United States. New York, 1868.

Hawle, William. A View of the Constitution of the
United States of America. Philadelphia, 1825.

Ross, E. A. Social Control. New York, 1901.

Ross, F. A. Slavery Ordained of God. Philadelphia, 1859.

Sage, Bernard J. (Centz, P. C.) The Republic of Repub-
lics, or American Federal Liberty. England, 1865.

Sawyer, G. S. Southern Institutes. Philadelphia, 1859.

Seabury, Samuel. American Slavery Justified. New York,
1861.

SIMMS, W. S. The Morals of Slavery. Charleston, 1837.

Smith, W. A. Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of
Slavery. Nashville, 1857.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 355

Stephens, A. H. A Constitutional View of the Late War
between the States. Philadelphia, 1867.
Savannah Speech of March 21, 1861, in Moore's Rebel-
lion Record, I., D, 44-48.

Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution. Boston,

1833-
Miscellaneous Writings, edited by W. W. Story. Bos-
ton, 1852.

Stringfellow, T. Scriptural and Statistical Views in
Favor of Slavery. Richmond, 1856. Fourth edition.

Taylor, F. M. The Right of the State to Be. Ann Arbor,
1891.

Taylor, John. An Enquiry into the Principles and Policy
of the Government of the United States. Fredericks-
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Construction Construed and the Constitution Vindicated,

1820.
Tyranny Unmasked. Washington, 1822.
New Views of the Constitution. Washington, 1823.

Thoreau, H. D. Civil Disobedience, 1849, i° ^ Yankee
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Thornton, J. W. The Pulpit of the American Revolution.
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TiEDEMANN, C. G. The Unwritten Constitution of the
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Tiffany, Joel. A Treatise on Government and Constitu-
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Tucker, H. St. George. Commentaries on Blackstone.
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Upshur, A. P . A Brief Inquiry into the True Nature and Char-
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Van Evrie, J. H. Negroes and Negro Slavery. New York,
1 861.

Walker, Francis A. Discussions on Economics and Sta-
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3S6 AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES

Ward, Lester F. Dynamic Sociology. New York, 1883.
Collective Telesis, in American Journal of Sociology,

Vol. II.
Wayland, Francis. The Elements of Moral Science.

New York, 1835.
Webster, Daniel. Works of, in 6 vols. Boston, 1851.
Williams, Roger. The Bloudy Tenant of Persecution for

Cause of Conscience. London, 1644.
The Bloudy Tenent yet More Bloudy. London, 1652.
WiLLouGHBV, W. W. The Nature of the State. New

York, 1896.
Social Justice. New York, 1900.
Wilson, James. Works, edited by J. D. Andrews. Chicago,

1896.
Wilson, Woodrow. The State. Boston, 1889.

An Old Master and Other Political Essays. Boston, 1893.
Winthrop, John. History of New England. 1630-49.
Wise, John. A Vindication of the Government of New

England Churches. Boston, 1772.
WooLSEY, Theodore D. Political Science. New York,

1877.

INDEX

Abolitionism: premises in tlieoiy
of, 207 ; typical platform of, 207 ;
attitude toward slaveholders, 209 ;
relation to no-government theory,
209; historical significance of,
216.

Adams, John : theory of, during the
Revolution, 43, 48, 52, 69; basis
of later theory, 124 ; criticism of
pure democracy, 125 uq.; doc-
trine of aristocracy, 130 siq.;
theory as to balance of powers,
136 seq.; comparison of, with
Samuel Adams, 135 ; fundamental
principle in creed of, 140; com-
parison of, with Jefferson, 162.

Adams, Samuel: on the right of
revolution, 56; on purpose of
the state, 62 ; on monarchy, 69 ;
comparison of, with John Adams,

135-

Anti-slavery : radical Abolitionist
theory, ao6; the philosophical
argument, 217 ; Lincoln's theory,
321 ; comparison with pro-slavery
theory, 248. Ste Abolitionism.

^stocracy: denunciation of, in
1776, 75 ; Adams's defence of, 130
seq.; principal features in aris-
tocracy, 131; recognition of, in
government, 132 ; hereditary no-
bility, 133; John and Samuel
Adams on, 135; Jefferson on
natural and artificial aristocracy,
155; decline of, during Jack-
sonian period, 184; Lincoln's
criticism of, 224 ; pro-slavery
theory of, 336.

Balance of powers : Paine's oppo-
sition to, 73 ; doctrine of, in 1776,
79; development of, in Revolu-
tionary state constitutions, 80;
Federalist's doctrine of, 107;
John Adams's theory of, 136 ; re-
adjustment of, during Jacksonian
epoch, 184 ; criticism of tripartite
division by Goodnow, 323.

Bledsoe, A. T. : on nature of lib-
erty, 23s.

Boucher, J. : on consent of the gov-
erned, 64; on equality, 65; in-
dorsement of divine-right theory
by, 65 ; on absoluteness of gov-
ernment, 66 ; opposition to right
of revolution, 67.

Brownson, O. A.: on constitution
of state and of government, 292 ■
on location of sovereignty in the
United States, 295.

Burgess, J. W.: theory of, as to
national state, 299 ; theory of sov-
ereignty, 300 ; criticism of doctrine
of federal state, 300 ; criticism of
theory as to state of nature, 308 ;
criticism of theory of natural
rights, 310; concept of liberty,
313; theory of relation of Teu-
tonic races to political civiliza-
tion, 313 ; doctrine as to function
of the state, 317 ; distinction be-
tween state and government, 335;
application of distinction to prob-
lem of sovereignty, 336.

Calhoun, J. C. : defence of legisla-
tive power, 181; repudiation of

3S7

358

INDEX

natural-right theory, 232; doc-
trine as to nature of hberty, 234;
on relation between superior and
inferior races, 239; criticism of
theory held by the Fathers, 268;
on government as a social neces-
sity, 269; on the function of a
constitution, 270; on responsi-
bility of government, 270; doc-
trine as to despotism of the
majority, 271; on difficulty of
restraining majority, 272; theory
of "concurrent majority," 273;
advantages urged for " concur-
rent majority," 274 ; objections
against answered, 275; constitu-
tional doctrine of nullification,
276; doctrine of secession, 278
seq. ; on the indivisibility of sov-
ereignty, 279 ; on original sover-
eignty of states ; on relation
between central and state gov-
ernments, 280 ; on distinction
between government of United
States and a league, 281 ; com-
parison of, with W^ebster, 287.

Centz, P. C. : see Sage.

Channing, W. E.: anti-slavery
theory of, 218 seg.; on man as
a person, 218; on the rights of
personality, 219 ; on slavery as
subversive of personal rights, 219 ;
on slavery and democracy, 220.

Chase, S. P. : theory of a free con-
stitution, 212.

Church and State: Puritan theory
of relation between, 5, 7; Revo-
lutionary attitude toward, 86 ;
removal of religious restrictions
during Jacksonian epoch, 193;
disestablishment of churches, 194 ;
Jefferson's theory as to church
establishments, 195 ; Madison's
theory on, 195.

Clay, Henry: criticism of Jack-
son's use of prerogative, 180.

Commons, John R. : sociological
discussion of sovereignty by,

330-

Connecticut, Fundamental Orders
of, 17.

Contract : formation of contracts
by Puritans, 16; Puritan theory
of, 18 ; T. Hooker on, 20 ; theory
of, in 1776, 50 ; Jefferson on
necessity of preserving principle
of, 148 ; reactionary tendency
regarding, 200 ; repudiation of
social contract by Cooper, 231 ;
by Calhoun, 232; application of
theory of contract to nature of
Union by Madison, 263 ; by
Jackson, 264; by Tucker, 266;
Webster's application of contract
idea to genesis of Union, 284;
Story's doctrine as to, 285;
Lieber's criticism of social-con-
tract theory, 307 ; Burgess's
repudiation of doctrine of,
308.

Cooper, T. : criticism of natural-
right theory, 231.

Cotton, J.: on the nature of the
church, 8 ; on relation of church
to state, 10; on freedom of con-
science, 13; on democracy, 15,

Davis, Jefferson : on nature of the
Union, 283.

Declaration of Independence: con-
temporary interpretation of, 88;
Jefferson's originality in framing,
146 ; Lincoln's interpretation of,
222 ; Calhoun's interpretation of,
229.

Democracy : elements of, among
Puritans, 16, 27; evidences of,
among colonists, 32 ; Patriot
theory of, 47 seq.; application of
theory in formation of govern-
ments, 76; distrust of, in Consti-
tutional Convention, 99; reaction

INDEX

359

against, evident in Federalist, 103 ;
J. Adams's criticisms on, 125 seq. ;
Jeifersonian democracy, \iflseq,;
Jacksonian democracy, 176 seq. ;
anti-slavery theory of effect of
slavery on, 220 ; pro-slavery
theory as to effect of slavery on,
239; recent studies in, 327 ; sum-
mary of democratic development,
342 ; whether the United States is
drifting away from, 343,

Dickinson, John : on natural rights,
48 ; on taxation and representa-
tion, 52 ; on right of revolution,
56.

Divine right : Boucher's theory of,

6S.

Eliot, C. W. : on American con-
tribution to civilization, 328.

Eliot, John : on Scriptural basis for
Puritan system, 3.

English political ideas : influence
of, on Fathers, 47, 89 ; on Ameri-
can theory in general, 337.

Equality : Puritan theory of, 25 ;
Revolutionary theory of, 47;
Boucher's criticism of, 65; Ad-
ams's denial of abstract love of,
127; Abolitionist theory as to,
207 : relation of, to personality,
218; pro-slavery doctrine re-
specting, 230, 248; comparison
between pro- and anti-slavery
theories as to, 248; Burgess's
theory of political inequality of
races, 314.

Executive: conflict between colo-
nial assembly and, 34; subordi-
nate position taken in Revolu-
tionary state governments, 80;
Federalist theory regarding need
of energy in, 113; Adams's doc-
trine as to place of, 138 ; revival
of executive during Jacksonian
epoch, 182 seq.

Federalist, The: historical basis
for theories of, ioi, 119: doc-
trine as to relation betweet
democracy and size of state, 104 ;
definition of a republic, 106;
theory of separation of govern-
mental powers, 107 ; doctrine as
to legislative power, no; theory
of bicameral legislature, in ; on
basis of representation in legis-
lature, 112; .on size of legisla-
ture, 112; theory as to energetic
executive, 113; theory as to
judiciary, iij ; on relation be-
tween liberty and authority, 116;
on bills of rights, 117; on true
guarantee of liberty, 119; de-
scription of federal Union by,
254; explanation of mixed char-
acter of Union, 254 ; doctrine of
divisibility of sovereignty, 255.

Fisher, S. G. : quoted, 291.

Fitz-Hugh, George : on substitu-
tion of religious truths for politi-
cal theory, 243 ; on undesirability
of liberty, 244; on slavery as
best basis for society, 244; on
slavery and socialism, 245.

French political theory: influence
on Jefferson overestimated, 91,
167; influence of Montesquieu,
91 ; general influence on Ameri-
can political ideas, 337.

Garrison, W. L. : on " gradualism,"
208 ; no-government doctrine of,
209; theory of emancipation, 215,

German political theory : influence
on new school of political science
in United States, 306 ; nature of
influence, 338.

Giddings, F. H. : restatement of
natural-rights theory by, 310; on
relation of democracy to colonial
government, 328.

Godkin, E. L. : on democracy, 338.

36o

INDEX

Goodnow, F. J.: theory of dual
division of governmental powers,
333; theory of administration,
323 ; on place of political
parties in governmental system,

324-
Government : distinction between
state and, 324 seq.; Lieber on,
325 ; Burgess on, 325 ; Wilson
on, 327; Willoughby on, 327;
function of government during
Revolutionary period, 61; Lie-
ber's doctrine as to function of
government, 315; Woolsey on,
316; Wilson on, 317; Burgess
on, 317; WiUoughby on, 319;
attitude of economists toward,
319 ; comparison of early with
later theory of governmental
functions, 321 ; Ross on limits
of state interference, 331.

Hamilton, A. : on natural rights,
48; doctrines developed in
Federalist, 103 ieq.

Hammond, J. H. : quoted, 238.

Hereditary succession : Paine's op-
position to, 71; Revolutionary
state constitutions on, 75; John
Adams not averse to, 133.

Hooker, Thos. : theory of contract
as basis of religious and political
society, 20.

Hopkins, Stephen : on rights of En-
glishmen, 44; on taxation and
representation, 53.

Hosmer, W. : on liberty, 208.

Hurd, J, C. : on sovereignty as a
matter of fact, 292; on sover-
eignty of " states united," 295.

Individualism : in political theory
of Revolution, 95; in Abolitionist
theory, 315 ; in philosophical ar-
gument against slavery, 217 ; re-
cent change in attitude toward,

315 seq.; summary of these
changes, 321.
Inequality : as a basis for democ-
racy, 340. See Equality.

Jackson, Andrew: significance of
election and administration of,
178, 182; development of execu-
tive power by, 178 ; his theory of
rotation in ofiSce, 185 ; theory as
to nature of the Union, 264.

Jameson, J. A. : on different types
of constitutions, 291 ; on location
of sovereignty in United States,
393 ; on sovereignty of nation,
394.

Jefferson, Thos. : general consider-
ations respecting, 143 ; Declara-
tion of Independence and, 146;
on natural rights, 147; on the
consent of the governed, 148 ; on
principle of consent as main-
tained by revolution, 149; on
principle of consent as main-
tained by periodical revision of
constitution, 150 ; on exact period
for revision, 151; theory as to
monarchy, 153 ; theory as to aris-
tocracy, 155; on natural and
artificial aristocracy, 153; on
democracy, 157 seq.; definition of
republic by, 157; democratic
program of, 158; on educa-
tion and democracy, 159; on
local government and democ-
racy, 159; on subordination of
military to civil authorities, 160 ;
essential principle in democratic
theory of, 163; comparison with
J. Adams, 164; application of
democratic principles by, 164;
on agricultural population as
basis for democracy, 166;
sources of theory of, 167 ; rank
of, as political theorist, 171 ; sig-
nificance of career of, 171 ; aris-

INDEX

361

tocratic elements in democracy
of, 174; on relation between
church and state, 195.
Judiciary: position accorded in
Revolutionary state constitutions,
80 ; theory of Federalist respect-
ing, 115; democratization of, 197.

Kent, Chancellor: argument of,
against universal suffrage, 189.

Legislature, conflict of, with colo-
nial governors, 34 ; predominant
position given in Revolutionary
state constitutions, 81; Federal-
iit doctrine respecting, no;
Adams's theory of, 138 ; defence
of, against executive by Webster,
179 > I'y Clay, 180 ; by Calhoun,
181 ; loss of power during Jack-
sonian epoch, 179 seq.

Liberty: Puritan theory of, 23;
Revolutionary doctrine as to, 49
seq. ; constitutional measures de-
vised by Fathers to secure, 76;
Federalist theory as to guaranty
of, 119; anti-slavery doctrine re-
specting nature of, 206, 218, 222,
226; pro-slavery idea of, 234, 235;
comparison of pro- and anti-
slavery theories respecting, 235,
248 ; modem conception of, 312 ;
Burgess's doctrine of, 312.

Lieber, Francis : on difference be-
tween "nation" and "people,"
296; influence of, on American
political theory, 305 ; criticism of
state of nature by, 307 ; doctrine
of, as to natural rights, 308 ; dis-
tinction drawn by, between Galil-
ean and Anglican liberty, 309.

Lincoln, A. ; anti-slavery theory of,
221 seq.; interpretation of Dec-
laration of Independence, 222;
on Declaration of Independence
as an ideal, 323; on negro rights.

223; on danger in pro-slavery
theory, 224 ; on capitalistic theory
of society, 224; theory as to place
of laboring class, 225 ; on pres-
ervation of the Union, 291.

Locke, John : influence of, on
American Revolution, 89; con-
trast with Jefferson, 170.

Lowell, A. L. : on democracy and
the constitution, 329.

Madison, James: quoted in dis-
cussions of Federalist, 103 seq. ;
theory of separation of church
and state, 195; doctrine of di-
visibility of sovereignty, 259 ; on
Union as a binding compact,
263.

Majority, rule of: Jefferson on, 158 ;
tyranny of, denounced by Cal-
houn, 271 ; theory of " concur-
rent" majority proposed by
Calhoun, 273.

McDuffie, Gov.: on slavery, 238,

239-

Monarchy: opinion of, before
Revolution, 69; Paine's theory
of, 70; elimination of, from
American political system, 75;
Adams's theory as to function
of, 138 ; Jefferson's criticisms
on, 153.

Moses, B. J. : on democracy and
social growth, 328.

Mulford, E. : on "historical" and
" enacted" constitutions, 292 ; on
sovereignty in United States, 294.

Nationalism : Webster's argument
concerning, 284 seq.; later de-
velopment of theory of, 289 seq.;
summary of American theory
regarding, 302. See Union, Se-
cession, Nullification.

Nature, state of: Revolutionary
theory regarding, 47: theory o(

362

INDEX

repudiated by Cooper, 231 ; by
Calhoun, 232; by recent think-
ers, 307 seq.

Negro : see Slavery, Anti-slavery,
Abolition.

Non-resistance ; Quaker practice
of, 30 ; Garrison's theory of, 209;
practical program of, 211; Tho-
reau's discussion of, 213.

Nullification: Calhoun's theory of,
268 seq.; philosophical prole-
gomena to, 268 ; despotism of
majority, 271 ; doctrine of " con-
current majority," 273; advan-
tages of, 274 ; objections answered,
275 ; constitutional form of doc-
trine, 276.

Paine, Thos. : theory of social con-
tract, 50 ; opinion of, as to mon-
archy, 70 ; on hereditary succes-
sion, 71 ; on folly of checks and
balances, 73; Jefferson's opinion
of, 170.

Parties, place of, in American po-
litical system, 323.

Penn, William : theory of govern-
ment, 29; on democratic spirit
in America, 33.

People : Puritan political people, 5 ;
political people in 1776, 87 ;
" people " in Jefferson's day,
175 ; expansion of concept of,
during Jacksonian period, 187;
obscurity of term in 1789, 257 ;
Calhoun's interpretation of
"people of the United States,"
267 seq. ; Webster's interpreta-
tion, 284 seq.; sovereignty of, see
Sovereignty.

Property : protection of, as purpose
of government, 62; as qualifica-
tion for suffrage, 84 ; as qualifica-
tion for office, 85; abandonment
of, as qualification for suffrage
and office, 193.

Puritans, The : basis of system oi
2; theocratic elements in, 5;
theory of, concerning relation
between church and state, 7 ;
democratic elements in, 16, 27;
contracts made by, in formation
of church and state, 17 ; idea of,
regarding liberty, 23; theory of
equality held by, 25.

Quakers : political ideas of, 27.

Revolution, right of: Mayhew on,
55; S.Adams on, 56; Dickinson
on, 56; state constitutions on, 58 ;
Jefferson's indorsement of, 149;
claimed for states, 266.

Revolution, period of: historical
considerations respecting, 38;
constitutional theory of patriots
during, 42; doctrine of natural
rights, 47; theory of social con-
tract, 49 ; theory of popular sov-
ereignty, 53; theory of right of
revolution, 55 ; theory as to pur-
pose of government, 60; Loyal-
ist theory, 63 ; idea of monarchy
and aristocracy, 70; doctrine of
delegated powers, 76; of weak
government, 77; of separation of
powers, 79; as to short terms of
office, 82 ; qualifications for suf-
frage during, 84; qualifications
for office during, 85 ; relation
between church and state, 86;
source of ideas of, 88.

Rights, civil: demanded for negro,
223 ; pro-slavery theory regard-
ing, 237.

Rights, natural : theory of, in 1776,
47 ; Jefferson on, 147 ; based on
human personality, 218; repudi-
ated by Cooper, 232 ; repudiated
by Calhoun, 232; interpretations
of, to justify slavery, 233 seq, ;
Lieber's theory of^ 309 ; Burgess's

INDEX

363

criticism of, 310; Willoughby's
criticism of, 310.

Rives, W. C. : on division of
sovereignty in United Slates,
261.

Ross, E. A. . study of social con-
trol, 330 ; on grounds of control,
330; on means of control, 330;
on limits of control, 331.

Rotation in office : doctrine of, in
1776, 82: Jackson's theory con-
cerning, 185 ; Taylor on, 186.

Sage, B. J. : on nature of the

Union, 283.
Sawyer, G. S. : quoted on slavery,

237-

Secession : Tucker's theory of, 266 ;
Calhoun's doctrine of, 278 seq. ;
Madison's opinion regarding,
263; Jackson's attitude toward,
264; Webster's idea of, 284;
recent theory respecting, 289.
See Calhoun.

Seward, W. H. : doctrine of
" higher law," 212.

Slavery : theory of radical Aboli-
tionists regarding, 205; philo-
sophic argument against, 217;
Lincoln's attack on, 221 ; basis
of pro-slavery argument, 227;
inequality as necessitating, 229;
natural rights and, 231; theory
of liberty in relation to, 234 ; as
natural relation between superior
and inferior races, 236; relation
of democracy to, 239 ; ultra-
conservative defence of, 243;
comparison between pro- and
anti-slavery theories, 248.

Socialism : Fitz-Hugh on relation
between slavery and, 244; atti-
tude of recent theorists toward
individualism, 315 «?•

Sovereignty: of people in 1776,
S3; Federalist doctrine as to

divisibility of, 255; doctrine of
U. S. courts as to divisibility of,
258 ; Madison's theory as to
division of, 259; Rives's state-
ment as to division of, 261 ; Cal-
houn's theory of indivisibility of,
279; Calhoun on location of
sovereignty in U. S., 279; Cal-
houn's distinction between sov-
ereignty and its attributes, 280;
Webster's doctrine regarding lo-
cation of sovereignty in U. S.,
284; location of sovereignty by
later Nationalists, 293; doctrine
of sovereignty of nation, 294;
doctrine of sovereignty of " states
united," 295; Nationalist theory
of indivisibility of sovereignty,
298; Burgess's theory as to, 300;
application of Burgess's theory to
federal state, 300; relation of
distinction between state and
government to sovereignty, 326;
sociological discussion of sov-
ereignty, 330.

State : see Government, Social
Contract, Natural Rights.

Stephens, A. H. : on slavery as
proper basis for a republic, 239 ;
on nature of Union, 283.

Story, Joseph : on contract theory,
201 ; on double signification of
sovereignty, 262; on Constitu-
tion as a law, 285.

Suffrage : theory and practice of,
in 1776, 84; expansion of, dur-
ing Jacksonian period, 187
seq. ; defence of property qualifi-
cation, r88; plea for universal
suf&age, 191.

Taylor, John: on aristocracy, 144;
on rotation in office, 186.

Taxation: in relation to repre-
sentation, 42 ; constitutional
phase of taxation without repre-

3^4

INDEX

sentation, 42 ; political phase of,

SI-

Thoreau, H. D. : opinion of gov-
ernment, 213 , individualistic ten-
dencies of, 214; theory of free
government, 215.

Tories : typical theory of, 63. See
Boucher.

Tracy, Destutt de : works of, rec-
ommended by Jefferson, 168.

Tucker, H. St. George: applica-
tion of social-contract theory to
nature of Union, 266.

Union, nature of: theory respect-
ing, in 1789, 253 ; Madison's doc-
trine of, 259 ; Jackson's theory of,
264 ; Tucker's social-contract
theory of, 266; Calhoun's doc-
trine of nullification, 268; Cal-
houn's doctrine of secession, 278 ;
Webster's nationalist theory, 284 ;
later nationalist theory, 289 ; Bur-
gess's doctrine of, 299 ; summary
of theories regarding, 302.

Van Zandt, case of: doctrine of
Chase in, 212.

Walker, F. A. : on tendency away
from extreme individualism, 320.

Ward, L. F. : doctrine of socioc-
racy, 329.

Wayland, Francis : anti-slavery
theory of, 218 seq.; on man as
a person, 218; on rights of per-
sonality, 219 ; on slavery as sub-
versive of personal rights, 219;
on slavery and democracy, 220.

Webster, Daniel : theory of legis-
lative power as guardian of lib-
erty, 179; theory as to nature of
the Union, 285 ; on constitution
as a law, 284 ; as representative
of national spirit, 287 ; compar-
ison of, with Calhoun, 287.

Williams, Roger : on nature of the
church, 7; on relation between
church and state, 9.

Willoughby, W. W. : criticism of
natural rights by, 310; doctrine
as to function of government, 319 ;
on composite state, 301.

Wilson, Woodrow : on function of
government, 317.

Woolsey, T. D. : on function of
government, 316.

Printed in the United States of America.